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Abstract
This thesis analyses the performance of the Saudi Arabian press during the Gulf Conflict of
1990-1991. It seeks (1) to present the opinions of Saudi media academics and journalists
regarding the performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict; (2) to analyse the
content of the Saudi press in terms of the number of stories/ issues dealing with the Gulf
conflict, the theme of these stories; the characteristics of the Saudi press and the agenda -
setting capacity of the Saudi press before, during and after the liberation of Kuwait; (3) to
look at Saudi journalists' actual perceptions of the ideal function of the press in time of
war, and their views and level of satisfaction with the Saudi press's actual performance in
its coverage of the Gulf conflict; and (4) to find out what factors influenced the Saudi
press in its reporting of the conflict. An attempt is also made to examine the applicability
of various media theories to the Saudi press.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with media academics in all Saudi universities
and with journalists in the Saudi press organisations. Content analysis of the Saudi press
during the Gulf conflict was carried out, using a constructed week approach, for the
periods before, during and after the liberation of Kuwait. Confidence interval and Chi-
square analysis formulae were used in order to test the research hypotheses. A survey
questionnaire was administered to journalists regarding ideal press functions in time of war
and the actual performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict
The interviews with Saudi media academics and journalists revealed that the Saudi press
role was largely reactive in nature, including little comment or analysis. This was because
of the lack of information and political awareness in Saudi society as a whole, including
amongst journalists. Even after the liberation of Kuwait, little changed in the Saudi press
function, due to inadequate planning, lack of sufficiently trained and skilled journalists, and
the continued constraints imposed by the press' relationship with the Saudi information
policy.
The manifest content of the Saudi press revealed that it depended in its coverage of the
Gulf conflict on foreign news sources such as Reuters, AFP, AP, UPI, and paid greater
iv
attention to news stories originating outside Saudi Arabia such as from the USA, Western
Europe, Asia and other Middle Eastern countries, and relied more on foreign personnel,
specifically foreign government officials. Regarding the press agenda, political and
military/defence movement news was regarded as most 'newsworthy' followed by crime,
law and justice, economic and religious news relating to the Gulf conflict. The majority of
news tended to be positive in tone and to support the UN resolutions in relation to the
Iraqi regime. The leading articles, similarly were anti-Iraqi, and also attacked Iraq's allies
such as Jordan, Sudan and Yemen.
The survey findings confirmed those of the interviews and content analysis, that the Saudi
press depended on foreign sources in their conflict coverage. Those surveyed felt that the
press had not fulfilled its ideal role because it was not informative enough, gave too little
coverage and was not always trustworthy. The survey participants also felt that the Saudi
press regulation should come from the press itselt rather than be imposed by an external
body.
It is concluded that no single theory is sufficient to explain the performance of Saudi press
during the Gulf conflict. The authoritarian model was only partially upheld; in other
respects the press functioned more in line with the loyalty theory.
The findings indicated the importance of developing the Saudi press in terms of
management and journalistic skills. Recommendations and suggestions are presented, both
for the Saudi government, represented by Ministry of Information, and for Saudi press
organisations, to improve and develop their functions into the next millennium.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background to the Study
Usually, conflict between countries is caused by economic factors, imperialism, pursuit of
vital interests or aspirations, territorial disputes, or disputes over resources including water
(Anderson, 1996: 203-6). The causes of the 1990-1991 Gulf War, however appear to go
beyond these. Several major factors caused the war. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to
more than thirty countries, led by the USA, gathering in Saudi Arabia to liberate Kuwait.
The Iraqi regime commanded by Saddam Hussein desired to control the Arab world. LTG
HRH Mete'b ibn Abdullah, the Deputy Chief of the Military of the Saudi National Guard
and the Commander of King Khalid Military Academy, confirmed that "the invasion by
Iraq to Kuwait was partly a logical proof of the motives and behaviour of the Iraqis and
that the aim of the Iraqi party (the Ba'th Party) since its coming to power was to dominate
the Arab nation under the slogan of a single socialist Arab state" (1990: 1). The Iraqi
regime was in the final stage of producing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction. Saddam is known to have used chemical weapons against Iran, and against
the Kurds in Iraq, and was not trusted by the West 07 certain of the Gulf states; Iraq was
seen as a serious threat to their interests. In his 1991 testimony before the US Senate,
Milhollin, a director of the Wisconsin project on nuclear arms control, confirmed:
President Bush and his top military advisers have said that Iraq might
produce a nuclear weapon within six months to a year. . . He [Bush]
told US troops in Saudi Arabia on Thanksgiving that 'Every day that
passes brings Saddam Hussein one step closer to realising his goal of a
nuclear weapons arsenal and that is another reason, frankly, why our
mission is marked by a real sense of urgency' (1991: 243).
Brockmann argues that there was "far more than merely oil involved in the war, that the
competing trusts and cartels were fighting over everything from domination of the
weapons industry to domination of the entertainment industry" (1992: 165).
2In the early stages, the Saudi government had attempted to mediate to settle the
differences between Iraq and Kuwait. A meeting was held on Tuesday, 1st August, 1990 in
Jeddah, at which Crown Prince, Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz Al-Saud mediated between
Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti Prince and Prime Minister Izzat Ibrahim,
the representative of the Iraqi regime. The mediation failed, and the next day Iraqi forces
spread all over Kuwait. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait "began at 01.00 exactly on 2 August
1990. It eventually involved some 140,000 Iraqi troops and 1,811 tanks but was initially
spearheaded by two Republican Guard armoured divisions- the Hammurabi and the
Medina" (Freedman & Karsh, 1994: 67). The Iraqi invasion and occupation was
condemned by the UN, the Council of the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic
Conference, Islamic Foreign Ministers in their 19th conference in Cairo, the European
Community, the USA, EC Ministerial Council, and almost all the countries of the world.
Subsequently, the custodian of the two Holy Mosques, King Fand ibn Abdul Aziz Al-
Saud, on behalf of the Saudi government, announced that "Iraq had massed a big force
near the Kingdom's border" and welcomed "the participation of the brotherly Arab and
friendly forces such as Egypt, Syria, UK, USA and other countries" (Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, 1991: 12-34). The King's speech was a significant turning point in the situation in
the Gulf region. It had been a difficult decision to allow foreign troops into the Islamic
region, but the Saudi Ulama (religious scholars) had legitimised the move by giving it their
support.
The Gulf conflict was unique in that it, " . . under the aegis of the United Nations,
brought together an extraordinary coalition of forces from the Christian and Muslim,
capitalist and Marxist worlds" (Schott, 1994: 102). Initially, the coalition employed
economic sanctions, in accordance with UN resolutions l . By January 1991, however, the
situation had escalated to a full-scale war.
The 42 days of the Gulf war consisted of three phases of air attacks. Lasting 38 days in
total, followed by a four-day ground war, after which a cease-fire was declared by US
For more details of the UN resolutions until Kuwait liberation, their dates and themes in relation
to the Gulf conflict, see Appendix A.
3President Bush. The allied coalition overran Kuwait and southern Iraq, killing thousands
of Iraqis, destroying the Iraqi army and sending Saddam's Republican Guard into retreat.
Peace terms were dictated by the coalition, and Kuwait was freed from the Iraqi
occupation.
The aim of the coalition was for "clear objectives: a rapid war enabling little time for public
protest to emerge; specific goals and war aims: no body bag counting and preferably,
therefore, authority to control and restrict the media's involvement" (Taylor, 1992: 3).
This assertion raises the question of the performance of the press, particularly the Saudi
Arabian press,2 in the conflict. The Saudi Arabian press coverage aimed to win over local
and international public opinion and justify the Saudi government's decision and the United
Nations' policies and resolutions (i.e. that Iraq should withdraw immediately and
unconditionally from Kuwait) and the actions taken to restore international peace and
security in the area.
The 1990-1991 Gulf conflict and war between the Coalition (including Saudi Arabia) and
Iraq prompted close co-operation between the press and the government in Saudi Arabia.
The Saudi press, in these circumstances, was expected to adhere to the official State
ideology, which is based on the Holy Quran (the sacred scripture of Islam) and the
Shariah (Islamic Law), implemented according to one of the accepted trends of law in
Islam, the Hanbali school of thought (Al-Farsy, 1986: 76). The Quran itself is considered
the constitution of the country and provides ethical values and guidance but it is
implemented via the state's Judicial, Executive and Organisational authorities, all of which
are headed by the King. In these circumstances, the government's involvement was seen
as central to the conflict. Its policy, information and decisions, and communication
technology, particularly the press, was used as an instrument to convince the public of the
rightness of the Saudi policy. First, it succeeded in controlling effectively the flow of
Saudi local news and information'. Saudi journalists, in their coverage of the conflict,
2 By the Saudi Arabian Press is meant the Saudi Arabian National Daily Newspapers.
3 News, here, is defined as" 1) a report of a recent event, intelligence; information ... 2) the
presentation of a report on current events in a newspaper or other periodical or on radio or
television" (Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, Gramercy
Books, New York/Avent, New Jersey, 1989: 963.
4relied on the Saudi Press Agency [SPA]. Shortly before Operation Desert Storm began,
their access to the war zone was limited. Moreover, their reports were sent to the Joint
Information Bureau [JIB] along with stories or news from briefings based on the command
centres at Riyadh and Dhahran, or sometimes from daily briefings by the Saudi military.
News obtained from the paper's own correspondents had to be approved by the paper's
principal "gatekeeper", usually the Editor-in-Chief.
1.2 The Research Thesis
As this suggests, a high degree of government control was exercised over the supply of
news and information to the Saudi Arabian press during the Gulf conflict. To begin with,
the press remained silent, putting no pressure on state authorities regarding their handling
of the conflict and refraining from criticism of other governments. After Iraq invaded and
occupied Kuwait, the Saudi press and broadcasters had to get permission from the
government to report the event, even though the event was hardly 'top secret'. The
government wanted to be seen as central to the social structure and the press was to act as
a gatekeeper of what Saudis should think about.
It is might be assumed, then, that the function of the Saudi press system was in line with
the authoritarian press model, whereby the press is "a servant of the state and responsible
for much of its content to the power figures in charge of government at any given
moment" (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1963: 3). More details of this model will be
given in Chapter 2.
If this model is, indeed, applicable to the Saudi press, then the following hypotheses would
be expected to hold true:
I a. Political and military/defence developments in the Gulf conflict would be more
newsworthy than any other Gulf conflict news topics.
b. For political and military developments in the Gulf conflict, the type of news
would largely be domestic, rather than international and/or foreign.
5c. For political and military developments in the Gulf conflict, the tone of the
news would generally be positive rather than negative.
H. Within the Saudi press, individual newspapers would give similar levels of
coverage to various themes which the news items presented.
DI. Saudi press coverage would rely more heavily in respect of Gulf conflict news
on Saudi government officials than on other personnel.
IV. The Saudi press would pay more attention to Gulf conflict news stories
originating in the Saudi region, rather than those originating from other
geographical locations.
V. The Saudi press would depend heavily for their news presentations during the
Gulf conflict on domestic sources, namely their own staff the Saudi Press
Agency (SPA) and Saudi government officials, rather than on other sources.
VI. The tone of the leading articles of the Saudi press would be more positive than
negative.
In fact, it may be doubted whether the Saudi Arabian press acted completely in accord
with this model. It is therefore suggested that the authoritarian press model alone is too
simplistic to describe the role played by the Saudi press. This is because information flow
is affected by the three variables. These are: 1) hierarchy of nations; 2) cultural affinities
and economic associations, and; 3) news and information conflicts (Hester, 1973: 242-3).
The Saudi press, when tackling the Gulf conflict events, was directly affected by these
variables. First, regarding national hierarchies of power, it must be recognised that in
countries such as the USA and Western Europe there are powerful interest groups able to
exert considerable influence in dealing with other nations, small or big. According to
Iyengar & Kinder, they are commercial centres:
major trade posts in the colonial territories and the major capitals of the
western Europe and north America [which] have always housed the
majority of media and agency correspondents. It is the regular
production of routine news from such news capitals, rather than the
occasional production of news from 'news provinces', which draws the
boundaries and shapes the contours of the news atlas (1987: 153-4).
6News from the USA and Western Europe, in particular, dominated coverage of the Gulf
conflict It had always been as Vandijk noted, that "the United States, the most powerfid
country in the world both militarily and economically, got most attention in the wires of
the agencies, two of which are American [AP and UPI]" (1988: 42). Although UPI was in
decline by the early 1990s, another major American player had by then also entered the
scene, namely CNN.
News coverage was also influenced by cultural affinities and economic associations
between nations, for example between Saudi Arabia and Egypt or other Islamic countries
such as Pakistan where religions, language, and certain aspects of lifestyles are the same or
similar, encouraging news flow between these nations.
Another factor concerned the availability of news and information about the Gulf conflict.
There is no doubt that with so many counties involved in the conflict, whether they
supported or opposed the Iraqi aggression, the movement of news among nations would
both shape and reflect thinking about the nature of the conflict. Since Saudi journalists
were surrounded by the journalistic expertise and technology of CNN, the BBC and other
international media, they would have no option but to ensure that they played their own
part in the information flow.
In addition, other indirect variables, such as local journalists' lack of skills and experience,
communication facilities and the influence of government (information) policy'', created
further difficulties for the Saudi press.
In this context, it is suggested that the Saudi press would depend more in its coverage and
structuring of news more on external sources, namely Reuters, AFP, AP, and UPI sources
rather than on domestic sources, such as their own staff and SPA. This could be because
of the difficulty of getting government respondents, whether due to the lack of confidence
between the authorities and journalists or because of the government system. If this was
the case, it is logical to suppose that the Saudi press would pay no more attention to Gulf
4 See Appendix B, the Saudi Arabian Information Policy.
7conflict news stories originating in the SA region than those originating from other
geographical locations such as the UK and USA. Moreover, it would rely more heavily
for Gulf conflict news on personnel other than SA government officials. As a result,
political and military/defence developments would be regarded as more newsworthy than
other Gulf news topics, and the type of news would largely be international and/or foreign
rather than domestic. The occurrence of various themes would vary from one newspaper
to another, but coverage would tend to be positive in tone and to favour the Saudi
government and UN resolutions in relation to Iraq.
The leading articles of the Saudi press, which reflect editorial opinion and analysis
separately, would focus predominantly on Saudi Arabia, the Arab World, the Allied
Coalition, Iraq, anti-UN resolutions and economic and military issues, and those related to
the conflict The items on these themes would be more positive than negative in tone,
largely directed at Iraqi government officials and increasingly positive after the liberation
of Kuwait. So, journalists would have difficulty in dealing with the conflict objectively and
independently and in maintaining a balance in carrying the news.
Thus, it is of interest to explore the performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf
conflict, in the light of authoritarian press theory and other prevailing theories of press
functions. This will enable us to assess the extent to which any such theory or combination
of theories was applicable and to advance understanding, not only of the Saudi press role
itself but also of press-production more generally.
1.3 Aims of the Study
The aims of this study are: 1) To investigate qualitatively the opinions of Saudi media
academics and joumalists5 regarding the performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf
conflict; 2) To analyse the content of the Saudi press in terms of the number of stories/
5 For the aim of this study, the definition used by Mukherjee of journalists is used: "a 'journalist' is
(a) a person who, on a regular or on a temporary basis, creates media news coverage, i.e., a
correspondent, a photographer, a cameraperson, or a media technician, whose job consists of
working with words, images, or sound destined for the printed press, radio, film, or television; or
(b) a person whose regular occupation is the professional assistance of persons belonging to
category (a) above" (Alleyne, 1997: 112).
8issues dealing with the Gulf conflict, the theme of these stories, the characteristics of these
newspapers, and the agenda-setting capacity of the Saudi press before, during and after the
liberation of Kuwait; 3) To survey quantitatively Saudi journalists' perceptions of their
function in time of war, and their level of satisfaction with the Saudi press's performance
in its coverage of the Gulf conflict; and 4) To find out what factors influenced the
performance of the Saudi press when reporting the conflict for example, whether religious,
political or military restrictions were imposed on the press coverage of the conflict.
These aims can be translated into specific research questions:
Q.1.	 What are the Saudi media academics and journalists' opinions toward the
performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict of 1990 - 1991?
Q.2 a. Which main news topics were carried by the Saudi press, and why?
b. What type of news (domestic, international or foreign) was carried by the
Saudi press, and why?
c. What was the tone of the main news topics carried by the Saudi press, and
why?
Q.3. What was the main theme of news items chosen, and their tone in the Saudi
press, and why?
Q.4. Which personnel did the Saudi press cover in each news item, and why?
Q.5. To which geographically newsworthy locations did the Saudi press pay greater
attention, and why?
Q.6. On which news sources were the Saudi press dependent for their news
presentation, and why?
Q.7. What was the theme of the leading articles, what was their tone, and to whom
were they directed, and why?
Q.8. What are Saudi journalists' perceptions toward the Saudi press functions in
time of war and their views and level of satisfaction with its performance in
coverage of the Gulf conflict, and why?
Q.9. Did any internal and/or external factors, such as religious, political, economic
or geographic factors affect the amount and nature of coverage of the Gulf
conflict by the Saudi press and, if so, why?
9With these purposes and research questions in mind, the performance of the Saudi press
during the Gulf conflict can be understood and evaluated, and recommendations made for
better lines of communication between the Saudi government, press and society.
Moreover, the outcome of the analysis will, it is hoped, lead to a testing and development
of theory. An attempt will be made to assess the applicability of the authoritarian press
theory and other theories (see Chapter 2) to the Saudi Arabian press and, should those
theories prove inadequate, to suggest a new theory or model that better explains the
performance of the Saudi press.
1.4 Importance of the Study
This study derives its importance from its originality, contribution to knowledge, and
potential practical value as an input to future formulations of press policy in Saudi Arabia.
Why is a study of press ftmction and performance during the conflict necessary? Starck
has argued that:
It would seem useful to study media ftmction for two reasons, both of
which are linked to change. First, there are the developing nations
where basic communications policies are being formulated to assure
that the media will carry out prescribed functions effectively in the
given politico- socio- economic milieu Second, there is the need in
all societies for institutions to readjust constantly to a rapidly changing
environment. In both instances, it would seem that the media would
make some effort to take into account how their audiences feel about
what function the media should be fulfilling, as opposed to what the
functions 'were' or have been (1973: 145).
Saudi Arabia, as a heavily regulated Islamic State, provides an extremely fertile ground for
communications researchers studying the performance of its press, including changes that
could occur in conflict or wartime, since there is a strong link between the Saudi
government's ideology and the press in view of the place its occupies in contemporary
Saudi society. The Saudi press is in an influential position, given its sheer size, cultural
and political weight, since it is controlled by government. It is thus of interest to know
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how such an organisation operates, what factors affect it, what role it is intended to play,
and how it can best perform that role.
The modem Iworld is the scene of numerous political, economic and social conflicts, and
we have economic blocks at the international level, i.e. a block of producing countries and
a block of consuming countries. There is a new drive towards trade liberalisation. The
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) has opened the door increased for co-
operation, exchanged opportunities, as epitomised by the World Trade Organisation
(VVTO) for small countries an extension of international trade beyond the advanced
countries. As a result, even the advanced countries have started to fear competition from
East Asia, especially, the five tigers (Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong). In the face of new groupings, nations must make use of emerging opportunities,
especially in the aftermath of the Cold War and the prospect of the New World Order. It
is true that there are still political struggles in the world but we still need a greater
understanding and a comprehensive strategy for how to deal with these changes. The
world is increasingly globalized and interdependent. Thus the press as an instrument,
inside and outside Saudi Arabia, needs to be prepared to present and treat issues,
especially political issues, more critically, i.e. to determine whether or not the evidence
available justifies the conclusions that are drawn from it.
The press is an important intermediary between the decision-makers and the public and it
may both reflect and help to shape the relationship between them. The question arises as
we enter a new century, what is to be the relationship between Saudi people and
government, and where does the press fit into relationship? This study will contribute to
debate on this issue and aspires to help in finding some solutions (see Chapter 7,
recommendations of the study).
By shedding light on how the Saudi press performed in covering the Gulf conflict, this
study will analyse the validity of press theory and other ideas raised by communications
scholars in relation to the role of the press in society.
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The performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict has not been studied
previously. It is hoped, therefore, that this study will provide a foundation for other
studies, not only of the Saudi Media (press, radio and television) but also in the wider area
of media, culture and society.
1.5 Limitations of the Study
Any exploratory study related to the Saudi Arabian press is likely to face some difficulties,
especially as no such study has been done before. The major reasons for that are Saudi
researchers' lack of confidence in studying such a sensitive issue, lack of experience and
difficulty in gaining access to information and material.
In addition, any research project encounters limitations of scope which must be born in
mind when interpreting the study outlines. The first limitation concerns the study of
population. The research samples were drawn from the Saudi media academics in all
Saudi Universities, journalists on the seven national daily newspapers and other Saudi
journalists who were recommended by both the Saudi media academics and journalists.
The former were selected due to the fact they were senior figures and the latter were
closer to the reality of what was happening in relation to the press during the Gulf conflict.
Moreover, it was this second group who constructed the news. The rationale of this
choice of target group is explained fully in Chapter 3. Their opinions, presented in
Chapter 4, give us a general picture of the Saudi press environment.
For the quantitative survey of opinions of the Saudi press function in time of war, and
satisfaction with its performance in its coverage of the Gulf conflict, only Saudi journalists
were selected, as they were considered to be the group best placed to express their own
understanding of the journalist's task, and to distinguish between idea and reality in this
regard. This survey group was limited in two respects. The first limitation was with
regard to the interest groups represented. For political and cultural reasons, it would be
difficult to include government or military personnel in such a study, while constraints of
time and resources prevented a survey of the general public. Public opinion analysis and
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polls are virtually unknown in Saudi Arabia. The sample was also limited by gender, in
that the researcher was not given access to female journalists for interview, not were any
of the questionnaire responses received from women. This may be attributable to the
cultural norms of Saudi society.
The second limitation of this study concerns the analysis of the content of the Saudi press.
Such analysis was confined to only three Saudi national daily newspapers, namely, al-
Riyadh, Okaz and al-Yaum (see p.22). In addition, only the first pages of news and
information, together with the editorial pages of each of these papers, were selected.
Inevitably, therefore, potentially interesting and relevant news or information from other
pages that they may have appeared on other pages were excluded. This decision was made
because of the limited time available. It may be argued, however, that the front pages and
leader articles would be representative of the main events covered and attitudes expressed
in the newspapers. Moreover, the detailed coding of item themes (see Chapter 5) helped
to overcome this limitation.
However, one important note is that the researcher himself was the only coder in this
study. This might be considered one of the limitations of the study, but the argument here
is that the researcher followed the two steps recommended by Wimmer & Dominick
(1983); namely, he defined category boundaries, and then he conducted a pilot study.
Thus, the researcher believes that no other coder was necessary.
The last limitation was that the study did not consider the effect of the performance of the
Saudi Arabian press on Saudi citizens. The simple fact was that this study aimed to
explore attitudes and behaviour, not cause and effect. Moreover, given the difficulty of
surveying specialists in communications from the media colleges and departments in Saudi
Universities, it would be even more difficult to obtain valid responses from the general
public. In a society where the mass media are relatively new, people lack media
awareness, and researchers are commonly mistrusted. Nevertheless, some inferences can
be drawn from the opinions expressed by academics and journalists, and from the content
of Saudi press.
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Overall, it is not felt that the inevitable limitations of this study invalidates the data
obtained. The methods and organisation of this study may be considered an appropriate
way of serving the study objectives.
1.6 Saudi Arabia: A brief Overview
Saudi Arabia lies in the Southwest part of Asia, with an area of about 865,000 square
miles, and is bordered by the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea. The population of Saudi
Arabia is 16,929,294; 72.7% is Saudi and 27.3% non-Saudi, and the official language is
Arabic (Saudi Arabia Ministry of Economic and Financial Consumer Report, 1993: 34).
Modem Saudi Arabia was founded by King Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Saud in
1932. Its nomadic people's love for land developed a strong sense of independence within
the Arabian peninsula after the advent of Islam in the 7th century brought various tribes
and clans under one religion (Saudi Arabia; History, 1989: 1).
Saudi Arabia is an Islamic state. The government constitution is based on the Holy Quran
and Sunna (the traditions of the Prophet Mohammed). "A Council of Ministers, together
with the King, form the Executive and Legislative branches of government. There are 20
government Ministries, and several other government agencies and departments" (Saudi
Arabia; Facts and Figures, 1985: 4).
In order to understand the performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict, it must
be viewed in the context of the Saudi Arabian government system, society and mass media
in general. This section provides background information on those issues.
1.6.1 The Saudi Arabian Government System
The Saudi Government system encompassing the nature, its goals and responsibilities of
the State, as well as the relationship between the ruler and citizens, consists of three
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branches: the Council of Ministers, the Legal and Judicial structure and the Consultative
Council.
1.6.1.1 The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers established by King Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul Rahman Al-Saud in
1953, is headed by the King as the Prime Minister. Its other members are the Crown
Prince who is the Deputy Prime Minister, the Second Deputy Prime Minister and Cabinet
Ministers (Sandi Arabian Information Centre, 1996: 77). The Council is responsible for
drafting and overseeing the implementation of the internal, external, financial, economic,
educational and defence policies, and general affairs of the state. It meets weekly, presided
over by the King or one of his deputies (Saudi Arabian Information Centre, 1996: 77).
New bylaws were introduced for the Council of Ministers system in 1992. These explain
that the purpose of the state is to ensure the security and rights of all citizens and residents.
They also emphasise the importance of the family as the nucleus of Saudi society,
particularly in teaching its members to adhere to Islamic values (Saudi Arabian Information
Centre, 1996: 83).
In defining the relationship between the ruler and the people, the system emphasises that
all Saudi citizens are equal before God and in their concern for the well-being, security,
dignity and progress of their nation. They also have equality before the law (Saudi
Arabian Information Centre, 1996: 83).
For administrative purposes, the country is divided into 13 provinces, each of which has its
own Provincial Council, whose role is to deliberate on the needs of their respective
provinces, work on the development budget, scrutinise future development plans, and
monitor ongoing projects (Saudi Arabian Information Centre, 1996: 83). The Governor
and Vice-Governor of each province act as chairman and vice-chairman of their Provincial
Council. Each Council is composed of a minimum of 10 private citizens who are
experienced in their respective fields. As of 1993, the 13 Provincial Councils in the
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country contained a total of 201 members. Each Council has specialised committees to
deal with various issues of interest to the province. Reports issued by the Provincial
Councils are submitted to the Minister of the Interior and passed on to the appropriate
government ministries and agencies for consideration (Saudi Arabian Information Centre,
1996: 104).
The Saudi Government occupies a very important position in the Middle East, as a balance
between the various radical Arab States, moderate Arab States, the US, and Europe. It
has used its economic and political aid to develop good relations with Syria and Iraq
(before its invasion of Kuwait), and it maintains ties with the USA and European countries
which secure their interests. It counters the military and strategic pressures from its
neighbours, and neutralises or coopts radical leaders. Because of its importance to US and
Western interests, no state can pose a direct threat to it without reasonable assurance that
the West will react (Cordesman, 1987: 238).
1.6.1.2 Legal & Judicial Structure
Saudi Arabia has an extensive legal structure. The judicial system is based on the Shariah.
In 1928, King Abdul Aziz decreed the organisation of the court system and the procedures
to be followed. As the country developed, the Judicial system was developed through
subsequent decrees in 1936 and 1952 for the Civil Procedures Rules, in 1955 for the
establishment of the Board of Grievances, and in 1970 for the formation of the Ministry of
Justice (Saudi Arabian Information Centre, 1996: 107).
Today, the Ministry of Justice administers the Shariah legal system through the Shariah
Courts. At the trial level are the General Courts, or Courts of First Instance. Decisions by
these courts can be appealed to the appellate and, finally, the High Shariah Court. The
next level is the Appeals Court. Disputes arising from codified regulations are handled by
the Board of Grievances or by special courts. Examples are the Ministry of Labour and
Social Affairs' Supreme Committee for the Settlement of Labour Disputes and the
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Ministry of Commerce's Commercial Disputes Settlement Committee (Saudi Arabian
Information Centre, 1996: 107).
The decisions of these courts can be appealed to the office of the King or the Crown
Prince. They will turn the appeal over to the legal office of the Council of Ministers. A
decision by the Council of Ministers, signed by the King, is final. The revitalisation of
Saudi Arabia's political system reflects the nation's adaptability to modern development
without compromising its religious and cultural value (Saudi Arabian Information Centre,
1996: 107).
According to Moliver & Abbondante:
Supporting the close connection between religions and secular life is the
unification of the religious and secular leaders. In Saudi Arabia, the
king is more than a king. He not only sets down the law government
the country but he also presides over adherence to the Moslem religion.
The King is really a combination of president and pope 6. There is no
separation of church' and state in Saudi Arabia. The church is the State
and vice versa (1980:11).
To put it another way, "the religious authority gives legitimacy to the political power, and
the political power is in itself a form of religious prestige, for it is through this power that
the ruler maintains the conditions in which the Sharia may flourish" (Looney, 1982: 21).
1.6.1.3 The Consultative Council (Majlis Al- Shoura)
The primary function of the Majlis Al-Shoura is to advise the King on issues of importance
to the nation, in line with a long tradition of consultation with learned and experienced
citizens, which has its roots in Islam. The late King Abdul Aziz, who established the first
Consultative Council in the mid-1920s, explained: "We have to follow what is stated in the
6 'Pope' is used here in the general sense of 'head of the religious Establishment'.
7 'Church' refers not to any particular building or religious sect, but to the Religious Establishment.
In Saudi Arabia, it would mean the King, the Religious scholars, and all official bodies
responsible for implementing the Sharia.
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Holy Quran and the Sunnah in implementation of Allah's orders to consult others on the
affairs of the moment" (Saudi Arabian Information Centre, 1996: 88).
Since the mid 1920s until 1992, the consultative Council did not function and all
regulations, decisions, policy and social affairs were issued through the Council of
Ministers. In order to enhance its efficiency, King Fand restructured the consultation
system in 1992. In its present form, the Council consists of a chairman and 90 members
appointed by the King for a four-year renewable term. Its members represent the spectrum
of Saudi society. King Fand personally inaugurated the first session of the new Council on
December 29, 1993.
In fact, the change was to a large extent a response to political pressures stimulated by the
Gulf War. The ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United Kingdom, Dr Al-Gosaibi, said
that around 400 enlightened people and businessmen drafted a request to King Fand for
the establishment of a Consultative Council and for greater public freedom. The
ambassador clarified that behind their inquiry was a broader concern to make all local and
foreign policy decisions subject to a committee of approval. Even before receiving the
letter however, the King announced in November, 1991 that after the crisis ended, he
would issue a statement on the role of the monarchy and on the establishment and function
of a consultative Council (1992: 181).
The Council discusses regulations, domestic and international issues, and all other matters
of public interest. It can ask government officials to attend key meetings and request
access to government documents. Reports and recommendations made by the Council are
forwarded directly to the King.
One of the Council's first actions was to form eight specialised committees, namely:
Educational, Cultural and Information Affairs, Health and Social Affairs, Foreign Affairs,
Security Affairs, Organisation and Administration, Islamic Affairs, Economic and Financial
Affairs and Services and Public Utilities. "This system aims at upgrading the level of
administrative work and development in all parts of the Kingdom. It also aims at the
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preservation of security and order, and the rights of citizens and their freedom within the
framework of the Islamic Shariah" (Saudi Arabian Information Centre, 1996: 88).
1.6.2 Saudi Arabian Society
From the above discussion of the Saudi Arabian government system, it will be apparent
that the government and Islamic principle permeate all aspects of social life. Thus, Saudi
society is influenced by a range of religious, political, economic and cultural factors. "The
Saudi Arabian society has Arab and Muslim roots stretching back thousands of years.
From its land, Makkah, the Holy City, Prophet Mohammed emerged and spread. It is a
homogeneous society bound by the Islamic religion and the Arabic language. This society
is ruled by ancient traditions and ethics derived from Islam, and Arabian morals and
behaviour such as truthfillness and neighbourliness" (Ministry of Information, Undated: 5).
The link between government policy and religion has existed ever since the first alliance
between Mohammed ibn Saud and Imam Mohammed ibn Abdul Wahhab, which continued
to progress until King Abdul Aziz recaptured Riyadh in January 1902 (Iqbal, 1986: 11), a
vital step in his goal to restore the Islamic faith of the Arabian Peninsula tribes and join
them into one cohesive nation known as Saudi Arabia.
In the early years, much of the Saudi population was nomadic or semi-nomadic.
According to O'Sullivan they were
essentially herders of camels, goats and sheep, while settled people
were farmers, craftsmen and traders. The nomads brought the animal
products of the desert to the settlements, where they exchanged them
for food stuffs and other necessities: dates, rice, wheat, clothing,
manufactured goods and firearms. The settled people relied on their
nomadic allies for transport and alliances in war time (1993: 35).
The sending out of religious teachers among the tribes to teach them more of Islam
resulted in major changes in Saudi society, particularly in the north and the centre of Saudi
Arabia. This also helped to establish the nation's stability. Another major change was the
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merging of Bedouin communities from their isolated desert hamlets into the national
community of the country, enabling them to participate in its activities and development
programmes (Zamakhshari, 1994: 47, 49-50).
Other influences were the discovery and exploitation of oil which led to the entry of
Western companies (the Arabian American Oil Company [ARAMCO] introduced the
country's first TV station); the number of foreign visitors on pilgrimage to Makkah, and
the international trade which Saudi Arabia enjoyed by virtue of its position at the cross-
roads between Europe, Asia and Africa.
The rise in the price of oil in the 1970s brought huge wealth which enabled the government
to implement comprehensive socio-economic development plans. The 5-year Development
plans implemented between 1970 and 1995 created a solid infrastructure and witnessed
remarkable development in health, education, travel, trade, and mass communication. "All
these brought new ideas and influences to the country which are completely alien to its
society and its history" (Al-Harithi, 1983: 96).
Throughout the development plans, the Saudi authorities made it clear that one of their
fundamental goals was "to maintain the religious and moral values of Islam" (Ministry of
Planning, 1979: 53). At the same time, the five development plans relied heavily on
foreign manpower, who could offer greater experience and skill than indigenous workers
at less cost. This brought new social influences into the country. As the Saudi education
system expanded, creating a skilled Saudi work force, this problem was addressed by
measures "to increase the rate at which non-Saudi are being replaced by Saudi nationals
(` SaudiisationT (Saudi Arabia Information Centre, 1990: 30).
With these changes taking place, Saudi Arabia has faced tremendous social upheaval.
Socio-economic development has had an enormous impact on the lifestyle of the
traditional Saudi society. Indeed, as Elmusa observed: "Saudi has been transformed, over
the last three decades, from a traditional society to one in which life is textured by
imported consumer goods; the bedouin encampment, tent, mud house and camel have
yielded to the city, cement house, high-rise building, dishwasher, television set, satellite
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[dishes], car, computer-controlled equipment at work and all the trappings that modem
technology can supply" (1997: 345). In addition, the intemet service has recently been
made available to certain academic institutions and military organisations and is soon to be
available easily to the population as a whole. This communication revolution will open a
new era for Saudis, in which foreign values may be a major challenge.
As Paul (1984) highlights, one impact of oil on Saudi society has been an increase in the
number of intellectuals who have been able to pursue their education abroad, e.g. in the
UK, USA and other developed countries, where liberalism, individualism and personalism
are the dominant social motives. On their return, they must accommodate themselves to a
society whose dominant motivations are very different, where group loyalties are
traditional and where nepotism is almost a virtue. This is likely sooner or later to cause
conflict between these two groups, affecting the nation's stability.
Another factor is the new mobility of labour. It used to be common that each individual
must follow in the context of family and tribal cohesion, the network of area loyalties, the
hierarchical chain of control and the generalised understanding of the individual's right and
duties in society. For example, the son of a pearl-diver would be expected to become a
pearl-diver, the son of a merchant worked unquestioning in his father's shop, though in the
South of Saudi Arabia the sons of a man who was a peddler or salesman would feel a
sense of social stigma. Today, most people, including those who would formerly have
opposed this kind of work, like to be involved in buying and selling, and society now
approves these occupations. Indeed, nowadays, the Saudi young set off in all directions.
But there is another, external pressure which is the large community of foreign workers.
These, as of 1999, numbered some 5-6 million, according to an official source at the
Ministry of Planning (personal communication with the researcher).
There has also been a revolution of communications in the broad sense. The state
authority can no longer use the mass media to reinforce the traditional political or cultural
system, as Saudis increasingly tune in to foreign broadcasts such as BBC, CNN, VOA and
the media of neighbouring Arabic states. As of 1984, one-third of the population of two
cities in Saudi Arabia regularly tuned in to foreign broadcasts. The proportion will be
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greater now, so the effect on the thinking of the listeners or watchers cannot be negligible
and is barely open to control. Those who are less educated may be influenced by
neighbours' propaganda, e.g. from Iraq or Iran (pp. 189-91).
The point is that the speed with which these developments are taking place is so rapid that
it is difficult for people to keep pace with changes in society and adjust their conceptions
of individual's role within it.
1.6.3 Mass Media in Saudi Arabia
As mentioned earlier in relation to Saudi society, the mass media cannot be viewed
separately from the influence of either government policy and religious aspects.
1.6.3.1 Saudi Press8
The first Saudi newspaper, Umm al-Qura, was issued in Makkah, the religious capital, on
12th December 1924, on a weekly basis. It is an official publication, which publishes
"government treaties, royal decrees, Council notices, concession agreements and releases
of the Directorate General of Broadcasting, Press and Publications" (Shobaili, 1971: 57).
During the period between 1924 and 1963, the Saudi press gave "individuals limited
internal news, information, or events and some religious and social literature" (The
Arabian Publication House for Encyclopaedias, Undated: 194).
Approved by the Council of Ministers resolution no. 600, dated 9th January 1964, a Royal
decree no. (62) granted approval to the National Press Agencies Act "to enable new
8 For information related to the history of the mass media in the country before Saudi rule in 1924,
see Said AI-Harithi (1983). The Mass Media in Saudi Arabia: Present Concept,
Functions, Barriers and Selected Strategy for effective use in Nation-Building and
Social Awareness, Ohio State University. Unpublished PhD. Also see Abdul rahman
Shobaili (1980), A History and Analytical Study of Broadcasting and Press in Saudi Arabia,
Doctoral Dissertation, Ohio State University.
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people to read about their country, add more readers to the national press and increase the
distribution rate" (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1993: 23-27). It also helped to expand
news and information from abroad. New offices were opened inside and outside Saudi
Arabia particularly in the Arab region. The national press received financial support from
the Saudi government. Due to economic problems, particularly since 1991, the Saudi
press is now more dependent on advertisements. Indeed, it now devotes more space to
advertisements than to news or information. For example in July, 1999, al-Riyadh
newspaper devoted, according to the researcher's analysis,9
 more than 60% of its space
each day to advertisements, followed by Okaz with 53% and al-Yaum with 50%.
The Saudi Arabia Ministry of Municipalities and Rural Affairs of Saudi Arabia in its
publication explains that "there are 154 Arabic language newspapers and magazines
available in the Kingdom, of which 141 are published in the Arab world and 13 are
published outside the Arab world" (undated: 273).
There are seven national daily newspapers: al-Bilad, al-Jazeera, Okaz, al-Medina, al-
Nadwah, al-Riyadh, and al-Yaum. There is one evening newspaper, Al-Masaeyah, and
three English newspapers, Arab News, Saudi Gazette, and Riyadh Daily. For more data
about these daily newspapers see Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Names of the Saudi National Daily Newspapers, Their Location, Date First Published,
and Circulation Fi gures *
Name of Newspapers Date published & location Circulation
al-Madinah [Madina] 1962/1382(H) (West of SA) 47.000
al-Nadwah [The forum] 1963/1383(11) (West of SA) 35.000
al-Bilad	 [The Country] 1964/1383(H) (West of SA) 65.000
al-Riyadh	 [Riyadh] 1965/1385(11) (Centre of SA) 140.000
Okaz 1968/1384(H) (West of SA) 90.000
al-Jazeera	 [The Peninsula] 1972/1392(H) (Centre of SA) 90.000
al-Yaum	 [Today] 1972/1392(11) (East of SA) 40.000
al-Watani	 [Homelandl** (South of SA)
* Data taken from Al Yusaf, K, A (1986, March) Saudi Press: History and Development Almajalla Alarabiyah
(101) and from Rampal, K. R (1994) Mass Media in the Middle East, Comprehensive Handbook, Edited by
Yahya. R.. Kamalipour and Hamid Mowlana. Greenwood Press: Westport, Connecticut, London. P. 246.
** This newspaper has been authorised by the King and it is currently in the process of establishment
(g.l-Jazeera newspaper, March 12, 1998, No. 9296, P. 41. 
9 The analysis was done by using a constructed week approach (see Chapter 3, section 3.2.1 for
details).
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Al-Darrab claimed that newspapers, "since they are privately owned, make a profit.
However, besides their own income, the newspapers receive some financial support from
the government, who buys and distributes copies of the papers" (1983: 25).
There are also many magazines: weekly magazines, such as al-Yamamah Magazine;
monthly magazines, such as The National Guard Magazine; and bimonthly magazines and
quarterly magazines, such as The King Khalid Military Academy Quarterly.
Since illiteracy is comparatively high, as Al-Darrab noted, "newspapers and magazines do
not play quite as significant a role in communication as do the broadcasting media. For
example, the circulation of the Riyadh daily paper is only about 40,000 in the city with a
population of over 700,000" (1983: 27). Nowadays, the circulation of the Riyadh daily
paper is about 140,000 in a city whose population is estimated to be over 2,000,000.
1.6.3.2 Saudi Broadcasting
Broadcasting, in the form of radio and television has expanded and developed considerably
in Saudi Arabia since 1948, when two radio stations in the city of Jeddah and Riyadh
began transmitting (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1993: 105). Currently there are six
radio stations: The General programme, The Second programme, The Nida Ul-Islam
Radio (Voice of Islam), The radio of the Holy Quran, European Programme (in English
and France languages), and the Special Directed Programme (directed to different Islamic
regions in Asia and Africa in ten oriental languages, e.g., Urdo, Indonesian, Persian,
Turkish). The aim is to inform, educate and the gain reactions of Saudis and to spread
Islamic teachings and thought inside Saudi Arabia and outside (Al-Harithi, 1998: 100-
108).
TV began in 1965 with a single channel in Arabic, followed by a second channel in English
(with news in French) in 1983. Both channels have carried advertising since 1986 (The
Arabian Publishing House For Encyclopaedias, undated: 201). The aim is to inform,
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publish information and educate the public on their national heritage and encourage moral
values and principles derived from the Sharia Law.
ARAMCO started television transmission in Dhahran in 1957 in two languages, English
and Arabic. When the Saudi government built a station in Dammam in 1970, ARAMCO
ceased all Arabic-language transmissions but continued to transmit English -language
mostly US -programmes. The station is designated as Channel 3 and never identified as
being run by ARAMCO. Channel 3 was a significant source of information for the
coalition armed forces during the Kuwait operation. Indeed, the Saudi government
requested it to increase its transmissions in English to provide entertainment for the troops.
The station, however, is censored by the ARAMCO public relations department to ensure
all programmes conform to Saudi cultural standards (Boyd, 1995: 211).
Video tapes are available and popular with the public, due to the rise in living standards
and purchasing power, as well as interest in the various programmes which are produced
by the national information companies or programmes coming from abroad. The Ministry
of Information has set special regulations for video shops; all recordings must abide by the
Islamic values maintained by Saudi society. In 1992 there were 700 commercial shops
dealing in the sale and exchange of video tapes (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1993: 105
- 6). It is estimated that by 1983 there were 540,000 VCRs (Rampal, 1994: 252).
Nowadays, there would be slightly more VCRs in Saudi Arabia, because more people have
satellite dishes; Zamakhshari in 1994 found that 63% of Saudi parents had a video recorder
(1994: 171).
Neither a motion picture production industry nor cable television exist in Saudi Arabia but
satellite T.V. is available. Before Iraq invaded Kuwait, it was rare to see dishes on Saudi
houses. A few rich people or government officials had then, but they were hidden from
public view, at the backs of their houses. During the Iraqi invasion, the import and
manufacture of dishes was not banned, and their popularity became noticeably more
widespread during and after the Gulf War of 1991. However, "following a ban on the
import and manufacture of dishes, issued in March 1994, the Interior Ministry announced
on 28 June 1995 that all satellite dishes must be removed within one month. Failure to
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comply with the law would result in fines totalling $130,000 and terms of imprisonment.
Pressure from the senior Ulama concerned at the erosion of core Islamic precepts may
have played some part in the decision" (Jones, 1995: 40). Although it is now illegal to
have satellite dishes, it is estimated that from 3 to 6 percent of Saudi homes retain them
(Rampal, 1994: 251). Those who still have them try to hide them as they did before the
Iraqi invasion, and although it is not possible to buy a new dish, it is easy for people to
watch satellite programmes by sharing with a neighbour who already has one. Although
the official ban an satellite T.V. was issued to placate the conservative elements in society,
enforcement is lax.
Consequently, "Saudis receive television broadcasts from Arab states, including a common
Pan-Arab service, via the ARAB SAT (Arab Satellite Communications Organisation), in
addition to STAR TV from Hong Kong and channels from Turkey, Russia, and Western
Europe. STAR TV offers Cable News Network (CNN), BBC (British Broadcasting
Corporation) Asia. . ." (Rampal, 1994: 251).
The opposition to satellite T.V. among the religious conservatives stems from their fear
that through this medium, Saudi people will be exposed to undesirable Western influences
which will lead to a weakening of religious and moral values. "The religious leaders have
been especially concerned about the depiction of women in Western and even Egyptian
films, that is liable to arouse sexual excitement. Other objections to films include
references to Christianity and Judaism, alcoholic beverages, inappropriately attired women,
kissing, sex, and excessive violence" (Rampal, 1994 : 253).
1.6.3.3 Saudi Information Policy
The Saudi press is subject to the Information Policy set by the government. The Supreme
Council for Information was established in accordance with the Royal decree no 2022/8,
dated 12/9/1401(1980):
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[It] serves as the planning and supervisory body which makes the
policies for information development. The purpose of the council is to
prepare a clear media policy based on the sharia law. The policy must.
. . assist them in developing their programmes and evaluating their
output. The Council also prepares laws and regulations which control
the media activities (The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1993: 121).
Saudi information policy was authorised by the Council of Ministers, in decision nos. 78
(dated 14-5. 1400, AH1°) and 82, (dated 4-6, 1402 AH) and must conform to the precepts
and aims of Islam. Therefore the main objective is to raise the intellectual, cultural and
spiritual awareness of Saudis so that the principles of Islam may be disseminated and
asserted through understanding and conviction. The policy, which is comprised of
comprehensive articles, covering on religious, political, social, cultural and educational
aspects, is considered as a significant part of the state's general policy (The Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, 1993: 185-6). Appendix B explains these thirty articles.
Regarding the relationship between the government and the press, Najjar pointed out that,
"each newspaper is run by a government-appointed private group consisting of people with
experience in journalism. Although the newspapers are not directly controlled by the
government, they usually support government policies . . . [and] critical writings in
newspapers influence the thinking of the government" (1979: i-ii).
Moreover, a source of indirect government control over the press is the fact that "Under
the press regulation, the Director General and the Editor-in-Chief of each establishment
must be approved by the Ministry of Information" (Al-Harithi, 1983: 185).
Another example is that, according to Article 12A of the publishing regulations "the
Ministry of Information is authorised to censor all imported printed materials. The press
can be considered the secondary channel [radio and TV are first] in disseminating
government's new ideologies and policies" (Shobaili, 1971: 95-95).
(All) stands for Anno Hegirae (hegira being the latinized from of Hijrah). The hegira is the
migration of the Prophet Muhammed from Makkah to al- Madinah, which took place on 16 July
622 CE. Saudi Arabia Infromation Cetner, (1990), The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Stacey
Interntional, London & New Jersey, p. 9.
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A more direct form of control is exercised through the Saudi Press Agency which in 1971
began operating under the administration of the Ministry of Information. Its role is ". . . to
issue news bulletins and pamphlets in the Kingdom and abroad" (Al-Darrab, 1983: 23).
Thus, government bodies send out official press releases to the Saudi Press Agency, which
in turn ensures that these are published in the newspapers.
However, this relationship between the government and press, according to Shobaili,
is a result of political and social conditions. First, was the political
atmosphere during the last decade. The middle eastern area was living
in a political ferment, fumbling between west and east with growing
extreme leftist ideologies. Propaganda campaigns clashed against each
other amidst that atmosphere. Change of governments, Coups d'etat
and revolutions characterized the dictionary of social scene. Saudi
Arabia, the new emerging country, busy with its internal development
programmes, did not want to hurl itself into that violent upheaval
(1971: 95-96).
Generally speaking, unlike the system in the United Kingdom, both press and broadcasting
are administered by the Ministry of Information and cannot be separated from the Islamic
religion and Saudi culture which shape most of the news and programmes' contents. In
addition, the Saudi mass media position in strongly linked with the government authority
and with the Saudi power structure.
In sum, the above description about the Saudi government, society and mass media gives
us a general idea how all these elements work together. Strong links with past tradition,
with Arab culture and Islam regulate every aspect of Saudi life and shape Saudis'
perceptions of the modern world. Such influences were certainly apparent in the way the
Saudi press responded to the Gulf conflict of 1990-1991.
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Chapter 2
The Performance of the Press: Theory and Practice
In the post-war period, technological advances have made possible the almost
instantaneous flow of information world-wide. As the speed and scope of information
flows increase, policy-makers, journalists and social scientists are forced to recognise the
important role of the press in international affairs and in crisis situations. Some writers
believe that "improving the quality and quantity of information flow between countries and
regions could contribute, to some extent, to a decrease in world tensions" (Babbili, 1986:
363). As decreasing the world tensions is the politicians' task, the press remains an
important instrument to achieve their mission. Thus, politicians recognise the importance
of public opinion. In times of tension, particularly during war time, the press, therefore, is
"a means to achieve political influence. . . [and] mobilise political support" (Wolfsfeld,
1997: 2). It is important to realise that "news is vastly different in nature from continent
to continent, from country to country, and even from news medium to news medium
within any country" (Ostgaard, 1965: 52). Such differences in the content and style of
news presentation depend on a complex interplay of factors, including the political and
cultural environment, journalists' role in message-making, and ethical and professional
values in relation to objectivity and newsworthiness.
This chapter attempts to present in a summary form the most significant influential social
and political dimensions which affect the performance of the press. The general theoretical
work presented in this chapter is divided into seven major sections. The first discusses the
four theories of the press namely, authoritarian theory, libertarian theory, social
responsibility theory and the soviet-communist theory. The aim is to understand the
control and operation of the press throughout the world from various ideological
perspectives. The second section presents the Arab media systems, namely, the
mobilisation press, the loyalist press and diverse press. The aim is to understand how the
press is controlled and operated in the Arab world, and to identify within which system the
Saudi press can be classified. The third section presents three mass media theories,
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namely, the Bullet theory, the agenda-setting function of mass media theory and the Spiral
of Silence theory. The aim is to challenge what Lowery and DeFleur call "speculation,
accusation, and undocumented conclusions" (1988: 17) in the study of the performance of
the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections discuss several
elements in relation to the government, press and journalists' work, namely, the
communication process formulae, the function of mass media, objective journalism, and
the significance of news (news values and its ideology value). The aim is to explain the
nature of journalistic and press activity, the relationship between government and
journalists, and journalistic values in relation to the presentation of news and information.
The last section presents a brief background to the study in relation to the media in the
Gulf war. The aim is to look at the performance of press and broadcasting during this
particular war and the perceptions of individuals in relation to the press, government and
public.
Taken together, it is believed that significant and influential social scientific studies that
will be discussed in this chapter can be grouped and related to each other to constitute a
theoretical framework for understanding the performance of the Saudi press during the
Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 and its relationship with the Saudi government. This task is a
complex one, due to the large diversity of viewpoints among prominent scholars in the
field of communication studies.
2.1 Four Theories of the Press
Throughout the world, the press are engaged in a constant struggle to remain as
independent as possible from state control and political interests. One significant reason is
that the press today has a great influence over government, particularly executive
decisions. Observers such as Eldridge, Kitzinger & Williams see the press as "acting as
agencies of social control, in the hands of established authority or a dominant class, and
used to manage and manipulate the emergence of mass opinion and mass democracy to
serve their ends" (1997: 12). To understand the way in which media control and press
systems operate throughout the world, it is important to explore Siebert, Peterson &
Schramm's work in this field, Four Theories of the Press (1956). They identified four
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main theories of the media (newspapers, radio and television) which, they argued, have
largely determined what kind of press the Western World has. The four basic
philosophical theories that apply to press systems throughout the world can be summarised
as follows:
2.1.1 The Authoritarian Theory
The oldest of the four theories was first conceived by Plato who was convinced that:
[T]he nature of man, including his material interests and selfish
passions, would tend to degrade government from an aristocracy to
timocracy, to oligarchy, to democracy, and finally to tyranny [In
addition, he] conceived the ideal society as one in which the state
established and enforced the unity of political and cultural goals. That
idea meant rigorous control of opinion and discussion (Siebert,
Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 12).
The authoritarian press theory, developed in 16th and 17th century England and
subsequently adopted and practised in many parts of the world, is based on the idea that
the role of the press is to serve the state and its government. The government, therefore,
has the sole right to use the media, irrespective whether it is owned by private or public
organisations. It controls the media by government patents, guilds, licensing and
sometimes censorship. The media are not allowed to criticise the political apparatus,
officials in power, or other friendly governments (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 7).
Information on government is treated in the same way as discussion of government
policies. Authoritarian states have tended not to publish information about the issues and
arguments presented at meetings of the central advisory body. Decisions are not made
public unless they require general public compliance or support. Even general assemblies
are secretive, and discussion the proceedings outside the walls of the meeting place is often
punished (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 27).
Thus, the press role is simply to report news and information, but to offer no interpretation
or analysis unless it is in line the government policy; it should present the readership with
_
the government policy agenda as facts that are to be accepted; the press should represent
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the government to the public, rather than the reverse, and so can exert pressure on the
government's behalf. Public opinion that is in opposition to the government will be
suppressed. Finally the press is expected to influence the public in the way desired by the
government. It is not considered part of the press's role to raise public awareness or
question government actions (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 27). In sum, the press
under this theory functions as a propaganda instrument and as a publicity arm of the
government. The government is the sole arbiter of political policy and social affairs; public
participation is non-existent and opposition is not tolerated. Not only this, but the
government policy dictates the press agenda.
As extreme example of this authoritarian model is Hitler's Germany, where the
propaganda minister, Goebbels "was recognised as a master of his trade by those who
fought and by those who acclaimed the Nazi State" (Doob, 1950: 419). Likewise, with
Hitler and Mussolini: "Both their published statements and their actions indicate a
continuation in a perverted way from the doctrines of authoritarianism, and their treatment
of the mass media was entirely consistent with the basic principle of absolutism" (Siebert,
Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 15).
In other contemporary authoritarian regimes such as Libya, Cuba and China, journalists
become an instrument in the hand of government rather than an important source of
information or a watchdog which acts on behalf of the public to ensure the government
works in the national interest. Indeed, during the Gulf conflict, the allied coalition reverted
to authoritarian practices. A good example was the establishing of the 'pool system'
where 'journalists were formed into Media Reporting Teams (MRTs). The Americans
were to be supervised by censors from the Public Affairs (PAO) and the British by the
MoD's public relations officers (PROs)" (Taylor, 1992: 51). More information about the
pool system is given in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
2.1.2 The Libertarian Theory
Libertarian theory emerged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The
"principles of libertarian philosophy are based on the answers to questions about the nature
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of man, the nature of society and man's relation to it, and the nature of knowledge and of
truth" (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 40). John Milton wrote that "a majestic
argument for intellectual freedom in the libertarian tradition . . .. It was for its time a
powerful argument against authoritarian control" (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956:
44). Basic to Milton's argument was the belief that men are capable of rationally
distinguishing between right and wrong, good and bad. To exercise this skill man should
have full access to the ideas and thoughts of other men. Milton wanted serious minded
thinkers to be free from government censorship to air their views and opinions openly and
honestly. On similar lines, John Stuart Mill formulated the idea of freedom of expression
by presenting four basic propositions. He argued that:
if we silence an opinion, for all we know, we are silencing truth.
Secondly, a wrong opinion may contain a grain of truth necessary for
finding the whole truth. Third, even if the commonly accepted opinion
is the whole truth, the public tends to hold it not on rational grounds
but as a prejudice unless it is forced to defend it. Lastly, unless the
commonly held opinion is contested from time to time, it loses its
vitality and its effect on conduct and character (Siebert, Peterson &
Schramm, 1956: 46).
Connected to Mill's emphasis, Thomas Jefferson, as a political figure, concluded that "the
principal function of government is to establish and maintain a framework within which the
individual could pursue his own ends. The function of the press is to participate in the
education of the individual and at the same time to guard against deviations by government
from its original purpose"(Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 47).
The libertarian theory is supposedly applicable to western society, though this is open to
question in that a small group of people control the media and their communication
facilities. This situation was one of the major arguments of the former Soviet Union in
1948 at the Geneva Conference on Freedom of Information. It argued that "true freedom
of information could not exist as long as western media were controlled by 'a small group
of capitalists', while the United States called for a totally unrestrained flow of information"
(Ayish, 1992: 491). However, under liberal regimes such as the UK, the USA and France,
journalists become the principal source of news and information and a watchdog of
government for the public.
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2.1.3 The Social Responsibility Theory
This theory mostly relates to changes in the technological, industrial and social order,
which brought a gradual shift away from pure libertarianism, and in its place began to
emerge what has been called the social responsibility theory of the press. In the United
States of America the Commission on the Freedom of the Press after World War II did a
great deal toward making social responsibility an essential part of its tenets. The
significant functions of the press, under social responsibility theory are: "servicing the
political system by providing information, discussion, and debate on public affairs . .
[and] enlightening the public so as to make it capable of self-government [and]
safeguarding the right of the individual by serving as a watchdog against government;. . ."
(Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 74).
However, until the 1980s, the fact is that government in the field of communication
became a restrictive regulatory and participating agency. Siebert argues that governments
tried to withhold certain communication content from their citizens by proposing plans for
their mass communication, particularly broadcasting. The aim is to bring forward the need
for the government to guide the public in the way it believes is appropriate to the nation's
security and interest. This necessitates the grading and labelling of information distributed
by private media (1972: 219- 226).
With this role of government in mind, on the other hand, journalists under the social
responsibility model believe that they should be objective and independent in dealing with
news and information gathered, and present it to citizens with as little bias as possible. In
addition, they assume that readers are not sufficiently informed, so journalists need more
space to interpret the issues for them in the way they believe it is reliable and accurate.
Moreover, they rely on the freedom of press, whereby they have the right of access to
government policy to ensure the press does its job as a watchdog and at the same time to
enhance the two-way communication between the government and public that would
influence general policy.
The attitudes of those involved in a political conflict are shaped or reinforced by the
selection of news content and the way it is presented. During the Gulf conflict, for
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example, the press played a major role in the formation and expression of public opinion:
suggesting legislation, supporting the liberation of Kuwait, exposing Iraqi crimes and
rewarding approved actions with favourable publicity. By representing the people, it
promoted the interests of the coalition. This argument is highly relevant in times of
conflict So, there is a relationship between the government and its press, whereby each
has the duty to serve the public in a conflict such as the Gulf conflict.
2.1.4 The Soviet-Communist Theory
The former Soviet Communist Theory was developed in the Soviet Union, "although it has
links with the authoritarian systems practised by Nazi Germany and Mussolini's regime.
The theory is based on Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist thought, with a mixture of Hegel and
19th century Russian thinking" (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 15). The purpose of
mass media control for national unity or the party in power is to contribute to the success
and continuance of the Soviet Socialist system, but more particularly to the dictatorship of
the party (or proletariat). The communist press theory is dying a slow death, due to the
collapse of the USSR However, remnants survive in communist countries such as China
and Cuba. As Andrei Vyshinsky stated, "Marxism tries to be 'all-embracing'; it
'contemplates. . . totally'; it 'eliminates subjectivism. . . in choosing . . . ideas; it tries to
reveal the common roots of 'all ideas and all different tendencies" (cited in Siebert,
Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 106-107). Mass communications in relation to the authority
theory are used
instrumentally. . . that is, as an instrument of the state and the party.
They are closely integrated with other instruments of state power and
the Party influence. They are used as instruments of unity within the
state and the Party. They are used as instruments of state and Party
"revelation". They are used almost exclusively as instruments of
propaganda and agitation. They are characterised by a strictly
enforced responsibility (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 121).
With the decline of communism and the end of the Cold War, public opinion in Eastern
Europe has been organised on a massive scale for freedom and social life has changed and
become materially oriented. In this situation, the theories of press today fall under one of
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three general movements: "market, Marxist and advancing" (Altschull, 1995: 418). All,
Altschull said, "are systemic - they include elements of the political structure and
environments, economic forces, and the paymasters of the press but also the other
ingredients of life, both public and private" (1995: 426-427). Altschull examines the three
movements in terms of three arguments: (1) articles of faith, (2) purposes of journalism
and (3) views on press freedom. Each represents a general standard in the way that
journalists should work.
By articles of faith, what is meant is that the press is a unifying and not a divisive force.
The press is an agent of beneficial social change, based on a two-way exchange between
journalists and readers. The purposes of journalism are perceived as being "to serve
truth. To be socially responsible. To educate politically and culturally. To serve the
people by seeking, in partnership with government, change for beneficial purposes, [and]
to serve as an instrument of peace" (Altschull, 1995: 429). The third and final argument of
the movements of the press in terms of press freedom is that "a free press means freedom
of conscience for journalists. Press freedom is less important than the viability of the
nation. A national press policy is needed to provide legal safeguards for freedom"
(Altschull, 1995:435).
The relationship of these theories with other theories explored later in this chapter, and
their significance for this study, will be analysed in the conclusion to the chapter. At this
point, however, it is worth noting that the press theories and arguments as described above
only dealt with the directive aspects of the democratic, communist and the third world
ideology and how the state manipulates or uses the social influence exerted by a public
communication campaign. This researcher considers these theories as the guidelines and
standard policy for any press organisation. One reason is that the theories seem to be a
basis of regulation and law. For journalists, this is like a written agreement between the
state and press. In the communist and developing countries, there is an information policy
for journalists, which they must abide by, whereas in the western world there is no written
policy for journalists to follow, except self-regulation based on social responsibility.
The main point that emerges from these different theories is that "the press always takes
on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates"
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(Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956: 1). Second, the theories describe how the media
should operate in advanced countries such as the USA and UK where the freedom of
speech and freedom of the press are protected. How far this objective applies today is a
matter of debate, and especially when a State is involved in conflict, as in the case of the
Gulf conflict and war in 1990-1991. This will be considered later in this chapter.
However, since the focus of this study is Saudi Arabia, it is necessary, in order to fit the
Saudi press into this theoretical framework, to have some understanding of Arab media
systems in general, as this might shed light on relevant factors related to the nature of the
state or the role ofjoumalists in serving the public.
2.2 The Arab Media Systems
Rugh (1979) considered the cultural, political and economic realities that shape the content
of media in the Arab World. He presents a topology of the Arab media systems by
grouping the media into three fundamental categories or 'subtypes', namely, the
Mobilization Press, the Loyalist Press and the Diverse Press.
2.2.1 The Mobilisation Press
The mobilisation press is distinguished by the journalist's behaviour and political
conditions by which the press is affected in tackling issues and events. This group includes
countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and the Yemen (Rugh, 1979:
32-33). In these countries, three press characteristics can be identified. First, it does not
"criticize the basic policies of the national government. The government's foreign policies
are particularly unassailable, but the major lines of domestic policy too, are never attacked
. . .. Politically important issues are not treated from various angles but are presented from
the one point of view which is acceptable to the government" (Rugh, 1979: 35). Sanctity
of leaders is another characteristic, so that "negative information about the character,
behaviour, or personal lives of the top rulers does not find its way into print, no matter
how well known by the newsmen or even the public" (Rugh, 1979: 35). Finally, "there is
no significant diversity on important political issues among the press. Its editorials and
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news stories on political issues or related to government issues tend to be strikingly similar
to the government action. The point is that the language and tone of news stories is "to
help mobilize great campaigns launched by the regime against some obstacle to economic
development or against a foreign enemy" (Rugh, 1979: 35).
In relation to the political conditions, the major element is that, "a small, aggressive ruling
group [e.g., the Iraqi Ba'th regime] is in authority, effectively in control of all important
levers of power. It faces no genuine organised opposition and allows no challenger to its
authority to speak out publicly on the domestic scene" (Rugh, 1979: 36). According to
Rugh, the mobilisation type of press is to some extent the result of a strong ruling elite
(usually a single political party) which sees itself as being at the forefront of some
campaign and seeks to involve actively all sectors of the population (1979: 37). Under
these conditions, Rugh writes:
These are strong incentives for journalists to support the regime and its
policies, at least on issues about which the regime is sensitive. Without an
organized opposition party or group, these is no public criticism of the
regime to report in the newspaper column, and the psychological
atmosphere makes it very difficult for the newspaper columnist
independently to voice criticism of the government (1979: 36).
Primarily, the state controls the press via appointments to key editorial positions, namely
the Editor-in-Chief; the censorship process, and ownership of the national news services
which are used as an important source of policy guidance, all to ensure the loyalty of the
press so it will reflect the government's position rather than public interest.
2.2.2 The Loyalist Press
The Loyalist Press is "consistently loyal to and supportive of the regime in power despite
being privately owned" (Rugh, 1979: 71). Such countries, for example, in this category
are Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. The
content of news and political matters bear similarities to those of the mobilisation press.
The loyalist press avoids questioning the political policies of the rulers, or attacking key
political personnel. Leading articles and other commentaries, in essence, uphold the
UNIVERSHY LIBRARY LEEDS
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official line. The actions and policies of the leadership are, if not actively supported, at
least passively accepted. Government influence on press content is even greater and more
direct in times of national emergency, when the leaders call for the newspapers' loyal
support in the national interest (Rugh, 1979: 74, 79, 85). Such pressures were brought to
bear on the Saudi press in the Gulf conflict, both before and after the liberation of Kuwait.
2.2.3 The Diverse Press
Where a diverse press exists, more freedom and diversity of opinion and news is possible
than under of the mobilisation or loyalist press types. Lebanon is today the clearest
example of this type of press system (Rugh, 1979: 89). Kuwait, and Morocco have also
developed the diverse press although they have some of the loyalist press characteristics of
the loyalist press. However, although these three countries have more freedom and
diversity of opinion then other Arab states, there are important differences among these
three systems. Whereas in Lebanon, the press is normally self-regulating and subject to
little government constraint, the media in Kuwait and Morocco are more strictly
controlled. Even they, however, have some scope for freedom and diversity which is made
possible by a degree of openness and tolerance of diverse opinions within the political
system (Rugh, 1979: 111-112).
This discussion of the three systems of Arab media has illustrated the way difference in
political systems from one country to another are reflected in different levels of press
diversity and freedom. It has been suggested here that the Saudi Arabia press is an
example of the Loyalist press. Whether this is so, or whether the Saudi press has elements
of more than one type, will emerge from the analysis presented in subsequent chapters.
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2.3 Mass Media Theories
Having discussed the press theories and the Arab media systems, it seems necessary to
draw attention to three significant theories used in the communication studies.
2.3.1 The Bullet Theory
The "bullet theory" or "hypodermic - needle theory" as DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1982,
(cited in Severin and Tankard, 1992: 247) called it has been recognised by a number of
scholars, who trace it to the apparent power of propaganda during the World War 11.
According to Severin and Tankard, "It was a popular view in the years prior to World War
II, when many people shared a fear that a Hitler-style demagogue could rise to power in
the United States through the force of mass communication" (1992: 247). Lowery and
DeFleur explain what they term the magic bullet theory of media effects. According to this
theory the media send messages to society at large. These messages are perceived in more
or less the same way by everyone and have a strong impact on people's feelings and
attitudes, leading them to respond in a somewhat uniform manner Thus this theory views
mass communication as powerful, uniform, and direct in its effects (1988: 21-22).
This impact is ascribed to the absence of counter acting social controls from other sources,
such as commonly-held customs and traditions (Lowery & DeFleur, 1988: 22). According
to the "bullet theory", the press message has a direct influence and impact on an
individuals' 'brain'. As Lasswell explains, it is assumed that
whoever controls the material instruments of communication can
imprint upon the passive mind of the audience images that protect the
material relationships then prevailing or in prospect. Thus propaganda
[white, or black or grey] is viewed as an activity, low in material cost,
by means of which the receptivities created by material contradictions
can be made politically effective (1965: 540).
This theory, indeed, can be linked with what was discussed previously in relation to the
communist theory, in that the aim is "to maximize the power at home and abroad of ruling
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individuals and groups of. . .. state [by] the management of mass communication for
power purposes" (Lasswell, 1965: 537-8).
This theory is, however, challenged today. With the improving technology that facilitates
communication, other forces are driving the change in all directions to all continents, and
have contributed to the emergence of a new society which could be termed the information
society. It can be argued that the media cannot completely affect individuals or change
their behaviour, but rather reinforces the attitudes they already hold. One main reason is
that every individual is different in the way he or she organises beliefs, attitudes, values,
and needs, or experiences gratification. These differences are the product of past
experience (Lowey & DeFleur, 1988: 33). Taylor comments on the current lack of any
satisfactory model showing that the media influence human behaviour (1997: 6).
Lowery and DeFleur question the accuracy of the bullet theory, arguing that media
influence is not uniform, powerful or direct but is mediated by individuals' social
interactions (1988: 24). Certainly, in developed counties, there are many different interest
groups (for example trade unions, business) which influence political decisions and policy.
In relation to the Gulf conflict, the bullet theory would imply that press information be
derived wholly from government sources and that there would be conscious use of the
press, by government, to direct public opinion towards the conflict. Whether this was, in
fact, the case, we shall examine in subsequent chapters. A more moderate view of the
power of the press is provided by the agenda-setting theory of the press, whereby the press
may be seen, not so much as a passive tool of government, but as an opinion leader and,
possibly, a mediator between government and people.
2.3.2 The Agenda - Setting Function of Mass Media
An early study of the agenda-setting function of the mass media was conducted (1972) by
McCombs and Shaw, who explained the agenda setting function of the mass media in the
1968 presidential campaign. Their work drew on Cohen's note "that the press may not be
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but is stunningly successful in
telling its readers what to think about" (1963:13). An agenda, therefore, is defined "as a
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set of issues that are communicated in a hierarchy of importance at a point in time"
(Dearing & Rogers, 1996: 2). An agenda in political terms is "a general set of political
controversies that will be viewed at any point in time as falling within the range of
legitimate concerns meriting the attention of the policy" (Dearing & Rogers, 1996: 2).
Both politicians and journalists may contribute in setting that agenda.
A study of trends in the public agenda from 1954-1994 suggested that over the period in
question, the agenda has become more diverse and volatile. Whereas at one time, one or
two overriding issues dominated the public agenda, now there are many competing issues
and voices (McCombs & HuaZini, 1995: 517). Because of the agenda-setting influence of
the mass media, politicians are anxious to manipulate the media, such that both media and
public agenda reflect the government policy agenda. As Franklin commented:
Parties try to influence media campaign coverage in one of four ways.
First, they try to set the election news agenda so that media attention
is focused on issues which are favourable to them. Secondly, parties
try to structure their contacts with broadcasters to allow them some
control over politicians' media appearances, i.e. parties negotiate
'rules of engagement'. Thirdly, parties coach their politicians in media
presentation skills to guarantee political messages are communicated
as effectively as possible. Fourthly, if all the above fail and parties
believe that a particular broadcast presents them in an unfavourable
light, they complain (1994: 143-144).
The point here is that, in line with the authority theory of the press, government goals take
precedence during conflict and war, i.e. the Saudi press will tell people what to think about
or what to think But, will the press set the agenda for the Saudi political campaign,
influencing attitudes toward political issues? Later chapters will examine whether the
policy of the Saudi press (and, indeed, that of the coalition) in coverage of conflict and war
was linked to the political and military policy. Where such is the case, the public agenda
would be likely to change from one where the press agenda influences the political
campaign or policy, to one where the government policy agenda sets the press agenda, in
line with what Franklin has argued.
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2. 3.3 The Spiral of Silence Theory
The original article discussing the spiral of silence theory was published by Noelle-
Neumann in the Spring 1974 edition of the Journal of Communication. Noelle-Neumann
noted in her study that "a leading German research institute has found evidence to support
Tocqueville's view: more frightened of isolation than of committing an error, they
[individuals] joined the masses even though they did not agree with them" (1974: 43).
Noelle-Neumann illustrated the influence of the press on public opinion with reference to
"the pressure brought to bear on householders in a neighbourhood to shovel the snow
from their sidewalks". She took this to demonstrate that social conventions, customs, and
norms are, among the 'situations' and proposals of significance with which a large number
of people express agreement or disagreement in their public lives (1974: 13). A clear
explanation of this theory is given by Severin and Tankard. They explain that public
opinion is influenced by the combined effect of three characteristics of mass
communication: its cumulation, ubiquity, and consonance. By consonance is meant the
consistent perspective of an event presented by different newspapers and other media. The
effect of such a unified stance is to overcome selective exposure, since there are no
alternative messages from which readers or viewers may select. The impression is thus
created that most people look at the issue in the way that is presented by the mass media
(1992: 252-253).
Severin & Tankard, referring to Noelle- Neumann, draw attention to the important role of
the mass media as the main source to which most people look to find the trend of public
opinion. The spiral of silence is affected by the media in three ways by influencing
people's impressions as to what is the dominant opinion on an issue; by influencing
people's ideas about which opinions are becoming more widespread and by shaping
people's feelings about which opinions they can safely utter in public without risking
isolation or ostracism (1992: 253). Did these three mechanisms operate in relation to the
Saudi press, since all Saudi newspapers followed a single information policy? The answer
to this question will emerge from the final content analysis of the Saudi newspapers and
our interpretation of this content (see Chapter 7).
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2.4 Communication Process Formulae & Function of Press
Having considered various theories about what the press might be expected to do, and
why, we now need to consider how it performs its role beginning with the mechanism of
communication itself.
2.4.1 Communication Process Formulae
The elements of the communication process can be understood, first, in relation to two
relevant formulae. McQuail & Windahl (1993: 13-14) cited the Lasswell formula and
Braddock's extension of Lasswell's formula. They explained that Lasswell's formula
asked five questions to be answered. These are: Who? (communicator); says what?
(message); by which channel? (medium); to whom? (receiver) and with what effect?
(effect). Braddock, on the other hand, has extended the Lasswell formula by adding two
elements: under what circumstances? and for what purpose?
These two formulae show a typical view of the communication process "as starting with a
source who has ideas or information to transmit to an audience. The ideas are transformed
into messages or a set of symbols, and are then transmitted to a receiver through a medium
or a combination of media" (Agunga, 1990: 141).
McQuail, with a similar framework, elaborated on the elements of the communication
process by identifying a set of questions and comments as follows: "Who communicates to
whom? (source and receivers); why communicate? (function and purposes); how does
communication take place? (channels, language, codes); what about? (content, references,
types of information) and what are the consequences of communication (intended or
unintended)" (1987: 7).
This study will attempt to answer such questions (with the exception of the last, which
would require longitudinal studies and raises difficulties of access to appropriate samples,
as well as measurement of attitudes) in relation to the messages conveyed by the Saudi
press during the Gulf conflict. Sources, receivers, channels and content may appear
44
relatively straightforward to define and identify. In order to identify the functions of the
communication messages, however, it is helpful to have a theoretical framework or list of
recognised communication functions, onto which the content of the Saudi press can be
mapped.
2.4.2 Function of the Press
Media structure and performance play an increasingly significant role in shaping public
opinion and international relations. As a result, the media is considered as a major
collective source of information and images that operate at two levels:
At the personal level, [the media] provide a link to the larger society
and at least indirect connections to other human beings, and in varying
degree a sense of connectedness and solidarity . . .. At the political
level, the media play a central role in the working of democracies. . .
the creation of a 'public sphere,' meaning all the places and forums
where issues of importance to a political community are discussed and
debated, and where information is presented that is essential to citizen
participation in community life" (Herman & McChesney, 1997: 2-3).
The notion of message at these two levels is, however, a rather complex one. A message
can be misinterpreted unless it produces a meaning that an audience can understand and
interpret. Any communicator is involved in the encoding of messages which "is at the core
of symbolic interaction between people" (Combs, 1981: 45-46). Combs further elaborates
that:
Mind, self and society all emerge in symbolic communication between
people. Mind is the process of acquiring the ability to use and actually
using symbols. The self arises, develops, and is transformed in ongoing
social interaction. Society is a cauldron of communication activity.
Mind, self; and society are all communication processes and not
structures. The social objects of the world are not 'things' but rather
communication processes, symbolic entities which change over time
through interaction and thus new definitions of the situation and the
objects of the situation (1981: 46).
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McGuigan also argues that press messages "circulate in a semiotic landscape which
structures meaning in terms of difference, opposition, dialogue, [and] asymmetry. Their
boundaries are drawn between inside and out, home and foreign . . .. The journalist, then,
is not really in command of the meaning- making process" (1997: 252).
Human beings convey and transmit messages through symbols derived from past
experiences and mutual interactions. Those symbols, however, can be the source of many
communication problems. Misunderstanding of such symbols can lead to misapprehension.
Accurate communication requires the sharing of significant symbols, presupposes shared
knowledge, language, culture, religion etc. According to Franklin "Media messages are
the results of complex interaction between media and content and readers who bring
distinctive interpretative framework to the coding process which reflect the particularities
of their social and cultural backgrounds and experiences" (1994: 225). This highlights the
need for communicators to be able to adopt an integrated, unifying perspective towards all
the messages they receive and transmit. Examining each message individually may lead to
a distorted perception. It is necessary to look for the message behind the message, and to
recognise that news is not about single items of information, but about the way information
is packaged.
From these arguments, two elements emerge. First, the journalist in creating effective
messages should understand that the communication process is a matter of symbolic
interaction between people. Second, the journalist should, in formulating his/her
messages, ideally be in command of the "meaning-making process". But the fact is that
journalists, particularly during a conflict or war, are too busy to take command of the
meaning-making process. In practice, journalists are reduced to reporting news in
conformity with the information policy issued by the government or agreed upon
professional standards.
There is, however, a form of "gatekeeper", or self-regulation, which enables the journalist
to select messages that come to him/her along the chain of news. Nevertheless, the
functions of the press should satisfy the audiences' needs. These functions are as follows:
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1. Information: providing information about events and conditions in
society and the world; indicating relations of power; facilitating
innovation, adaptation and progress.
2. Correlation: explaining, interpreting and commenting on the meaning
of events and information; providing support for established authority
and norms; socializing co-ordinating separate activities; consensus
building; setting orders of priority and signalling relative status.
3. Continuity: expressing the dominant culture and recognizing
subcultures and new cultural developments; forging and maintaining
communality of values.
4. Entertainment: providing amusement, diversion and the means of
relaxation; reducing social tension.
5. Mobilization: campaigning for societal objectives in the sphere of
politics, war, economy development, work and sometimes religion
(Lasswell 1948, Wright 1960 & Mendelsohn, 1966 cited in McQuail,
1994: 79).
The reason for presenting these five functions is to examine whether or not one or more of
them were performed by the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict, and how Saudi
journalists believe the Saudi press performed in war time (see Chapter 6).
Laswell, Braddock and McQuail 's formulae, together with the five broad functions of the
mass communication in society presented above, provide a framework for identifying and
understanding the distinct pattern and character of the process of news presentation as
well as the functions and position of Saudi press coverage during the Gulf conflict. To
conduct such an analysis, it is necessary to make a judgement about the quality of
communication events. This involves examining to what extent their news or message is
relevant to the conflict and where it has positive or negative connotations, so as to achieve
an attitude shift. We also need to ascertain whether the news selection is appropriate for
the intended readers and whether the news/subjects presented are newsworthy and have
credibility. Regarding the latter point, it would be appropriate to take into account
journalistic values, relating to objectivity and significance of news.
2.5 Objective Journalism
There is a wide expectation that journalists in liberal democracies will conform to three
principles identified as constituting 'objective journalism'. These are as follows:
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Independence. Journalists should be independent of political
commitments and free of outside pressures, including pressures from
government and other political actors, advertisers, and the news
organisation itself as an institution with economic and political
interests.
Objectivity. The journalist's basic task is to present 'the facts' to tell
what happened, not to pass judgement on it. Opinion should be clearly
separated from the presentation of the news.
Balance. News coverage of any political controversy should be
impartial, representing without favour the positions of all the
contending parties" (Hahn, 1986: 68).
The need for journalists to be independent, objective and balanced may be accepted in the
most advanced countries, where the freedom of expression and of the press, as well as the
questioning of government, are regarded as legitimate. But such views are likely to be
opposed by Communist and Third World countries where the press is expected to serve
the political system, primarily by manipulating the public in such a way that the
government achieve its goals, rather than informing the public so they can judge the
situation according to their individual interests. Journalists can only report and present
news reliably and adequately if they are free from government restriction.
In short, 'objective journalism' requires more freedom and less restriction. This ideal is
based on professional standards or journalists' responsibility. However, these "have often
led to news productions that contradict the interests of the network managers and the
power structure to which they and their corporations belong. . [moreover] these codes
may lead them to broadcast or [present] news that criticises existing practices, politics, and
even institutions within the society" (Kellner, 1990: 118).
As a result, two aspects should be recognised as constituting the significance of news,
namely, the news value and its ideological value (Hall, 1981: 231). But, before discussing
the significance of news, it is important to consider the nature of 'newspaper journalism'.
Tracey suggested that "the highest standard of professional performance occurred when
the reporter presented the reader with all sides of an issue (though there were usually only
two) presented all the 'facts' and allowed the reader to decide what these facts meant"
(1977: 22). But the fact is that in a conflict situation, such as war, the readers are more
passive rather than active, waiting for news from both press and government. And such
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information is not always forthcoming Governments may choose to withhold certain
information. Because of this journalists are less able to present the truth. Thus,
journalists' ability to conform to the three rules of objective journalism discussed above is
constrained, according to Golding & Elliott, by the following factors. First, newspaper
journalism is normally subject to law and its operations and structures are defined in
legislation. Legal regulations have to be translated into routine practice. Second,
newspaper journalism must accept the strict distinction between fact and comment to
which it has to adhere because of its "dominant public presence, monopoly, close
relationship with government and constitutional position" (1979: 32). In an attempt to
achieve this, new standards of impartiality and balance were adopted and fact and
comment were differentiated organisationally by the separating of 'news' and 'current
affairs.
The press is profoundly influenced by the political process in many ways. These who have
political power are able to exert power, directly or indirectly, over the media; the media
perspective on conflict and other events is inevitably influenced by the prevailing political
culture; antagonists manipulate the manner of operation of the political decisions.
Moreover, it is in the nature of the media that they are normally reactive, rather than
proactive. Their role is not to initiate events themselves, but to report, comment on and
interpret events initiated by others (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 3).
One of the major factors affecting the nature of news coverage, however, is the "changes
from within journalism itself', such as the trend towards freelancing. Franklin elaborated
on this theme as follows:
The disadvantages for journalists seem clear. First, for most freelances
the rewards are extremely poor. . .. The second. . . some newspapers
breach copyright and behave unethically in their dealings with
freelanceis . .. Third, freelance work is accompanied by considerable
job insecurity; this in truth favours compliance with managerial
requirements with the obvious consequences for editorial
independence. Fourth, freelance work transfers the burden of capital
costs necessary for journalistic production from management to the
individual journalist. . .. Finally, the freelance life is solitary, lacking
the companionship of colleagues and semi-detached from the
professional culture ofjoumalism . .. Journalism will be characterised
by a continued expansion of freelancing; contracts will become the
norm and staffjobs a rarity (Franldin ,1997: 54-57).
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Hence two major institutions which play a significant impact on society are the state and
the press, and indeed both often complain about each other. But to what extent do they
need each other to perform their respective functions?
There is conflict indeed of who controls the news media agenda or public agenda, the state
or the press. If it is the state, then the function of the press as a watchman is
compromised. The government would be free from public accountability and the press
would either have limited access to vital information about the workings of government or
possibly be used by the government. It is obvious that the relationship between the state
and the press depends on the established state ideology.
So, who controls the news media agenda or public agenda, the state or the press, is a topic
of major debate. In truth, governments of all convictions have always tried to influence
the press, in both 'democratic' and authoritarian regimes, particularly during conflict or
war time. Wolfsfeld said:
The political process has a major impact on the press because political
power can usually be translated into power over the news media,
because the political culture of a society has a major influence on how
the news media cover conflicts, because the news media are much more
likely to react to political events then to initiate them, because realities
often determine how antagonists use the news media to achieve political
goals, and because political decisions have a major influence on who
owns the media and how they operate (1997: 3).
Thus, the conditions in which journalists today have to operate are as follows:
1. The changing managerial and occupational practices;
2. Journalists take refuge in the concept of "objectivity";
3. Journalists are considered by some observers as `spies';
4. Media thrive on conflict rather than conflict resolution, that is why
diplomacy is not normally high on their agenda; and
5. Foreign policy issues which the media seize upon are invariably infinitely
more complex than the media can ever possibly convey in the time and space
available to them (Taylor, 1997: 121-143).
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Factors that contribute to these conditions include social, economic and political pressures.
However, we cannot ignore that the media also attempt to control the public agenda as the
government does. So the power of the media, therefore, is related to its ownership and
control structure and to environmental constraints operating not only on the media
industries themselves but on the wider society. There are, however, particular groups and
individuals who play a key role in shaping the form and content of media messages: major
newspaper owners such as Rupert Murdoch; managers of large broadcasting corporations
such as the BBC, press editors; journalists, feature writers and producers. The small
number of the "media moguls" and the high level of vertical integration within the industry
present a real challenge to the freedom of communication on which democracy depends
(Eldridge, Kitzinger & Williams, 1997: 31, 43-44).
So as Cohen said, reporters hold two sets of perception of the role of the press. From one
perspective, the reporter plays a neutral role, conveying information which is used by
others to set policy; from another, the reporter is an active participant in shaping policy. In
this respect, the press finds itself playing a variety of roles. These roles are:
The press as informer: The press is a neutral provider of factual information, so people
can form their own conclusions about issues.
The press as interpreter: This role is based on a perception that people cannot understand
the news unless its significance is explicitly pointed out to them. Thus, interpretation is an
essential part of reporting.
The press as an instrument of government: Governments use the press to disseminate
their messages, while journalists are under pressure to report "obvious" news.
The press as representative of the public: The man or woman in the street does not have
the opportunities available to reporters to interrogate officials. In this sense, the press are
mediators between the public and officials, and may act as the voice of public opinion.
The press as critic of government: Journalists expect to monitor and speak out against
arbitrariness in government foreign policy-making positions and practices.
The press as an advocate of policy: Journalists' criticism of government policy is a
forerunner to the recommendation of an alternative. This role is played, in particular, by
independent reporters and analysts (Cohen, 1963: 22-40).
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An alternative is a symbiotic relationship between press and government, each benefiting
from the other, for, while the press, through access to government, obtains the most
complete information possible on a topic already covered, the government gains favourable
coverage for its actions and policies. In this situation, the value attached to objectivity in
press coverage implies that the government should provide sufficient information to enable
the press to present an accurate story. On the other hand, the government believe that the
press's privileged access to government records confers on it a responsibility to inform
public opinion. Thus, both the government and press are participants in policy-making.
Whilst the government makes policy by the way it tackles issues and presents itself; the
press influences policy by the way it brings government actions and intentions to the notice
of the public and, in turn, provides feedback from the public to the government (Martin,
1981: 31,43-44).
2.6 The Significance of News
The knowledge and consideration of the significance of news is imperative to successful
press communication. Newspapers seek to inform and entertain the public, and editors
consciously select for coverage those events and ideas which they feel will interest and
attract the readership. So, an important question is, what factors could affect journalists'
work in this respect? Two significant aspects of news, namely, news values and
ideological values dominate journalists' work (Hall, 1981: 227).
2.6.1 News Values
The first factor which affects the pattern of coverage of events is 'news value', a concept
which is regarded as "composed of some of the major criteria by which information about
events is gathered, selected and published" (Hartmann & Husband, 1981: 290). Such
criteria have been suggested by Galling and Ruge (see Figure 2.1, p. 52). The news value
"consists of the professional ideology of news - the common-sense understanding as to
what constitutes the news in the newspaper discourse" ( Hall, 1981: 231).
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The news is in fact audience-oriented and according to Ostgaard, journalists should
consider three significant factors that can influence the content of the news message and
the necessity of making the news 'newsworthy' or 'interesting' or 'palatable' to the
audience. These are: 1) news should not be too complex; 2) readers should be able to
identify with the news ; and 3) news should be exciting. A story must also pass these three
tests to pass through what is called 'the news barrier' (Ostgaard, 1965: 45). However,
the reality is that journalists in their selecting what is to be news often use vague,
shorthand terms to explain or describe complex events, issues and regions (Alleyne, 1997:
5). Franklin detects a change in journalists' judgements since the late 1980s as to what is
newsworthy to be presented to the public. He comments on a tendency in both print and
broadcast media to
a retreat from investigative journalism and the reporting of hard news
to the preferred territory of 'softer' or 'lighter' stories. Journalism's
editorial priorities have changed. . .. the worlds of sport or the royal
family are judged more "newsworthy" than the reporting of significant
issues and events of international consequence. Traditional news
values have been undermined by new values; 'infotainment' is rampant
(1997: 4).
The significant issue at stake in relation to news values and Franldin's arguments is: when
does an event become news? According to Galtung & Ruge in their classic study, an event
becomes news if it satisfies the twelve conditions that can be read in Figure 2.1 (1965: 64-
65).
The conditions and their explanations presented in the figure "could apply to some extent
throughout the world press" (Hetherington, 1985: 7). Hetherington proposes, more
simply, that journalists, consciously or unconsciously, "generally base their choice and
treatment of news on two criteria: (1) what is the political, social, economic, [religious,
particularly in the Muslim nations], and human importance of the event? And (2) will it
interest, excite and entertain our audience?" (1985: 21).
The first criterion that Hetherington believes affects a journalist's judgement or choice and
treatment of news is the political or economic importance of the event. The state as a
participating agency takes priority in all nations and affects all issues since its task is to
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work for the public. It "can assume three distinct roles. The state can limit the elements
that permit freedom of expression, as well as restrain expressions it finds offensive or
threatening; it can encourage an environment within which freedom of expression can
flourish, within the boundaries of serving the state's own interest, and it can use the media
to promote its own goals and interests" (Brasch & Ulloth, 1986: xii). In most Third World
countries, government authorities, or censors, determine what is in the best interest of the
people. In communist countries, direct influence through ownership of the press ensures
control and direction along party lines and government goals (Martin & Chaudhary, 1983:
3).
The second criterion, interest, is vital. In determining this, the final arbiter of what should
be published, in the Western media, is the Editor-in-Chief or editorial panel (Martin &
Chaudhary, 1983: 3).
In practice, in deciding what will interest and excite readers, the Editor-in-Chief will
apply criteria such as those of Galttmg and Ruge, cited in Figure 2.1, for example,
reference to elite persons, unexpectedness, and so on. In countries where the government
exercises more control over the media, 'interest' in Hetherington's terms is a less relevant
criterion for news selection. The question in such situations is not so much what will be
interesting to readers, as what the government feels it is necessary, desirable or beneficial
for them to be told.
2.6.2 The Ideological Value of News
Ideological values that influence the news, another important aspect of press
communication, "consist of the elaboration of the story in terms of its connoted themes
and interpretations . . . [which] belong to the discourse of the newspaper, to newsmen as a
professional group, to the institutional apparatuses of news-making" (Hall, 1981: 231).
Often the primary aim of the press is to reflect local society by reporting and presenting the
facts, i.e. it is a common press aim to serve both the government and public. In doing so,
the members of the press may be aware that "ideological news values belong to the realm
of moral- political discourse in the society as such. Ideological themes will be influenced
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in different ways according to the particular construction which each newspapers selects"
(Hall, 1981: 231).
This, in turn, will depend on the newspaper's policy, political orientation, style of
presentation, tradition and image (Hall, 1981: 231). An example can be found in Strobel's
comments on media coverage of events in Somalia in the summer and autumn of 1992.
The media did not present sensationalised coverage of the many deaths and the plight of
the refugees, pushing the US government towards intervention, but focused instead on
diplomatic efforts and statements by members of Congress and relief groups (1997: 141).
Another important issue that should be addressed in relation to ideological value is the
determination of a few factors that make events newsworthy. Hartmann & Husband
distinguished two kinds of characteristics:
First, conflict, threat and deviancy all make news. . . conflict is the
stuff of news just as it is the stuff of drama and literature. Material
that can be couched in terms of conflict or threat therefore makes
better 'news' than that which cannot . . .. [Second is the] ability to be
interpreted within a familiar framework or in terms of existing which
may images, stereotypes and exceptions may originate in the general
culture, or they may originate in the news [events] itself and pass from
these into the culture (1981: 294-5).
For this reason, those involved in politics are accustomed to monitor the press, closely as a
reflection of public response to their performance. If they perceive that they are getting
too little coverage, they will court publicity to bring their actions and ideas to the public
notice. If coverage is excessively negative, they may perceive a need to change their
policy or present it differently (Wolfsfeld, 1997: 64). For example, during the Gulf
conflict, President Bush was advised to give whatever information he could, in a rapid,
aggressive manner (Hiebert, 1991: 110). One basic implication here is that political actors
often control their messages by establishing internal censorship. But by the same token,
the specific contribution of political debate is difficult to locate outside the press. For
example, particularly during the diplomatic handling of the Gulf conflict, in the different
attempts to reach a peaceful settlement, governments, specifically the allied coalition,
relied on the media to gettheir messages across to both Saddam Hussein and the public all
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over the world in general. Once the war started on 17 January, 1991, however, some
conflict arose between government and media. The next section of this chapter tackles
several issues in relation to the press function and its performance during war time, with
reference to the Gulf war, by way of background to this study. The discussion
encompasses such issues as the way that the public, as well journalists, look at the media
during a war and the relationship between the media people and military authorities in
gathering news and information to be presented to the public.
2.7 Studies Related to the Gulf War and the Media
Having understood the four press theories, Arab media systems, and the function and
communication process as well as key issues in journalistic practice, let us now look at
several studies related specifically to the media during the Gulf war. No specific study, to
my knowledge, has dealt with the performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict,
though the following three studies dealing with the media during the Gulf war are relevant
to this study.
2.7.1 Public Perception of war Coverage in the USA
FitzSimon looked at America public perceptions and opinions in relation to the US
media's Gulf War coverage spanning the period between August 2, 1990 and March 10,
1991. The study was conducted by nine of America's leading polling organisations. The
majority of questions centred on the following nine categories: press ratings, news sources,
censorship issues, manipulation of media for propaganda, how closely respondents are
following the news, respect for the press, emotional response to war coverage, bias issues,
and others (which do not fit any of the first eight categories) (1991: 86-87).
The principal findings were as follows:
- The news coverage of the war was generally well perceived by respondents;
- Americans relied mainly on television for Gulf War news;
- Although the networks were generally well perceived, CNN was considered to have
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performed best;
- Overall, these was a high level of support for military censorship of the media during the
conflict;
- Many respondents accepted the possibility that news may have been censored by the
Iraqi military, but were keen to hear it nevertheless. Others thought the press had done
well in not conceding too many propaganda opportunities;
- Most respondents had followed news of the crisis quite closely, but were less interested
in the aftermath, with the exception of the homecoming of the first American forces;
- A two-thirds majority of respondents believed that media coverage of the conflict had
been objective and unbiased.
The favourable perception of US media coverage of the Gulf conflict can be attributed in
part to the way the US prepared the media and public, psychologically, for war. American
broadcasting and newspapers reports prior to the Iraqi invasion gave clear warning of the
conflict that was to come. For example "on April 5, [1990] after Saddam threatened to
'scorch half of Israel', if it attacked Iraq, the New York Times columnist A. M. Rosenthal
compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler . . .. The Washington Post's Jim Hoagl similarly on
July 5, described Saddam's threat against Israel as an 'airborne version of Hitler's ovens'. .
.. In short, the Saddam - Hitler's analogy was quite well established before the invasion of
Kuwait. Thus, American public support for the president's policy was not sympathy or
identification with Kuwait but antipathy toward Saddam Hussein" (Dorman & Livingston,
1994: 70-71). The campaign, Dorman & Livingston added, "was narrowed to a single
message designed to reinforce the Saddam - as - enemy sentiment"(1994: 72).
The other significant finding concerns the approval of military censorship. This attitude
may, perhaps, be related to the Vietnam experience, when they did not wish to see
coverage of the deaths of young Americans in battle. This perception can be contrasted
with that of the British public, most of whom believed that the media should report battles
in detail, including the deaths of those who, in the public perception, honourably sacrificed
their lives for the public good. Perceptions of the Gulf War coverage will be considered
further later.
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2.7.2 Television and the Gulf War in the UK
Morrison, focusing on a new approach to understanding and judgement of the war,
conducted a survey to explore what British viewers considered the role of television ought
to be in covering the war, paying particular attention to the images and information
transmitted during the Gulf War. Morrison's study revealed that the majority of viewers
saw television as their principal source of news about the Gulf War - with radio second,
and the printed press third. Viewers also placed great trust, in terms of accurate
reporting, in the four main television channels (BBC 1, BBC 2, ITV and C 4) as well as in
CNN and Sky. They believed that these channels performed well, especially BBC 1,
considering its news to be very accurate. However, there were complaints levelled against
television, mainly that it was repetitive, and that too much time was devoted to the war
(complaints against the press centred on it not being informative enough, and too
repetitive) (1992: 1-28).
The issue of censorship, which the media were highly concerned about in order to increase
the credibility of the news to their viewers, is another major point. The degree of
restriction placed on journalists by the coalition forces was seen as much less stringent
than that imposed on journalists in Iraq. Consequently, there was a higher level of trust
placed in reports originating from the coalition front. The functions of the media in
relation to society can be measured by its relationship with the government, and its legal
system. Both the media and the government have the same level of legality exercising their
privileges and enacting laws. Press and broadcasting should work independently and the
government should not suppress free expression. However, the government has the right
to ensure that the media interprets the law correctly. This is based, ideally, on social
responsibility, and making sure that the public has the access to all information that does
not compromise the security of the nation. But, what if the political or military authorities
asked journalists deliberately to report false material to the public?
Morrison's study found that viewers totally disagreed with the media peddling false
information. They felt that, at the very least, the truth should be broadcast once the war
was over, but that false information could be used if it saved the lives of British troops.
An example of this would be "if the army asked a British journalist to give out a false
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report to confiise the enemy, thus saving a lot of British lives . . . 14% of viewers thought
that journalists should refuse to give out false information where as 64% wished for the
truth to be presented once the war was over" (p. 25).
In terms of reporting negative events, the majority of viewers, according to Morrison,
agreed that :
1. Evidence of mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners of war by British troops would be
reported while the war is going on.
2. If a British journalist was asked to under-report the number of coalition planes shot
down for the state of morale, though the true figure was given in Baghdad radio he
should report the true figure.
3. If a British journalist discovered that other coalition forces, rather than the enemy,
were responsible for certain coalition casualties, he has an obligation to report it
while the war is going on.
4. A mistake by the Commanders, adversely affecting the course of the war, should be
reported while the war is going on (1992: 28).
This study was notable for its detailed exploration of perceptions of the presentation of
four events which received wide media coverage during the Gulf war, namely: the bombing
of a bunker in Baghdad, in which large numbers of civilians had been sheltering; the
parading on Iraqi television of captured coalition pilots; the surrender of the Iraqi troops;
and the scenes of Iraqi troops on the Basra road, who, in retreat from Kuwait, had been
subject to coalition air attacks (p. 23).
The majority of viewers agreed that television had the right to show these specific events
but "those who felt it was wrong to show these items on television concentrated either on
the potential risk of upsetting people. . . or upon the perceived propaganda and negative
morale impact of the coverage. In the case of the captured coalition pilots, the concern
was that relatives of the airmen shown would be upset" (p. 24). It is, therefore, obvious
that people do not like to see pictures of injury or death on their TV screens. Morrison's
study reveals that the majority of viewers accepted that television should report battle with
details of Iraqi and British casualties, for the reason that the news presented should be as
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accurate as possible. Viewers, on the other hand, did not accept that showing the conflict,
and the subsequent casualties, was a good thing, reasoning that it would upset the relatives
of the dead and injured, and that they did not like to see dead bodies on TV.
2.7.3 Perceptions of American Mass Media Corespondents in Saudi Arabia
during the 1990 Gulf Crisis
The last study is that of Al-Jahlan, who looked at the perceptions of American mass media
correspondents in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf crisis. One of Al-Jahlan's objectives was
to examine this in relation to the role of the Saudi government and the United States
Military in restricting their journalistic activities. Respondents were asked to respond, on a
scale of "1" for the most negative to "5" for the most positive attitude, to a number of
issues. The survey revealed several interesting perceptions.
In terms of Saudi control of reporters, the following items received the highest rate of
agreement from the survey participants:
(a) Saudi Arabia's control and censorship of foreign reporters during the Gulf
Crisis was perceived as less than that of many other Third World countries, with 5.9%
strongly agreeing and general agreement from 41.6%;
(b) Foreign reporters being able to interview and quote "people on the street"
without any censorship received strong agreement from 9.9% of the respondents, while
40.6% agreed generally.
The items which received the lowest rate of agreement included (a) some reports being
altered or cancelled by the Saudi censors, with only 1.0% strongly agreeing and the same
percentage generally agreeing; (b) reporters having to pass through official Saudi
censorship, with only 3.0% strongly agreeing and 5.9% agreeing; (c) reports on non-
military issues having to pass through official Saudi censorship, with only 3.0% strongly
agreeing and 5.0% agreeing.
Regarding the United States Military control of reporters, the following items received the
highest rate of agreement from the survey participants:
61
(a) The United States military in Saudi Arabia controlled and censored military
news more than Saudi officials did; this received strong agreement from 35.6% of the
respondents and general agreement from 40.6%;
(b) Censorship and control of reporters by the United States military officials in
Saudi Arabia hampered the flow of information about the Gulf Crisis; 34.7% of the
respondents strongly agreed with this, while 41.6% agreed;
(c) Foreign correspondents were able to interview more American personnel than
Saudi personnel with 13.9% strongly agreeing and 46.5% agreeing.
The overall analysis of the data indicates a relatively favourable attitude in relation to
Saudi control of foreign reporters during the Gulf Crisis. Al-Jahlan concluded his results
by suggesting that "a minority of respondents agreed that the United States military
control of reporters hampered the flow of information during the 1990 Gulf Crisis; a
majority agreed that the United States military controlled reporters and news more than
did the Saudi officials; and a majority agreed that military issues were censored by the
United States military" (1993: 118).
The three studies reported above have some features in common. All employed a
systematic methodological approach by way of a standardised question and answer format
(continuum ranking, Likert scale, open-end question inventories and checklists). A shared
quantitative approach attempted to find out the respondents' perceptions and levels of
satisfaction. Both FitzSimmon's and Morrison's studies centred on the audience rather
than journalists, as was the case with Al-Jahlan. All the studies examined democratic
systems over Islamic ones. Despite this difference in context, these studies contributed in
informing the researcher's thinking about ways of eliciting, required for this study, and all
three studies were drawn on in the design of the research instruments.
Summary
This chapter has laid a theoretical framework for the present study, by exploring the
political and social influences on press performance, the components of that performance
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in terms of elements that make up the communication process, and ethical and professional
values that affect how the press selects and presents material.
We began with four theories which depict a variety of relationships between the press and
government. The situation in Saudi Arabia cannot be characterised as either libertarian or
Soviet communist, but to what extent do either the authoritarian theory or the social
responsibility theory explain the role of the Saudi government vis -a- vis the press? If the
authoritarian theory applies, we would expect to see the Saudi press in the Gulf conflict
adhering very strictly to an official government line, with no room for questioning,
criticism or interpretation. ff, on the other hand, social responsibility theory applies, we
might expect to see a little more flexibility and freedom for the Saudi press, though it
might still largely confine itself to a government line if it were persuaded that the national
interest was at stake.
Either explanation, but especially the latter, would be consistent with the classification of
Arab media, according to which the Saudi press has been categorised as loyalist -privately
owned and so ostensibly not government controlled, but nevertheless concerned primarily
to present a supportive, uncritical view of the government and its policies. It will be
interesting, however, to investigate to what extent the Saudi press was used to perform a
mobilisation function during the Gulf conflict, as such a function is generally more
consistent with the authoritarian press theory.
Also presented were three theories of press function whose interest and significance for the
present study lies in their implications of political behaviours which might be reflected in
the content of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict. If the Saudi government views the
press as a "magic bullet", we would expect to find, particularly under an authoritarian
theory, evidence of conscious and deliberate exploitation of the press to carry propaganda;
the press, in such a case, might be characterised as a "mobilisation press". Under the
"agenda-setting theory" of the press, the government influence would be more subtle, but
it is recognised that politicians, aware of the success of the press in "telling people what to
think about" make conscious efforts to manipulate it. Under this theory, then, we might
expect to find the Saudi press setting the agenda of public opinion; but under the influence
of press loyalism and authoritarian and/or social responsibility model, the agenda that is
63
"set" will actually be that of the government or some other powerful establishment group
such as the religious leadership or the military.
One mechanism though which this may take place is explained by the 'spiral of silence
theory'. If the press presents only one perspective on events, people (in this study, Saudi
journalists, for example,) who hold a different view will feel increasingly isolated and will
tend to keep quiet to hide their "deviance". Thus, gradually, dissenting opinions are
suppressed.
An understanding of the communication process formulae (section 2.4) leads us to analyse
the content of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict in terms of a series of questions:
who conveys what message, to whom, about what, under what circumstances, and for
what purpose? We recognise, moreover, that the content and tone of such coverage will
reflect the degree to which Saudi journalists uphold the professional value of objective
reporting (or, perhaps, the outcome of a conflict between that standard and the calls of
loyalism and social responsibility or the exertion of authoritarian pressure). It will also
reflect certain values and beliefs with regard to what is "newsworthy" and why.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
To fulfil the aims of this thesis and to validate the research hypotheses and questions
presented in Chapter 1, three research methodologies were used, namely, interviews with
the Saudi media academics and journalists, content analysis of the Saudi press, and survey
questionnaires administrated to the Saudi journalists. Each of these methodologies is
discussed in the following pages.
3.1 Interview Method
In order to answer research question No. 1, that is, to find out Saudi media academics'
and journalists' opinions toward the performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf
conflict, interviews were used. An interview is defined in Webster's Encyclopaedic
Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language, as: "a conversation or meeting in which a
writer or reporter asks questions of a person or persons from whom material is sought for
a newspaper story, television broadcast, etc" (1989: 745).
Regarding format, "The most common type of interviewing is individual, face- to- face
verbal interchange, but it can also take the form of face- to- face group interviewing,
mailed or self-administered questionnaires, and telephone surveys" (Fontana & Frey, 1994:
361).
In this study, form of face- to- face interviews were conducted in a field trip to Saudi
Arabia from 15th February -5th May 1997. We used the "semi - structured" approach in
which " . . . a limited subject is probed in depth without a fixed order" (Smith & Manning,
1982: 99).
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Academics' opinions in the Saudi universities specialising in communication studies were
sought because they represent a group whose knowledge is respected by the Saudi
government and society alike. They prepare students for subsequent employment in the
Ministry of Information as well as in the Saudi press organisations. They also act as
consultants to various public and private organisations. In these capacities, they can be
expected to have experience not only of media theories but also of the policy issues
affecting the communication media in Saudi Arabia. Journalists, for their part, are
regarded as an important source of opinion, because they are directly involved in news
production and responsible for what goes into the Saudi press day by day. It is they who
have to tread the fine line between the government policy agenda and the press agenda,
and who are most directly affected by any interference in news stories.
3.1.1 Participants:
Three different groups were contacted.
Group One. Media academics in all media colleges and departments in all Saudi Arabian
universities. There is one media college called Media and Call College, located in the
Imam Mohammed ibn Saud Islamic University; there are three communications
departments, in the Art College, King Saud University, in King Abdul Aziz University and
in Umm al-Qura University. Academics selected for the study all had a Ph.D. in
Journalism and Broadcasting.
Group Two. Saudis journalists (editors, reporters, correspondents) in all seven Saudi
Arabian national daily newspapers (al-Madinah, al-Nadwah, al-Bilad, al-Riyadh, Okaz,
al-Jazeera, and al-Yaum).
Group three. Other important Saudis individuals working in the Saudi media such as
Saudi television or similar organisations.
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As a result, a total of 24 personnel were chosen as the population of the study: 10 media
academics, 9 journalists and 5 other media-related personnel. The selection of the sample
was based on the suggestions made by the directors of each of the media colleges and
departments in Saudi universities or by the Editor-in-Chief or the managing editor of
editors of Saudi newspapers. Other personnel were nominated by one or more of the
media academics or journalists interviewed. However, for the convenience of the study,
we put the opinion of such individuals under the journalists section for the reason that
those personnel were involved in some capacity with journalism, rather than teaching at the
universities.
3.1.2 Interview Procedure
Questions were formulated to obtain a critical analysis of the performance of the Saudi
press from the participants. Questions were framed so as to draw on participants
knowledge of the major institutions in Saudi Arabian society-police, politics, military and
press. They were asked in open-ended form, so that interviewees could express
themselves freely in response'.
In conducting the interviews, three important aspects of setting up the interviewer-
respondent interaction were considered: the purpose and reason for the interview was
explained to each participant; a cordial relationship between the researcher and participants
was established to encourage their co-operation in answering the questions accurately and
completely. Finally the researcher emphasised the importance of the respondent's
contribution and how seriously the task was to be taken (Fowler & Mangione, 1990: 55-
56). The interviews was held in their places of work and on average lasted 45 minutes.
To facilitate a free exchange of ideas with participants, the interviews were tape- recorded
with their permission. So the researcher was freed from note taking, and interruptions to
the flow of interviews were avoided. In addition terms with multiple meaning were
1 For details of the questions asked, see Appendix C.
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avoided and ambiguity was eliminated to ensure that every question meant the same for
each participant. All interviews were conducted in Arabic, the native language of the
participants, except in the case of one respondent who preferred to answer in English.
After the interviews, the discussions were transcribed by the researcher, who then
summarised each interviewee's responses in English. These translations were checked by a
native English speaker, to make sure that the respondents' statements were clear and
understandable.
The resulting of qualitative data are presented in Chapter 4.
3.2 Content Analysis Method
In order to test hypotheses I-VI and answer research questions 2-7, a content analysis is
essential. Content analysis is defined by one author as, "a research technique for the
objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of
communication" (Berelson, 1952: 18 ). The main requirements of such an analysis are
that it should be objective, systematic and quantitative, as explained by Wimmer and
Dominick Being systematic implies that the sample selection must follow proper
procedures, which allow for each item equality of opportunity for inclusion in the
analytical process. At the same time, all content under consideration must be treated in the
same fashion. Objectivity comes through any results gained being easily replicated by
future researchers. Quantitativeness depends on how careful is the researcher's reporting,
so that his/her findings, and their interpretation and analysis, facilitate further use (1983:
138-139).
Content analysis is concerned with manifest content, which Patterson, quoting Reed, H.
Black and Edwin 0. Harroldsen define as ". . . mean[ing] what is said or printed, not
what is between the lines" (1984: 36 ). A conceptual framework for content analysis,
which should be considered as a scientific approach, should include the following: "the
data as communicated to the analyst, the context of the data, how the analyst's knowledge
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partitions his reality, the target of a content analysis, inference as the basic intellectual task
[and] validity as the ultimate criteria of success" (KrippendorfE 1980: 25-26).
With this in mind, the framework of this study is intended to serve three purposes:
perspective, analytical, and methodological To provide perspective, that is, to aid
conceptualisation, the design of the practical content analysis for Saudi press during the
Gulf conflict needs to be presented. The framework is analytical, in the sense that it
facilitates the critical examination of content analysis results obtained by this researcher's
interpretation, which is discussed in chapter 7; and methodological, in the sense that it
directs the growth and systematic improvement of the method of content analysis which is
used in this study and is discussed below.
Together, consideration of the definitions and requirements of content analysis and the
above framework provided an efficient way of investigating the content of the Saudi press
and gave this study reliability and validity, as will be explained in greater detail below.
Evidence of the application of the definition of content analysis within the above
framework is presented through the sampling, research categories and measurement, all of
which are again discussed in the following pages. In order to interpret accurately the
inferences and tasks of the Krippendorff model, one should keep in mind the "location of
the variable [category] portion of the context of available data . . .. The target [therefore]
is what the analyst will want to know about" (Krippendorff 27). What this research is
trying to establish is clearly stated in the Chapter 1, which sets out the aims of the study,
along with the research hypotheses and questions. In order to make the necessary
inferences, it is also necessary to have a "logical bridge between available data and the
uncertain target in their context" (KrippendorfE 27). In this study an uncertain target, for
example, might be the Saudi Arabian government or other governments in their political
handling of the conflict, more specifically, or the nature of the relationships between the
Saudi Arabia government and the press during the conflict.
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3.2.1 Sampling
The sample for content analysis of Saudi press is drawn from the three major Saudi Arabia
national daily newspapers, namely, al-Riyadh (Riy), Okaz (Oka), and al-Yaum (Yau). The
papers were selected because of their size of circulation and stratified geographic
distribution. Al-Riyadh is distributed in Riyadh the political centre of the country. Okaz is
centred on the area of the 'Sacred Shrines', while al-Yaum is distributed in Dammam, an
area close to the battle front and a vital port. Al- Yaum is the only daily newspaper issued
in the eastern zone of the country. For more details of the names of all the Saudi national
daily newspapers, their locations, the date they began publication, and their circulation, see
Chapter 1, Table 1.1.
Before drawing up the sample for the content analysis, the time frame of the study was
decided upon. It extended from 2 July, 1990 to 30 March, 1991, a period covering the 30
days prior to Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, to 30 days after the liberation of
Kuwait (see Table 3.1).
Table 3.1 The Time Frame of the Stud
Period Time
1. Before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
2. Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait
3. The liberation of Kuwait
4. After the liberation of Kuwait
2 July, 1990 - 1 August, 1990
2 August, 1990 - 16 January, 1991
17 January, 1991 - 28 February, 1991
1 March, 1991- 30 March, 1991
However, each of these periods was characterised by different levels of coverage as
follows:
The First Period: 2 July, 1990 to 1 August, 1990.
The first period relates to the thirty days leading up to the invasion, which is an important
starting point for the entire analytical process. There should be a logical connection
between items appearing in this period and those appearing in the other three periods of
analysis. Since the Gulf conflict was perceived as external political threat to Saudi Arabia,
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it should be an important issue in both the Saudi policy as well as the Saudi press agenda.
For more data in this regard, see Chapters 4, 5 and 7.
The Second Period: 2 August, 1990 to 16 January, 1991.
The second period includes the coverage by the Saudi press of Iraq's invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, including religious and diplomatic debates, and resolutions in favour
of Kuwait and the Allied coalition. This period also contained the peace movement's
demonstrations in Saudi Arabia and other countries such as the UK, USA and Egypt,
which were generally non-violent and good-humoured character.
The Third Period: 17 January, 1991 to 28 February, 1991.
The third period, covers the liberation period which began when Allied aircraft and cruise
missiles struck Iraq, and the subsequent ground war, and ended with Iraq's agreement to
meet with the US to discuss cease-fire terms.
The Fourth Period: 1 March, 1991 to 30 March, 1991.
The fourth and the last period follows the liberation of Kuwait. It is a good rounding off
point. One should note, compared with the Endings of the above three periods, a
difference in the Saudi press performance after the liberation of Kuwait. Has there been a
change in relation to the Gulf conflict in presenting news and information?
However, the general assumptions are that: first, there was a strong shift in the Saudi press
treatment of the main news topics, and the conflict, during each period because of the
United Nations' resolutions pertaining to the conflict. Second, it is expected that, through
each period of study, the Saudi press covered the very broad aspects of the Gulf conflict
such as factors leading up to the conflict in the region, why Saddam invaded Kuwait and
the level of casualties. Also of interest is the language used and the role of the Saudi
press in reporting the events, since we observed that the Arab media after the war between
Israel and Arab in 1963 lost their credibility when the Arab states were defeated by Israel.
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This would be reflected in the choice of material, the themes that were emphasised, the
links that were made between these and the final conclusions that were drawn. Finally, it
can be argued that the coverage would reveal the attitude of the Saudi government and
press, towards Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the conflict as a whole, and also reveal the
Saudi government's policy and Saudi press agenda in relation to the Gulf conflict. All
these assumptions were identified in the light of the Saudi press content presented in
Chapter 5 and interpretation in Chapter 7.
For sampling purposes, it was not the aim to spend a lot of time analysing all issues
appearing throughout the period of the study. Instead, we employed the constructed week
approach, in estimating population parameters for all three newspapers. 'Constructed
week' sampling "assur[es] that all days of the week are represented in the sample" (Lacy,
Robinson & Rife, 1995: 395). Use of the 'constructed week' approach, according to
Jones and Carter " . . . will yield news - hole estimates which are close enough to a hand -
measured 'real' figure for nearly all content analysis purposes. . ." ( 1959: 399).
The value of the constructed week sample for content analysis is that it is " . . . more
efficient than pure random or consecutive day sampling . . . For a population of six
months of editions, one constructed week was as efficient as four [and] two constructed
weeks would allow reliable estimates of local stories in a year's worth of newspaper entire
issues. . ." (Rife, Aust & Lacy, 1993: 135).
As a result, a constructed week sample for each period was selected. Thus, the first week
of each period was chosen, regardless of whether it started in the beginning or the middle
of the month. One exception to this was that, all days in the third period were analysed, in
order to reflect as filly as possible developments in the war. Table 3.2 lists the days of the
week, and the months for which newspaper issues were chosen for analysis.
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Table 3.2 Dates of Newspapers Covered by the Study
First period: before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait:
Mon 2, Tue 3, Wed 4, Thur 5, Fri 6, Sat 7, Sun 8, July, 1990. (7 days)
Second period: The Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait:
Thur 2, Fri 3, Sat 4, Sun 5, Mon 6, Tue 7, Wed 8, August, 1990.
Sun 2, Mon 3, Tue 4, Wed 5, Thur 6, Fri 7, Sat 8, September, 1990.
Tue, 2 , Wed 3, Thur 4, Fri 5, Sat 6, Sun 7, Mon 8, October, 1990.
Fri 2, Sat 3, Sun 4, Mon 5, Tue 6, Wed 7, Thur 8, November, 1990.
Sun, 2, Mon 3, Tue 4, Wed 5, Thur 6, Fri 7, Sat 8, December, 1990.
Wed 2, Thur 3, Fri 4, Sat 5, Sun 6, Mon 7, Tue 8, January, 1991. (42 days)
Third period: The Liberation:
Wed 17 January to Thur 28, February, 1991 (43 days).
Fourth Period: After the War:
Fri 1, Sat 2, Sun 3, Mon 4, Tue 5, Wed 6, Thur 7, March, 1991. (7 days)
The front page is "important because most readers glance at it first, since it is on the
counter of shops and kiosks" (Hetherington, 1985 :152). It is common for the front page
in Saudi newspapers to contain the 'leader article, which expresses the newspaper's
editorial opinion; this is the case for al-Riyadh and al-Yaum, whereas Okaz's leader is
inside the paper.
Issues of each of the surveyed newspapers were drawn systematically for the chosen dates
and the front page and leading article of each was analysed. Thus, for each of the
newspapers under study, 99 issues, that is 99 front pages and 99 leading articles were
analysed. In total, 297 issues of the three Saudi press were analysed. In the analysis, all
items, and non advertising material that appeared on these newspapers' front pages were
recorded in the study, classified under one of the seven categories discussed in the next
sub-section. No attention was paid to the actual amount of space devoted to each story
or to headline size. Cartoons and pictures, if they were clearly associated with a particular
article or editorial, were included in the coding for the overall story. If not, they were
treated as separate items and coded under one of the seven categories (see p. 73).
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3.2.2 Research Categories
When constructing categories for analysis, newspaper material was categorised on the
basis of a reformulated and expanded version of categories used by Stevenson, et al.,
(1990: 197-9). The categories and their definitions were as follows:
Category A: Main news topics. The main news topics were political, military/ defence,
economic, social service, crime/law/justice, sport, education, ecology/environment, natural
disasters/accident, religion, multi-issues and others (see Appendix D for definitions
specifications).
Category B: Type of news. The types of news selected were classified into the three
following categories: domestic, international (involving Saudi Arabia and a foreign country
regardless of its geographical location) and foreign (with no reference to Saudi Arabia).
Category C: Tone of main news topic. The tone of the main news topics was classified
as positive or negative, the judgement being based on whether the news topic and tone
were favourable or unfavourable to the UN resolutions. Thus, items which focused only
on Iraq's aggression and lack of co-operation with the international community were
classed as negative in tone. On the other hand, items which hi . hlighted and supported the
policies and actions of Saudi Arabia and the allied coalition to resolve the situation,
whether diplomatically or militarily, were classed as positive.
Category D: Theme of news item and leading articles. The theme is the main subject or
idea in a piece of writing. The themes of news items and leading articles were also
classified as positive or negative and were judged, based on each item's tone, as either
favourable or unfavourable to the UN resolution, on the same basis as explained above.
Category E: Personnel. The personnel referred to the government of Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, PLO, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North
America, Latin America, Africa, Asia/Pacific, the Middle East, Multi-region and the Allied
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Coalition. In addition, individual or institutional (domestic, international, and foreign),
multi region and unidentifiable personnel categories were used.
Category F: Geographical Locations. The following geographic locations were
identified: Saudi Arabia, which is separated (for the purpose of this study) from the Middle
East as a district entity, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America, Latin America,
Africa, Asia/Pacific, the Middle East, Multi-regions and unidentifiable geographical. In
addition, the UN is used as a separate entity for the purposes of this study.
Category G: Source of news. The sources of the news stories were encoded in the
following categories: newspapers' own staffC the Saudi Press Agency [SPA], the major
international services (Reuters, Agence France Press [AFP], Tass, The Associated Press
(AP), and United Press International [UPI], other media- both home and abroad, private
citizens, public officials, multi sources, other agencies and unidentified sources.
Every effort was made to keep the above main categories independent, but some
categories were divided into sub-categories. After defining the categories, and detailing
definitions, the encoding began with individual news stories. This was undertaken by the
researcher. To facilitate systematic, quantitative encoding, seven separate data sheets for
each newspaper were designed. Each sheet contains one category (see Appendix E). For
this purpose, the constructed week approach was adopted, and samples of each of the
three newspapers taken for the three periods, i.e. 21 issues in total. The idea was not
simply to get data and calculate percentages of items in each category per se, but rather
to learn about our research process, coding approach and observation techniques.
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3.2.3 Reliability & Validity Checks
3.2.3.1 Reliability:
In social science research the term 'reliability' means that ". . . repeated measurement of
the same material will result in similar decisions or conclusions" (Wimmer & Dominick,
1983: 152).
There are two types of reliability. Intercoder reliability, ". . . refers to the degree of
agreement between different coders at the same time, whereas intracoder reliability
measures the test- retest stability of an individual coder over time" (North et al., 1963: 42).
Agreement means that each of the coders places a story in the same category (Smith et al.
1988: 741).
The following steps were undertaken. Research category boundaries were defined with
maximum detail. Second, because there were no coders trained using the coding
instrument and the category system, a pilot study was conducted. Samples of each of the
three newspapers were taken for one week in the second of the three periods of interest to
the study, one constructed week for period, i.e. 21 issues in total. Articles in this sample
were categories to check that the categories were unambiguous and sufficient to cover the
range of items to be classified.
3.2.3.2 Validity
The term 'validity' is defined as " . . . the extent to which an instrument measures what it
is intended to measure" (North, et al., 1963: 41- 42). However, ". . . validity of the data,
as well as the ability to generalise the results, is directly related to the level of reliability"
(North et al, 1963: 49).
In order to avoid poor validity in observational data, four different possible sources were
considered: "1. Inadequate sampling of complex stimuli, 2 Imprecisely defined or
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inadequately understood observational categories or definitions [and] 3-4. Subtle changes
in the environment and persons observed" (Smith 1981: 139, quoted Dunnette). "The
commonest definition of validity is epitomized by the question: Are we measuring what we
think we are measuring?" (Kerlinger, 1973: 457). In the case of the present research, a
total 3,609 individual items were analysed. The researcher is confident that this was a
sufficiently large sample to capture the complexity of press performance during the Gulf
conflict Moreover, the division of the sample into three periods allowed for changes in
the environment during the course of the conflict, which might be expected to influence the
content of the press. The classification categories drawn from Stevenson et al (1990) were
found to be clear and in most cases straightforward to apply. In the few cases where some
initial difficulty of classification was experienced due to the mixed nature of some items, a
re-reading of the definitions given by Stevenson et al (1990) was sufficient to resolve the
matter. However, "In most cases, validity does not seem to be a major problem in content
analysis. Most of the time, a careful definition of categories and judicious and alternative
selection of indicators will take care of the matter" (Berelson, 1952: 171).
3.2.4 Statistical Procedures
For an analysis of the data of the content analysis, tables that summarise the findings of the
quantitative content analysis were prepared for all categories.
For the main news topic, type and tone of news topic, as well as the theme of news item
and leading article, frequencies were employed. For the personnel, geographical locations,
and source of news, rank order, frequencies and percentages were used. The purpose of
this was to analyse the data to determine how each of the newspapers examined for this
study performed in relation to the selected analysis categories. This would enable the
researcher to identify similarities and differences between newspapers by comparing the
tables but, more importantly, to answer the research questions and test the research
hypotheses.
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Each table addressed one of the main research questions and was used to investigate an
individual hypothesis. The research questions were answered, and the findings presented
in tables containing statistical summaries. The tables described the set of distribution,
measurement of level (rank, frequency, and percentage) and measurement of spread of
newspapers, to compare different levels of distribution.
For testing the research hypotheses, the main approach was to compare the proportions
(p) of the differences in each category (main news topic, personnel, geographical, source
etc.) for each newspaper. This was done using a statistical test based on a confidence
interval (Everitt & Hay, 1992: 58-61) given by the following:
p +1.961/X100 —
•
where 1.96 is the critical value for a 95%* confidence interval;
p the proportion of news from each category; and
n the total number of news items for each category counted for
each paper.
One important note is that the calculation for the 'unidentified' or 'other' unit in the three
categories (personnel, geography and source) was eliminated in order to procure more
accurate results to test the hypotheses.
In addition, in order to investigate fully each of the main hypotheses, we examined all the
hypotheses (except those relating to the theme and leading articles) on two levels: for each
newspaper (Riy, Oka and Yau) individually and then for all of them together. This means
that each hypothesis listed in this study produced three subhypotheses (except hypotheses
Nos. II and VI), all of which have been statistically tested.
* A 95% confidence interval was used to reflect a narrow interval for identifying differences or lack
of differences between the proportions. This level is that most often used in the research literature
as well. The corresponding critical value of 1.96 is obtained from statistical tables, from the
normal distribution tables using the normal approximation to the binomial distribution.
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The generation of sub-hypotheses can be illustrated with reference to hypothesis Ia which
was:
Political and military/defence developments news in the Gulf conflict would be more
newsworthy than other Gulf conflict news topics.
For the purpose of analysis, this hypothesis yielded three sub-hypotheses, mainly
1) Political and military/defence developments news in the Gulf conflict would be more
newsworthy in al-Riyadh newspaper than other Gulf conflict news topics.
2) Political and military/defence developments news in the Gulf conflict would be more
newsworthy in Okaz newspaper than other Gulf conflict news topics.
3) Political and military/defence developments news in the Gulf conflict would be more
newsworthy in al-Yauni newspaper than other Gulf conflict news topics.
Sub-hypotheses were generated in the same way for hypotheses Ib, Ic, III, IV and V. As a
way of avoiding repetition, for each hypothesis that produced subhypotheses, their results
appear in Appendix F. On the basis of the research findings, for all newspapers under
investigation it was possible either to reject or accept each of the hypotheses with,
however, slight differences in the source of news for three periods of the study, namely,
the Iraqi invasion and occupation, liberation and after the liberation. As a result, the
researcher was able to group all the newspapers under investigation into one broad
dimension, and for most categories and for each period. This is especially pertinent, given
the fact that all Saudi newspapers are governed to by the government's information policy,
to which they must adhere.
In order to test hypothesis VI (theme of leading articles), since the frequency with which
each subject matter occurred was very small, we used the overall total number of
appearances in the three newspapers to investigate whether or not the theme of the
leading article was positive or negative, by using the same statistical test. This was based
on the same confidence interval as was used in testing research hypotheses Nos. I, III, IV
and V. A summary of the research hypotheses results are presented in Appendix F.
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To investigate hypothesis No. II (relating to the theme of news items), we used a pareto
analysis (this involved the ranking of the themes in order of decreasing frequency). We
have considered, and ranked, only the top ten themes (calculated from the total) and
classified the rest as 'other' for each of the periods of the study.
The rationale for this cut off is due to the fact that, for the invasion and occupation period
beyond this point, each theme outside the 'top ten' was mentioned less than 20 times for
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all the newspapers combined, representing only 861 X 100 (2.3%). For the liberation
period, Each 'other' theme was mentioned less than 28 times for all the newspapers
28
combined, representing only 1148 X 100 (2.4%). For the period after the liberation,
each theme outside the 'top ten' was mentioned less than four times altogether, which
4
represents only 174 X 100 (2.3%).
So, in order to test hypothesis No. II, a statistical Chi - square analysis (Everitt & Hay,
1992: 100) was performed, the formula for which is given as
2 11 (Ni Miy
X= 	
9	 i-1	 Mi
where Ni represents the frequencies for each theme in one newspaper (i.e. Oka
newspaper)
Mi are the frequencies for each theme in other newspaper, (i. e. Rzy or Yau newspaper)
9 is calculated as the degrees of freedom (11-2), 11 = themes ( and 2 = number of
theme objective comparisons).
We used this test at a 5%* level. The critical value at this level is 3.3.
* The same rationale given for the use of a 95% confidence interval applies to the 5% level here.
There are no approximations applied here as the Chi- square is the appropriate distribution for
this analysis.
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3.3 Survey Method
To answer question No. 8 [What are Saudi journalists' perceptions toward the Saudi press
functions in time of war and their views and level of satisfaction with its performance in
coverage of the Gulf conflict, and why?], a survey research methodology was used. A
survey is defined by Webster's Encyclopaedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English
Language as "a sampling, or partial collection, of facts, figures, or opinions taken and used
to approximate or indicate what a complete collection and analysis might reveal" (1989:
1432). One writer argues that "Survey research, also called 'questionnaire research'
enables. . . [the researcher] to obtain managerial defensible data that are (1) representative,
(2) generalizable to a specific audience segment, and (3) precise estimates of audience
characteristics" (Simmons, 1990: 75). Two types of survey in the quantitative approach
are common in communications study: descriptive and analytic surveys. The descriptive
survey is especially appropriate for this thesis, because it attempts to count a representative
sample which tells us how respondents feel about a given subject or issue and then allows
us to make inferences about the target population as a whole which, in turn, provides us
with information to make predictions and take action. The analytic survey is used in
studies that look at causal relationships between one variable and another. Both of these
types of survey could be used to answer questions or test hypotheses through statistical
analysis (Oppenheim, 1992: 12).
The descriptive survey is used in this study. The aim was to gain evidence from
respondents. So, we arranged the questions and, more importantly, findings according to
respondents' perceptions toward the Saudi press functions in time of the war and its
performance in Gulf conflict.
In order to obtain manageable, defensible data, the following procedures were undertaken.
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3.3.1 Target Population2
The population for the study was Saudi journalists (editors, reporters, correspondents) in
all seven Saudi Arabian national daily papers (al-Madinah, al-Nadwah, al-BE/ad, al-
Riyadh, Okaz, al-Jazerah, and al-Yawn). This resulted in 79 journalists being surveyed.
This sample's selection was based on the suggestions made by Editors-in-Chief and
editorial managers who believed that the survey should be given only to those who had
experience in dealing with the conflict. This approach may be considered an effective
method of studying Saudi journalists' perceptions, particularly as the sample covered all
regions of the country.
3.3.2 Design of the Study
This section of the study has a different starting point from those of FitzSimon, Morrison
and Al-Jahlan (see Chapter 2), because we are concerned with Saudi journalists'
perceptions of the Saudi press functions in time of war, and their views and level of
satisfaction in its coverage of the Gulf conflict.
In exploring these, the following procedures were employed:
3.3.2.1 Research Instruments
Following Fowler's recommendations (1993) that questions should have several
properties, the final design of the questionnaire contained several important elements: 1)
2 In addition to journalists, it was originally intended to survey specialists in journalism and
broadcasting from the media colleges and departments in Saudi Universities. However, the 50
questionnaires sent out yielded so few responses (12, i.e. 25%), that this group was discarded,
being considered too small to be of benefit. The poor response may have been attributable to
several reasons: fear that answers could be used against them; other demands on their time,
particularly as the Kingdom's rapid development gives rise to a need for new communication
campaigns, and the fact that Saudi society is still not familiar and comfortable with surveys as a
means of giving information.
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Both questions and answers were fully scripted, which allowed respondents to be fully
prepared to answer the questions; and 2) Ambiguity was eliminated because every question
meant the same for each respondent (69-70). In addition, all terms or concepts were
written in such a way as to ensure full answers. A sixteen-page questionnaire, including a
covering letter in the Arabic language, was distributed in March, 1997 to the groups
mentioned above. The researcher himself visited each newspaper during May and July
1997 to collect the questionnaires and to follow up any queries3.
Respondents were asked to respond to the statements and questions employing three
standardised formats: 1) Likert- type scales: "Strongly agree", "Agree", "Undecided",
'Disagree" and "Strongly disagree"; 2) ticking the appropriate choice from a set of pre-
selected answers; and 3) a checklist, whereby respondents were asked to rank items in
order of importance. These formats allowed for statistical analysis of both percentage and
distribution of all responses, as well as the measurement both of direction and degree of
agreement with any statement or question given.
The questionnaire was divided into three parts. The first part of the questionnaire
contained forty - four questions. The questionnaire sought information regarding the
respondents' perceptions of the press functions in time of war. The questions were
adopted following Starck's (1974), FitzSimon's (1991) and Morrison's (1992) questions,
but in a somewhat different way. They are broken into five themes in relation to the
function of press as they were named by McQuail (see Chapter 2, p.46). They are:
information, correlation, continuity, entertainment and mobilization function. In addition
to these fimctions, questions in relation to press regulation was also presented in this part.
The second part, containing twelve questions, dealt with the respondents' view towards
and level of satisfaction with the Saudi press performance during the Gulf conflict. Finally,
the third part dealt with the general characteristics of respondents: age, sex, education
level, position held and experience in their former or current position.
3 Appendix G lists all the questions asked.
83
The questions in the first section revealed what the researcher labelled as the ideological
perspective focusing on what Saudi journalists think the function of the press in an
Islamic State should be. It prepared them to answer the second part, which was arranged
around more specific questions, requiring greater knowledge of the Gulf conflict.
Accordingly, thirteen main types of questions were included in this instrument:
(a) Questions about the respondents' perceptions of the function of the Saudi press in
time of war;
(b) Questions on the press coverage (the job the Saudi press did in covering the Gulf
conflict);
(c) A question on the perceptions of adequacy of various media coverage of the Gulf
conflict;
(d) Questions concerned with primary sources of news in coverage of the Gulf conflict;
(e) A question concerning the press' agenda during the Gulf war;
(f) A question concerning negative news (depth and fairness of the coverage in Gulf
war);
(g) A question concerning the publication of Saddam Hussein' speeches;
(h) A question concerning the press and military authorities' intervention for the
dissemination of news and information in coverage of the Gulf conflict;
(i) A question concerning military censorship, and their reasons for doing so in
coverage of the Gulf conflict;
(j) A question concerning the limitations of the Saudi press in coverage of the Gulf
conflict;
(k) A question concerned with journalists' level of satisfaction with the Saudi press in
coverage of the Gulf conflict;
(1) A question concerning how closely journalists followed the Gulf conflict news after
the liberation of Kuwait; and
(m) Questions concerning the general characteristics of respondents: age, sex,
educational level, position held and experience in his/her former or current position.
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3.3.2.2 Validity and Reliability of Questions
3.3.2.2.1 Validity
Validity, is seen as the extent to which an instrument measures what it is intended to
measure. However, "The validity of survey responses is inherently more difficult to
establish than their reliability . . . because stated intentions are not matched by
corresponding behaviours . . .. What people say they do and what they actually do, do
not always coincide" (Bulmer & Warwick, 1993: 157). Thus in this survey, steps were
taken to find out whether or not respondents were stating opinions that were matched by
their corresponding behaviour. This was discovered by comparing the manifest content of
the Saudi press with respondents' answers to the questionnaire (see Chapter 7).
A preliminary draft of the questionnaire was prepared and subjected to tests of validity.
The major classes of validity namely criterion, content, and construct, were considered in
relation to the study's questionnaire (de Vaus, 1986: 47-8).
In the light of deVaus' major classes of validity, we presumed that the concepts
incorporated into the questions, and the arguments that were in the researcher's mind
when he designed the questions, seemed an appropriate measurement of what the
questions were intended to measure. In addition, validity is not seen as be a major
problem in survey research in that, as long as careful testing of reliability is undertaken, the
validity of measurement is guaranteed.
3.3.2.2.2 Reliability
It was not considered feasible or appropriate to carry out a statistical procedure checking
the reliability of the survey instrument (i.e., part 2 and part 3) as the construction of items
did not lend itself to measurement of the internal consistency of the section on an item -by-
item basis to find out the correlation coefficient between each item and the overall ratings
of each section. It was not possible to split the instrument into equivalent halves or to
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constrict two equivalent forms of it. Nor was a test - retest design possible as Editors -in-
Chief of the various newspapers made it clear that a questionnaire would go to journalists
who are considered experts, rather than to all journalists in the organisation; as a result,
the sample would be too small. So, it would be unrealistic to give the same test to the
same sample twice as most respondents would remember their answers from the first
occasion. The same would be the case with the group of people on whom we tried out the
questionnaire (more details are represented below). The last reason is that the questions in
the survey were written in a manner to suit what this researcher intended to measure.
Thus, two ways of alleviating these problems were employed:
1- To have the questionnaire scrutinised by experts in the conduct of surveys; and
2- To try out the questionnaires (i.e. pilot test) on a number of people who were
similar to the Saudi journalists used in the actual research. To do so, we translated the
questions into Arabic, following the double translation method recommendation by Boyd
(1978: 502). The Arabic translation was then translated back into English. After changes
were made, the questions were yet again translated into Arabic, this time by a second
translator. This double translation procedure was employed to ensure that the statements
and questions in Arabic were consistent with the English original. The questionnaires were
then distributed to faculty members from the following academic organisations: two from
King Saudi University; two from The King Khalid Military Academy and one from the
Institute of General Administration. After accommodating the changes recommended by
these faculty members, a pilot study was conducted. The questionnaire was pretested on
ten of people who were similar to the sample, i.e. journalists; this pre-test sample was
chosen because they worked on The National Guard Magazine and The King Khaild
Military Quarterly, on both of which the researcher used to work as an editor. The main
advantage of this was that the respondents who worked on these two magazines added to
the research to check the reliability of those questions, which related to the military and the
war and helped the researcher to eliminate any ambiguities of phrasing from the questions.
Their opinions and comments about the difficulties encountered in filling out the
questionnaire were also solicited. The final version of the questionnaire was entitled, "The
Saudi Arabian Journalists' Perception toward the Saudi Press Functions in Time of War
and its Performance in Gulf Conflict (1990-1991)".
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On the basis of the considerations and procedures outlined above, the survey instrument
was deemed to be sufficiently valid and reliable to be used with confidence in the main
study. Table 3.3 shows the newspapers, number of questionnaires distributed and number
of usable responses.
Table 3.3 Ouestionnaire Distribution and Res onse Rate amon g Saudi News a ers
Newspapers Number of questionnaires
distributed
Number of Usable
Responses
al-Madinah	 [Madina]
(Western SA)
al-Nadwah	 [The forum]
(Western SA)
al-Bilad	 [The Country]
(Western SA)
al-Riyadh	 [Riyadh]
(Central SA)
5
4
5
22
3
0
3
8
Okaz
(Western SA)
al- Jazerah	 [The Peninsula]
(Central SA)
al-Yaum	 [Today]
(Eastern SA)
15
24
4
7
8
0
Total 79 29 (37%)
3.3.3 Statistical Procedures
For the analysis of data, range, mean, rank order and percentage analysis were employed.
However, due to the fact that there were very few respondents, the percentage of
responses for the first part of questionnaire was calculated by compressing the original 5-
point scale into a 3-point one (agree, undecided and disagree).
In view of the small number of questionnaires returned, there is a danger in presentation of
responses in terms of percentages, that one or two individuals responding in certain ways
can result in large percentage shifts. However, whilst recognising this danger, the
researcher has nevertheless expressed responses in such a manner so that the reader can
readily gain a general view of the patterns of responses. Consequently the percentages
have been given as integers rather than strict percentage points.
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As for calculating the main news topic of the survey study, a ranked order was used from
the respondents' answers. In this way the main news items were uncovered in terms of
their importance to Saudi Arabians. Based on the results, rankings were calculated in
relation to the following: when the response to a topic was given number 1, this received
12 points; a topic given number 2 received 11 points and so on, until number 12 received
1 point. All the points were added to determine which topic received the most points -
that topic was accordingly ranked first.
Following from this discussion of the three methods that were used to test hypotheses and
answer the research questions, the following chapters 4, 5, and 6 will present the research
findings pertinent to both the research questions and hypotheses. A general interpretation,
evaluation and conclusion of the performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict
appears in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 4
Saudi Arabian Media Academics' and Journalists' Opinions toward the
Performance of the Saudi Press during the Gulf Conflict (1990 -1991)
In the previous chapter, the three research methods, namely, the interview, content analysis
and survey questionnaire, were used to collect quantitative and qualitative data. This
chapter presents the opinions of Saudi media academics and journalists toward the
performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict. Their views expressed in
individual face-to-face interviews provide a preliminary overview of the relevant issues
which will contribute towards a detailed understanding of the role of the Saudi press in the
conflict
It must be admitted that the elapse of seven years between the Gulf conflict and the
conduct of these interviews raises the potential problem of hindsight; in other words, there
was a danger that respondents' answers may have been coloured by what they had learned,
read or experienced since the conflict or by the ability to stand back from events and
interpret than as a whole. The researcher made every effort to overcome this risk. It was
made clear to respondents that what was required was recall of what they thought and felt
at the time; moreover, the researcher used probes and follow-up questions to cross check
responses and to identify and correct for hindsight.
For the sake of academic integrity, the researcher records in the following pages what the
participants said in reply to the questions they were asked without any changes or
alterations. However, because of translation as well as the nature of oral interview, there
are cases where some explanation is needed in order to convey the correct meaning. It
should also be pointed out that many of the participants tried to distance themselves from
the issues by using terms like 'the Gulf or 'Arab media' or 'press' instead of using the
terms 'the Saudi media' or the 'Saudi press', to protect themselves against any further
questioning later, because of the sensitive nature of the subject. The researcher does not
feel this cautious wording detracts from the credibility or validity of their comments.
Topic Category
1. Saudi press performance before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
2. Saudi press performance during the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
3. Saudi press versus Iraqi press performance.
4. CNN and Saudi press performance.
5. Suspicion between Military and Journalists.
6. The Saudi War correspondents.
7. Saudi press performance after the liberation of Kuwait. 
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In presenting the interviewees' comments on the Saudi press performance during the Gulf
conflict, seven areas are addressed (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1 Seven Topic Categories Grounded in Interview Data Finding from Saudi Media
Academics and Journalists
In presenting the findings, under each heading, we present first the opinions of the Saudi
media academics, followed by those of the journalists.
4.1 Academics' and Journalists' Opinions of the Saudi Press Performance before
the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
Like any other area in the Arab World, the Gulf region is rather more reactive than
proactive (militarily, economically and socially) towards threats. The press is faced with
the task of interpreting the environment and what is really being planned or prepared. The
participants were asked the following questions: (1) do you believe that before the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait and Iraq's subsequent threat to the rest of the Gulf States, the Saudi
press had identified the threat, particularly in view of the conflict preceding the military
occupation? (2) If the Saudi press did not identify the threat, what was its role during the
political conflict? (3) Do you think the press covered the conflict thoroughly by publicising
the common view point and/or predicting the future trends of the conflict?
Respondents from both groups were divided along two lines: those who supported the
press performance and those who criticised the work of the press before, during and after
the liberation of Kuwait.
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4.1.1 Academics' Opinions of the Saudi Press Performance before the Iraqi Invasion
of Kuwait
One media academic argued that predicting or identifying the Iraqi threat to Kuwait and
the region was not the function of the press, as:
It was not the Saudi press alone that did not predict the invasion of
Kuwait, but the whole of the western press had failed to predict the
invasion because journalists do not see what is looming on the horizon
and if we asked them to predict future events, it would be like asking
them to act as prophets with each journalist predicting what s/he wants.
It is true that there were high level meetings between the [political]
leaders before the invasion, but do you want the press to write of an
imminent invasion or war on the basis of these meetings? This is
impossible (MA/ 1)1.
Another academic referred explicitly to the connection between the Saudi press and the
Saudi government, highlighting the interdependence between politics and communications
not only in Saudi Arabia but all over the world, including in the developed countries. He
said:
It was impossible for the press and other media channels to adopt any
other point of view before the Iraqi invasion. There were mere guesses
about what happened before the invasion. On the other hand, the Saudi
government was part of the mediation effort between the Iraqi side and
Kuwait and consequently the Saudi press had an obligation to comply
with the official state policy and, hence, it was improper to give any
indications of impending dangers while the negotiations were still going
on. If it did, then that would have been taken to imply that there was no
value in the mediation by the kingdom (MA/2)2.
Not only was the Saudi press under an obligation to comply with the official state policy,
but there are also "certain given things in international laws and conventions which cannot
be attacked or broken. Predicting the future is not in the hands of the leaders but in the
hands of the selected few and committees in charge of making the decisions" (MA/3) 3. By
'international laws and conventions' the interviewee was referring to the fact that it is
1 (MA/1) Saudi Media Academic, Umm al-Qura University, Makkah.
2 (MA/2) Saudi Media Academic, Imam Mohammed ibn Saud Islamic University, Riyadh.
3 (MAJ3) Saudi Media Academic, Imam Mohammed ibn Saud Islamic University, Riyadh.
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unethical and unacceptable for one country, for example, to attempt to incite the people of
another to subversion or rebellion. Thus, there are ethical and legal norms which constrain
what the press may write about another country, especially in peace time. Even allowing
for such constraints, however, MA/3 seemed to imply that the Saudi press might have
done more than it actually did in this respect.
The press did not handle the events in depth to be able to forecast the
future. It reported the events as such but without saying what was the
purpose of the visit of Mr. so and so or why such and such an official left
the country. What was discussed in such and such meetings? Why was
there a meeting? The answers to all these questions was not been dealt
with before the invasion (MA/3).
Despite the reservations expressed by these respondents, it might reasonably be expected
that experienced journalists should be able to give some indications as to what was
happening without being too explicit, giving the reader the chance to make up his/her own
idea of what was going on or at least to be mentally prepared for the invasion.
Disagreeing with MA/1, another media academic said: "in principle I agree that the press
has a role in discovering or forecasting the future. This is from the theoretical point of
view, but the question is what has hampered the press from playing this role? Why was
the Saudi press unable to play this role ?" (MA/4) 4. He attributed its failure to two causes:
The first and most important one relates to a question of values rather than
the question of the role or function of the press because the Kingdom and
the Saudi population have a deeply held conviction that no crisis can develop
between one Arab country and another Arab country and it is unthinkable
that an Arab country would invade another Arab country. The second
aspect is that there were marked differences between the Saudi press and
other press in the Gulf in terms of dealing with this issue. Perhaps leading
editors of the Saudi press had sensed that there was something looming on
the horizon but backed off from discussing it. I consider this a good
judgement on part of the Saudi press because it did not lose its head.
Perhaps the press, on the other hand, did not have enough information to
deal with this type of conflict (MA/4).
4 (MA/4) Saudi Media Academic, Imam Mohammed ibn Saud Islamic University, Riyadh.
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This interviewee was very conscious of the position of Saudi Arabia as the leader of the
Islamic world and he felt that the Saudi press, in this situation, especially given that such a
war was unprecedented in Saudi experience, had a duty to remain calm and controlled until
the situation became more clear. This is what he meant by the Saudi press 'not losing its
head'. Another respondent contrasted the Saudi press performance with that of the
foreign media:
I followed the BBC's programmes from 12 o'clock for a month and they
were talking about the military build up in the region and saying such and
such is going to happen. Yet, the Saudi and Gulf media did not say a word
about all this. The danger of the situation was like the issue of the 'Tylenol'
tablets in the US where a sick person contaminated these tablets with poison
and distributed them to the chemists all over the US. A study was
immediately conducted to assess the speed by which information has reached
the general public and they found that some people did not even know that
these tablets were contaminated with a poisonous substance until five days
after. This happened in a society that is saturated with information.
Information in this case means the difference between life and death
(MA/5 )5•
Respondents offered various reasons why the Saudi press did not talk about the conflict
between the Iraqis and Kuwait. Some thought the press lacked the ability to interpret
events. For example: "the press lacked the specialist eye that could unveil what is behind
the events" (MA/6)6. Unveiling what is behind the events requires knowledge of a number
of social, military, economic and political issues. Is there a specialist eye to control the
flow of information in this press organisation? One believed that:
All those in charge of editing the political articles in the Gulf press are not
qualified for the job because the responsibility here is not only the
supervision of the political pages in the press. Journalists often resort to
what the news agencies report to edit even the political columns and they
lack independent voice and opinion. As a result all the press expresses a
single opinion and not diverse points of view (MA/2).
5 (MA/5) Saudi Media Academic, King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah
6 (MA/6) Saudi Media Academic, King Abdul Aziz University, Jeddah.
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An alternative explanation by MA/5 was that the press knew what was happening, but
could not announce it for political reasons. One commented that it would be strange if the
Saudi media did not sense something when half a million Iraqi troops crossed the Kuwaiti
border:
The mobilisation of all these troops took a long time and did not take place
within 24 hours or so and it was accompanied by a stream of circulars,
personnel carriers, frantic movements and clear pictures were relayed all the
time by satellites about what was taking place on the ground. The whole
invasion took place in broad daylight (MA/5).
He went on: "the media was quite capable of predicting what was going to happen, i.e.
the Iraqi/Kuwait conflict, but the Saudi media and that of other countries in the region [the
Gulf] always wait for the go - ahead from the political leadership before taking any action"
(MA/5).
Thus, the media academics did not think that the press had raised peoples' awareness of
impending events, but acted only after the incident had happened. At this point, it would
be interesting to consider the views and comments of these more directly involved: the
journalists.
4.1.2 Journalists' Opinions of the Saudi Press Performance before the Iraqi invasion
Consistent with the normal relationship in a state-controlled press system, according to
one journalist, it was not the role of the press to involve itself with politics and it could not
have been expected to predict the course of events in the Gulf
First, the Saudi press has no right to discuss or to meddle into other
Arab affairs and no Saudi press representative would go to the "Cultural
Forum" to receive money or gifts from any one. I remember there was
one person, by the name of Mufashar, from the Iraqi embassy, who
used to frequently visit our newspaper and invite us for lunch and we
used to refuse to go with him out of our conviction that the W ith Party
policy would lead to nothing but the destruction of the future of the
Arabs and Muslims. The second point [in the researcher's opinion it
contradicts the first point] is that the press is not an intelligence agency
and even the intelligence agencies have failed to predict what Saddam
had in mind (J/1)7.
7 (J/1) Saudi Journalist, al-Riyadh Newspaper, Riyadh.
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This was not, however, the general view. Other journalists appeared to imply that the
Saudi press could or should have done more than it did to warn readers of the turn events
were taking. Nevertheless, it failed to perform that role. As one interviewee put it, the
Gulf media before the war:
did not do well to unveil the real intentions of the Iraqi regime and it
failed to deal with these matters in an appropriate manner The media is
like a protective medicine but prevention by the media in the Gulf states
fell far short of what was required, by failing to make the reader aware of
the impending dangers surrounding him because of good will. This hit
people in the region very hard because we did not deal with issues
realistically and honestly (J/2)8.
Did the Saudi press, then, deliberately turn a blind eye to what was going on in the Iraq-
Kuwait conflict' In the view of journalists, the matter was not so simple. There were
several reasons why the Saudi press failed to predict or report what happening in the early
stage of the Gulf conflict. One was simply lack of information.
One of leading journalists in the Saudi attributed what had happened in the region to the
fact that
The Iraqis kept a low profile about their activities in a deliberate and
tactical attempt to cause the greatest element of surprise to countries in
the region and this was actually reflected in the media. The local press
was optimistic. The Iraqis, however, succeeded in hiding their real
intentions even though this is some kind of opportunism and deception
(J/3 )9.
For others, the problem was more one of the lack of political awareness, both among
journalists and among the readership and in Saudi society as a whole. One referred to
the indifference in analysing the political situation due to (a) the lack of
political awareness and the absence of specialist cadres who are capable
of thinking about these issues, and (b) the inability to decipher a
particular political message or piece of news in the media (J/4)").
8 (J12) Saudi Journalist, Islamic States Broadcasting Organization, Jeddah.
9 (J13) Saudi Journalist, Okaz Newspaper, Jeddah.
10 (J14) Saudi Journalist, al-Madinah Newspaper, Jeddah.
95
Another interviewee suggested that the Saudi press was unable to predict or identify the
danger because
The Saudi press is weak in the political sphere. We are not politically
minded readers nor a politicised nation and consequently we do not have
political analysts, except perhaps three writers: (1) Ridha Ladri, a writer
for the Okaz newspaper, 2) the leading article of al-Riyadh newspaper,
and 3) Abdul-Rahman Al-Rashid, the chief editor of al-Sharq al-Awsat
newspaper. The rest are confused between application, analysis, opinion
and propaganda (J/5)11.
In this connection, several journalists drew attention to the difficulty of criticising, or even
evaluating objectively, a leader who was widely hailed in the Middle East as a champion of
pan-Arab nationalism, and of swimming against the tide of popular adulation. One
referred to
the large contingent of Palestinian and Jordanians journalists in the
Kuwaiti press who lauded Saddam and later became his victims. The two
most prominent Kuwait newspapers involved in this praise were: al-
Qabas and al-Siyasah newspapers with Ahmed Al-Jar-Allah, the editor
in chief of al-Siyasah, spearheading this work (J/6)12.
Another commented on the fact that:
The Gulf media had glorified Saddam and in good spirit promoted him as
the pan-Arab leader. It failed to explore his motives and as there was no
direct control over the media and the only form of control was self:-
judgement. No voice was raised to say that there was danger looming in
the horizon QM.
Not all journalists, however, had glorified Saddam Hussein. One journalist, the only one
of these interviewed who responded to the researcher's questions in English, and who
criticised the Arabs' praise of Saddam, said:
I know and many people know that Saddam is a Mafia man. Then why
do we praise him'? When he attacked the Kurds in Halabjah, all the
leading articles in the Gulf newspapers came out saying that what had
11 (J15) Saudi Journalist, al-Hayai Newspaper, Riyadh.
12 WO Saudi Journalist, al-Jazeerah Newspaper, Riyadh.
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been said about Saddam's behaviour and the massacre of people of
Halabjah were all false accusations. One of the people who praised
Saddam eight years ago took pictures of the dead and the charred bodies
of the people massacred in Halabjah and gave them to the newspapers in
disgust, deploring what had happened. He did not bother to comment on
these pictures eight years ago but instead he was full of praise to
Saddam. In short I do not trust Saddam and if you go back to the
articles I wrote in al-Sharq al-Awasat newspaper before the invasion,
you will see that I criticised the people who praised Saddam (J/7)1.
Another journalist commented that if the Saudi press had not predicted events in the
at least it had not fallen into the same trap as some others in the region:
The Gulf press, including the Saudi press, was totally absent, but what I
want to confirm is that the Saudi press did not join the adulation of
Saddam Hussein as a person, in what was previously published about the
Iran-Iraq war. He is a Balth man and his talk about Arab nationalism is
out dated and rejected since 1976, because the media policy and we as
journalists do not applaud leaders of other countries (J/6).
It was also suggested by one journalist that it should have been clear what was happening
in the (lull; as the events of 1990 had been over-shadowed by earlier signs of Iraq's
expansionist intentions. In 1963 "Abdul Karim Qassim had massed troops on the Kuwait
border in a dress rehearsal of the [1990] conflict. The Iraqi troops pulled back after
British troops rushed to the sheikhdom, later to be replaced by Arab League forces"
(Frankel, 1991: 19).
One can conclude that the Ba'th regime had long had it in mind to take over Kuwait, which
it viewed as part of Iraq. The question arises, was the situation then any different from the
situation in 1990? Or "are we a nation without memory?" (J/8)2.
Thus, journalists and readers should believe and not believe everything that is said, but ask
why it was said? Is there a hidden agenda? They should look at information critically,
and allow themselves doubt and scepticism. Even for those journalists who were more
1 (J/7) Saudi Journalist, Saudi Public Relations CO, Jeddah.
2 (J18) Saudi Journalist, al-Bilad Newspaper, Jeddah.
97
politically aware and had their suspicions as to Iraq's intentions, however, it would have
been difficult to make such a dramatic claim openly. As one journalist commented:
I, like the decision makers in the Gulf states in particular and the Arab
world in general, was surprised by Saddam's actions. Even if the press
had had its doubts at that time, it could not have reflected them to its
readers. Who could dare to write a day or two before the invasion that
Iraq would invade Kuwait? Even if analysts in newspapers had their
own vision of what is likely to happen, nobody in the newspapers would
have believed them; not even they themselves would have come to terms
with such a thought (J19)'5.
Another point to be considered is the constraint imposed by government policy. As one
journalist explained: "The kingdom's policy is characterised by patience and waiting, and
for this reason the Saudi press is confined to official press releases which are often
cautious in tone" (J15). In a similar vein, another commented: "The Gulf media was at one
time representing the official state policy. It was giving information but not receiving any
feedback from the recipients on what they want. This perhaps explains why things went
wrong" (J/2).
The comments presented in this section suggest that, before the Iraq invasion and
occupation of Kuwait, the Saudi press played little if any role in predicting the course of
events. This was mainly a result of lack of information, lack of political awareness, and the
constraints imposed on the press by its role as a government mouthpiece. As a result, the
invasion of Kuwait came as a complete surprise to the Saudi population. The next section
will consider whether or not the Saudi press carried out its functions effectively during the
invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
4.2 Academics' and Journalists' Opinions of the Saudi Press Performance during
the Iraqi Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait
Attitudes, then, towards the Saudi press performance before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
may or may not shape participants' attitudes as to how the press tackled the conflict. This
15 (J/9) Saudi Journalist, al-Bilad Newspaper, Jeddah.
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is because some believed that the Saudi press like the Saudi government, was shocked and
surprised by events, which justified their lack of rational, analytical response, while others
believed that the Saudi press failed in its duty towards society. The participants were
asked to indicate their opinions of the Saudi press performance from the Iraqi invasion
and occupation until the Liberation of Kuwait. Each was asked if he believed that the
Saudi press performance was changed in this period of the conflict, and to what extent was
the Saudi press able to present the news and information and, why?
In fact, and astonishingly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the press and broadcast
channels in Saudi Arabia kept silent about the invasion for several days. Franldin said that:
Saudi Arabian news media assumed a traditional pose: they ignored it.
They were silent the next day, even as frantic Saudis huddled by short-
wave radios, or if they lived near the borders, watched television news
from other Arab nations. By the third day some newspapers were
writing about 'Iraqi aggression' although they offered few details.
Others were not so gutsy, referring only obliquely to tensions in Kuwait
(1991: 24).
Interviewees were asked about the silence of the Saudi press. From their responses, it
might be possible to identify the social, political or military reasons for it. However,
because of the intensity of the discussion in the limited time available and because the
period under discussion was that after the Iraqi invasion and occupation, which includes
the time of military build up in the region and the war time itself; the interviewees tended
to treat these events as one. Nevertheless, an attempt is made to present as reliable and
accurate picture as possible of their views of the Saudi press coverage of these events.
4.2.1 Academics' Opinions of the Saudi Press Performance during the Iraqi
Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait
One media academic pointed out that: "It is difficult for experts to judge on a theoretical
basis or from their own experiences the media channels in our society from a functional
point of view or how they work". He added that:
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At the time of the Iraqi aggression and invasion of Kuwait, the nations
were in a race with time to achieve fast growth and economic
development to build welfare societies. The occupation of Kuwait
psychologically shocked people in the region and has introduced
unexpected changes in the values and priorities in Islam.
All people irrespective of their backgrounds. . . , were in this state of
shock but with varying degrees of severity. The whole situation was
unusual and this applies to peoples' reactions and the response of the
media channels. The majority of people did not expect that they could
live in a war environment (M4/7)16.
Another reason why the press did not report the invasion during the first three days was
because "it was taken by surprise and it did not know what the official line was. The press
is bound by the official point of view and it uses it as a guidance in its work, especially in
circumstances like this one" (MA/2).
A similar point was made at some length by another media academic who said: "We must
understand the climate in which the press works. The press in Saudi Arabia is not
completely independent to warrant complete separation between the press and the political
establishment and other social institutions" (MA/4).
Justifying the stance taken by the Saudi press one interviewee pointed out that:
The press in any part of the world and at any time is constantly in a state
of emergency. It reassures people and avoids exciting them during war
time. There is no discussion of the political or military issues and getting
people to support the military decisions is an important issue. In
addition, it is necessary to close the doors on mundane and useless
criticisms (MA/8)17.
Reiterating what MA/3 had said earlier, when we talk about the Saudi press performance
before the Iraqi invasion, about the publication of the details of 'who met who and who
left and what was discussed in the meetings', MA/1 argued that "the role of the press
should have begun from the very moment the invasion took place". He went on to say:
16 (MA/7) Saudi Media Academic, King Saud University, Riyadh.
17 (MA/8) Saudi Media Academic, King Saud University, Riyadh.
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but unfortunately the press at that time was working in a haphazard way.
All that was written in the press was highly emotional and there was a
lack of concentration. This is because during the first few days there was
a news black out which had its advantages and disadvantages. The press
in Saudi Arabia usually addresses people's sentiments and feelings more
than it deals with the logic of things and this is causes others to say that
the Saudi general public was unaware. Why did not the press say why
Iraq invaded Kuwait? (MA/1).
Another disagreement with what MA/8 said came from one media academic who argued
that "the media can succeed even if there are no burning issues to be discussed" (MA/5).
He identified two reasons for the stance taken by the Saudi press:
First, . . . in the Arab media we are used to being convinced with the
voice representing the official line. . . when the Saudi public was looking
for an official voice, the leadership came out with its view which
matched the nationalistic feeling of the citizens.
Second, the media was faced with other issues related to the conflict and
problems appeared because the media was not prepared . . .. The Arab
media had to deal with various new concepts related to the political
regime, the ruler, the subjects, wealth distribution, those in power and
the haves and have nots. In short, the media had to deal with religious
and social issues (MA/5).
The same interviewee commented that dissatisfaction with the lack of any clear message
from the Saudi press caused people to turn to the foreign media. Other interviewees
analysed what they considered to be the deficiencies of the local media reporting, for
example that "each Saudi media channel became isolated from the others and each tried to
make, as far as possible, the maximum use of the information it has got in such a way that
one feels that Saudi media is controlled and lacks any creativity. I would have liked the
treatment to be carried out in unified way using a single strategy" (MA/6). As examples of
what he considered to be impulsive, badly thought-out reporting, MA/6 noted that:
Some newspapers hurriedly reported information which was intended by
its sources to create confusion and to make the press lose credibility,
such as, for example, when one of the newspapers reported that
Saddam's son, Uday, [Saddam's eldest son]got married to the Israeli
minister daughter. Another example, is the newspaper articles calling
for repressive measures to stop the demonstrations that were taking
place in Arab countries against the presence of foreign troops on Arab
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soil. It is a well known fact that you cannot stop a democratic country
from expressing what it feels even if that was directed against you. . .
the scholars should be objective in their treatment of the issue (MA/6).
Another reason for press reticence was said to be that the Gulf region was "an emotional
subject and the public was not prepared to read about it. This reaction emphasises the
importance of the psychological factor in the media message" (MA/5).
An interesting point was made by MA/5 who compared the performance of the press to
the impact of poetry. He saw the press as having less impact than poetry, because it failed
to appeal to people's emotions.
There is a tradition in Arab culture of using poetry to mobilise patriotic sentiment. During
the period of the Gulf conflict, much coverage in the media was given to the poems of it.
Colonel Al-Oteibi, whose work was broadcast on radio and television and published in the
National Guard Magazine 18. These poems were full of patriotic fervour appealing to
Saudis' love of their homeland and emphasising the sacrifices made to protect it. It is
difficult to translate Arabic poetry verbatim, but some typical extracts from one of Al-
Oteibi' s poems are paraphrased below:
• When the king called out to his people,
Our tribes responded, so that all the
world heard them.
The kingdom is in our keeping,
protected wherever we are.
Its land will be protected by our blood.
We will hold it within our embracing arms.
Our land raised us and cared for us, and
it is where we will die, rather than
let anyone sully it and make it dirty.
No human being or evil will break our land,
for our families shelter it and will
sacrifice themselves for it°.
18 Four poems were published in The National Guard Magazine (August, 1990, Issue No. 95: 88.89;
October, 1990, Issue No. 97: 90-91; May, 1991, Issue No. 105: 88-89; and July, 1991, issue No.
107: 88-9).
19 The National Guard Magazine, October, 1990, issue No. 97: 90.
102
It is to these poems that MA/5 referred when he said:
What Lt. Colonel Khalaf ibn Hazal Al- Oteibi [a folk poet] has achieved
far exceeds what the Saudi media has achieved because he knew how to
rally the masses more effectively than the media planners themselves.
This is because his poems contained some of the words that were used
by our grandfathers and forebears in these situations and they succeeded.
The poet played on the nationalist feelings, respect for neighbours and
courage (MA/5).
These are various points of view expressed by the academicians. But what are the views
of journalists who were are at the heart of the press institution, on its treatment of the
invasion, occupation and war?
4.2.2 Journalists' Opinions of the Saudi Press Performance during the Iraqi
Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait
Journalists who where asked about press coverage of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of
Kuwait emphasised a point that had already emerged in relation to the pre-invasion period.
This was the initial silence of the Saudi press, until the government stance became clear.
In relation to the Iraqi aggression, it was said that "on the first three days of the invasion
the picture wasn't clear for the official broadcasting as they didn't know how to deal with
the situation" (J/6). The same interviewee added that: "The Saudi newspapers didn't
publish anything, because their position was tricky. But when the government announced
its stand, we started to take their event seriously and with more attention" (J/6).
Some journalists were of the opinion that, once the Saudi press began to cover events,
they played an effective role in informing the readership and mobilising public opinion. One
journalist gave the impression that his newspaper had been prepared, controlled, and active
in responding to the needs of the public. He described, for instance, the holding of regular
"operation room" meetings, the production of a new 'Events' supplement to re-establish
contact with readers who might otherwise have looked to other media outlets, the review
of opinions being expressed internationally by the media and by various interest groups,
and the provision of civil defence information.
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On the latter point, for example, he said: "People did not want rhetoric about nationalistic
issues but more concrete answers as to how to deal with chemical and biological weapons,
worsening of the economic conditions or food shortages should these occur" (J/8).
One area in which several journalists thought the Saudi press had succeeded was in the
provision of accurate and objective information. For example, the Saudi press spoke out
to reveal the extent of Saddam's use of chemical warfare against the Kurds in the North of
Iraq, an issue on which they had previously kept silent. They also drew attention to Saudi
Arabia's former support for Iraq during the conflict with Iran in the 1980s, giving details
of the value of aid given, the materials and equipment supplied, and so on. It could be
argued, however, that this objectivity on the part of the press occurred not so much out of
abstract commitment to journalistic values, but because the Saudi government, perceiving
a threat from Iraq, decided it was in its interest for these matters to be aired and gave the
"green light" to the press to do so.
Looking at the performance of the Saudi press during the conflict one interviewee said, "it
was good overall, because the press has more freedom to tackle the issues more than
television, which is considered the official instrument. For example, the al-Yamamah
Magazine exposed the lies of the Heshimis, the ruling family of Jordan. Al-Riyadh
newspaper also published a sensitive cartoon of Saddam which could not have been
presented by the official television" (J/6). Another point presented was that:
Action during the conflict wasn't through the newspapers but was
between the people, and the newspapers are the part of society which
represents this action. There is a special way of dealing with information
during the conflict because the policy of the newspaper is part of
government policy and at this time the nation is at war and everyone
should be aware of the danger of the situation which could affect the fate
of the nation (J/4).
One journalist contrasted the performance of the Saudi and other Arab press thus:
The Saudi press played a big part in this conflict. If you compare al-
Riyadh newspaper with Egyptian newspapers and newspapers of
neighbouring states, you will find that the Saudi press tackled the Iraqi
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aggression in a more critical and intellectual way and followed a straight
line with no exaggeration (J/1).
Some Arab media were accused of misleading the public. For example, "the Sudanese
newspapers described Saddam as being at the doorstep of Riyadh. The same applied for
Jordan newspapers -which I read- it was the same demagogy as appeared in Iraqi, Yemeni
and Jordanian newspapers in 1967" (J/1). The interviewee is of course referring to the Six
Day Arab Israel war, when the Arab states sought to retake by force territory which had
been annexed by Israel. In this journalist's view, the emotive reports, with no basis in fact,
that appeared in some Arab newspapers during the Gulf conflict were akin to the kind of
propaganda they had published during the earlier war. In the 1967 case they exaggerated
their own capability and tried to demonize Israel; in the Gulf conflict, they exaggerated
Saddam's success and tried to demonize Saudi Arabia for supporting the West. In neither
case was the rhetoric based on factual analysis.
Whether this was due to lack of political awareness or was deliberate propaganda is open
to question. Inter-Arab conflict has commonly been accompanied by extensive use of
media propaganda and misinformations to justify a state's actions or policies, or to
mobilise popular sentiment. Dr. Al-Bath, a member of the Saudi Consultative Council
drew attention to the manipulation of the media as a tool of psychological warfare by Iraq:
We found edited films and films from the war to which American men
and women soldiers were added, to make it appear that they were inside
the Kaba (the holiest Muslim shrine in Makkah towards which Muslims
turn their faces in prayer) and these films were being circulated in
south-east Asia and other Islamic societies. They were ready for
distribution before the conflict began and when the war started they
started circulating them (1991: 55).
In contrast, the Saudi official media, according to another journalist, were more reliable.
"Colonel Al-Rab ian [the official military spokesman of Saudi Arabia], for example, used to
hold press conferences attended by all media channels including CNN which used to report
it live" (J/6).
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Another journalist highlighted the connection between the task of the Saudi press and the
government campaign which relied on religious scholars. He said that:
The Arab world was split into two: those who stood in support of right,
justice and international law and those who stood against international
law. The media was supposed to prepare public opinion both inside and
outside especially with respect to the presence of friendly armed forces in
the region. The Saudi media succeeded in drawing attention to these
matters and it was supported in this by religious ulama from Al-Azhar
University in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria and Lebanon who tried to
convince people that the petitioning of friendly armed forces is Islamic
and constitutionally correct and it does not contradict the constitution of
the Arab League (J/10) 20.
Not all journalists, however, were satisfied with the performance of the Saudi press. One
challenged the view that the press was prepared and well organised:
The Saudi media was not prepared and did not correctly understand the
conflict. The man in the street was wondering, where was the role of the
media given the large support it receives from the state? This may be
attributed to the lack of planning and knowledge of how to manage
communication in the short, medium or the long term (J13).
He attributed this to:
The lack of scientifically qualified personnel capable of planning and
forecasting the future and dealing with it in a well thought manner
The press institutions do not believe in spending money to recruit people
with high qualifications who are capable of planning and good thinking.
Lack of enough knowledge of the aims of the press work in order to
finance these aims and eventually correct planning on sound basis. Thus,
when we look into the local newspapers, including the successful ones
like al-Riyadh and Okaz, we see the weakness in their job structure and
even the most effective cadres do not have academic experience in their
area of specialisation (J/3).
A critic of the press information function said:
Unfortunately we did not write about the crisis and the conflict in the
Saudi papers but when the media was given the go ahead the press was
20 (J/10) Saudi Journalist, al-Nadwah Newspaper, Jeddah.
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putting across what other media channels (The New York Times,
Guardian newspapers) were saying. We got all our information from
the West, yet we were the ones who had the problem. At least we
should have been be able to tell people of impending dangers (J/7).
Another point was that "when our newspapers went out and asked the public what they
were reading during the war, they said 'the newspapers go further than they should' (J/8).
He noted that readers found it difficult, at a time when they were trying to take in the
information on events in the Gulf to be confronted also by new information on subsidiary
political and economic issues. He suggested that the problem had been caused because the
Saudi press had failed to give readers accurate information when these issues first arose.
For example, he added:
Information was put out concerning those countries which refused to
support Kuwait such as Sudan, Jordan and Palestine, and which had
been become financially supported by the Saudi Government
previously. The Saudi citizens said that they had not known about this
financial support previously and that it was hard for them to believe
about it before. "This is not the appropriate time to tell me about it",
they said. The media was directly responsible for this lack of
information. If we consider Kuwait's policies we find that whenever
they build anything abroad, however small, they put the name of Al
Sabah on it. On the other hand, nobody knows that the "Royal
Education Centre" in Jordan, which is considered the most important
education centre in the Arab World, was built by Saudi Arabia and
when people are informed about this they are surprised and ask why it
hasn't been made known (J/8).
On the subject of the press's information function, an interesting theme emerges, namely
that of objectivity versus external constraint. Whereas some journalists expressed the view
that Saudi press coverage of the Gulf conflict was constrained by external factors such as
government policy, others, as we have seen, believed they had considerable freedom to
report events as they saw them. To those who were satisfied with the performance of
Saudi press such as J/6, quoted earlier this freedom contributed to their success. One
journalist who was dissatisfied, however, questioned the desirability of total freedom,
suggesting that it had led to inaccurate and misleading information being published. He
said:
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There should be a body - even in the most developed counties - to
protect the people from false information, which might make them
scared and shaky. Since the war started and till the cease fire I was not
subject to any external constraint. I am 100% sure that chief editors
were given the freedom to deal with the news in their own way. For
example, there were 20 Stealth aircraft. The Tass news agency reported
that one was shot down by Iraqis with a Soviet- made SCUD missile. I
published this, but the Americans said that they had all 20 aircraft
intact. If there was any regulation, that would prevent this news from
being published (J/1).
This interviewee's comments raise several interesting issues. It could be said that even
without an official regulatory body, censorship exists; there are certain types of news and
opinion that the press will not publish. There is also the point that a regulatory body
would not necessarily be concerned with the type of news cited in J/1'5 example, nor
would its existence guarantee against mistakes of this kind.
The previous answers concern the Saudi press situation in relation to the Iraqi aggression.
Given the conflict between the two countries, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the question arises of
how each government should deal with the events. Was there any misunderstanding or
was there any kind of propaganda? To answer these questions it is necessary to look at
what the participants believed about the Saudi press versus the Iraqi press, based on what
they had heard, watched and read on both sides.
4.3 Saudi Press versus Iraqi Press Performance
It is inevitable that a clash would develop between the optimism of the Saudi media and
the stubbornness of the Iraqis on how to get out of the conflict. The media is one of the
public tools by which some kind of respectability is given to the Saudi and Iraqi political
leaderships by making the public the judge, and if it is not influential, it can be made at
least co-operative with the political ideology of the leadership and its political and
economic decisions. Iraq, for example, had to substantiate its claims over the petroleum
resources of the Remailah fields. This required a media message or messages to raise the
spirit of the soldiers on the ground, on the one hand, and to win the support of the Arab
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general public, on the other. A question thus arises here: how did the Saudi press interact
with, or to what extent was it opposed to, the Iraqi press, since each press followed its
respective government policy?
4.3.1 Academics' Opinions of the Saudi Press versus the Iraqi Press
The Saudi press faced a challenge from the Iraqi press which had two messages during the
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. These were summarised by one respondent thus:
One was addressed to the politicians and it was accusing Kuwait and the
Gulf states of stealing the Iraqi oil while it was engaged in the war with
Iran. It also addressed the general public by claiming that Kuwait is part
of Iraq. However, this convinced no political leaders but it is the Arab
general public which were more likely to be convinced by this claim.
The second card the Iraqi media tried to play was the religion card and
this was the most effective message the Iraqi media put across. It
aroused the Arab masses in Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Tunisia, and
Algeria especially the Islamic organisations. This was reinforced by the
Iraqi bombardment of Israel with Scud missiles and the use of such
terms as the 'mother of all battles', and God's servants, the believers'
and by attending the prayers for those killed in the fight. All these
actions aroused the Islamic masses (MA/3).
Supporting the above argument about the second Iraqi message "the Iraqi media found a
wide reception because it touched the cord of religion and the nationalistic feelings of the
Arab and Islamic masses. This continued for about three months until the air attack on the
Iraqi forces in Kuwait and some of the strategic places in Iraq itself on 17th January"
(MA/2). As far as the Saudi public is concerned, MA/2 believed:
The Iraqi propaganda did not create any problem because a large section
of the Saudi public did not believe that the American armed forces had
arrived and were present in the holy places (Mecca and al-Madina) i.e.
they did not know of the new crusade attack to use the Iraqi media term.
The echo of this matter, however, was felt in some distant foreign circles
such as the Arab groups residing in Europe, the USA and some Islamic
countries (MA/2).
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However, the best way to look at the Saudi - Iraqi press contest is to look at the
journalists' opinions. One reason is that most of them were working during the first Gulf
war (Iraq-Iran 1978-1989) and were often involved in news gathering and presentation.
Their views would gave us more details or at least show how their experience affected
their presentation of the news and information.
4.3.2 Journalists' Opinions of the Saudi Press versus the Iraqi Press
The target of Saddam's media campaign was the ordinary citizens because he was calling
for the redistribution of wealth and the liberation of Jerusalem. In other words, his media
campaign was directed to people in Jordan, Egypt, Yemen and Sudan. In this the Iraqi
media were seen by journalists as having the upper hand and having a big influence in the
Gulf region. This is due to the fact that:
It [the Iraqi message] was very convincing and had a number of the Gulf
newspapers revolving in its circle by playing the card of Arab
nationalism, and Arab unity vis-à-vis the Persian nationality.
He used the annual gatherings of Arab writers and learned scholars in
Iraq (in Al-Mirbid) to shower them with gifts and put them in the most
luxurious hotels. He also had good relations with some of the Gulf
newspapers. Some newspapers were loyal to Iraq, such as al-Qabas [a
Kuwait newspaper], and used to defend Iraq and no one could have
dared to criticise Iraq in these papers.
Iraq played well its war with Iran and the threat of the Islamic revolution
and coined the phrase of 'exporting the Iranian revolution' to
neighbouring states. It used this very effectively, especially the threat
Iran poses to countries in the area (J16).
In fact, not only did Saddam give gifts before the invasion to influential writers and
thinkers, as the previous interviewee said, but also gave them to Arab heads of state as
well. The ambassador of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to the United
Kingdom, Dr. Al-Gosaibi, wrote that "Saddam gave on behalf of the Iraqis 50 million
dollars to the Egyptians, transferred in the name of President Husni Mubarak, who
admitted publicly that Saddam had promised more. The aim of this gift was to put the last
touch to his plan to draw Egypt into the Iraqi orbit on Iraq's side" (1992: 82).
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The researcher asked one of the Saudi journalists who had covered part of the Iraq-Iran
war, what had been the Iraqi regime's behaviour since. He responded as follows:
1. I saw by myself one million palm trees destroyed in Basra in Iraq to
use the land that had been cleared for the military offensive against Iran.
Iraq is a very rich country with huge natural and oil resources and I do
not think that it really needed to claim a few additional oil wells; besides
it is a member of OPEC.
2. Iraq has expansionist aims. He (Saddam) built himself and his country
from our money and the Gulf states aid and he started to see himself as
an emperor who is dissatisfied with the piece of land on which he lives.
3. The Iraqi media is a popular media and appeals to the lower classes.
It does not address the enlightened sections of the population (J/4).
He concluded that "the Arabs are sentimental people and they consist of groups without
political organisations" (J14). In this researcher's view, however, it is too easy to blame
the people. It could be argued that if Arabs are emotive, lacking in political consciousness
and easily manipulated, it is because their governments have made them that way. They
have withheld information, stifled opposition and debate, and failed to involve the people
in decision-making. Moreover, they have engaged political conspiracies in their own
interest.
Since it has been claimed that today is "an age of propaganda" (Taylor, 1995: 303), it may
be that journalists were involved in propaganda in one way or another on this issue. A
good starting point here is to record what a Saudi Television official said:
The Saudi press abided by neutrality and did nor respond to the Iraqis'
painful media insults and nonsense. During this verbal shoot-out the
BBC's Arabic service and some of the broadcasting stations in some
other countries started to broadcast scaring news about the ferocity of
the coming war in the Gulf and started to speak about the new deadly
weapons that might be used in the fight especially from the Iraqi side.
Under the direct psychological influence of what was being broadcast
by the BBC and the lies of the Iraqi media and misleading propaganda,
a number of people, especially in the Gulf region and the Arabian
Peninsula, started to turn to foreign radio, especially those broadcasting
on short wavelengths (J/11)21.
21 (J/11) Saudi Journalist, Saudi Minstry of Information, Riyadh.
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historically, the conflict in the Middle East, and in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict and
the 1967 war, gives us some indication of the influence of the Arab media and its policies,
bearing in mind the assumption that the credibility of Arab media was and still is under
suspicion, since each medium follows its government's policy and freedom of speech and
of the press does not exist. One journalist conceded that:
The Arab media played a different role during the Gulf war compared
with its role during the 1967 war and other conflicts in the region.
Nevertheless, the change did not measure up to what was required from
a media point of view because we are still following a policy of news
black out and leaving the recipient to turn and listen to other channels
such as Monte Carlo, BBC, Voice of America, and Israel to get what it
wants. This is like a disease affecting all recipients, even those in Arab
countries which like to regard themselves as democratic. The media in
all the Arab world does not meet the need of the recipient by giving it
what he wants but it gives him what it wants him to receive (J/2).
But he gave qualified credit to the performance of the Saudi radio, given its current
staffing levels, saying that "young journalists in the radio were able to perfect the choice of
words and to keep track of events, even it not to the extent one would have liked" (J/2).
One journalist picked up this point, saying that
The Saudi media was working on a number of fronts: the Egyptian
opposition, the Jordanian media, the Yemeni radio, the Islamic parties in
Tunisia, and Algiers and the Arab based Arabic newspapers. The Saudi
media, indeed the whole country, were shocked with the Iraqi behaviour
and that of some of the Arab countries who over the years had received
billions of dollars of Saudi in the form of aid, like Yemen, Jordan, and
Palestine. All these countries received annual aid and financial support
to develop their ailing economies, yet despite all this the Saudi media had
portrayed Saddam as an Arab hero (J/6).
Another disagreed that the Saudi press had praised Saddam, saying that "portraying
Saddam as a hero was not in the Saudi press before, but it was the Gulf states media"(J/1).
He suggested that:
Saddam bribed journalists in Jordan by building an apartment for each
one of them and selected in Egypt a group of journalists and paid each
one of them a regular salary and a car. He also succeeded in
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manipulating the ambassadors of some countries; Algiers, Morocco,
Mauritania, and Sudan (J/1).
The aim of some of those who claim Islamic leadership and those organisations which held
meetings with Iraqi backing "was to buy peoples' support for the occupation of one
country by another and to make people believe in the claim that the liberation of Jerusalem
passes through Kuwait" (J14).
One journalist added that "the Iraqi ambassador in Jordan was very determined to build a
club in Amman, no matter how much that would cost and to present it as a gift to
journalists there" (J/2). Another said that "it is not the press which rejected the Iraqi
claims but there were other factors that contributed to this rejection" (J/4). This was
because, "Saddam was using the slogan that Israel is an occupying force and must pull out
of the lands it occupied in the 1967 war but by occupying Kuwait he was doing the same
thing and contradicting himself' (J14).
Regarding the similarities of journalists' responses to the Saudi press performance against
Saddam's press propaganda it was said that, "Saddam had actually warned people,
especially in the last Arab leaders' summit, just before the invasion, when he said 'if any
army attacks an Arab country, or even Iraq, then you must fight it'. This was the trap into
which all leaders fell. They believed this 'snake' and in the end he chose his time very well
to deal a blow to them" (J/2).
Another important point raised is that made by one journalist who criticised CNN. He said
"CNN for its part gave Saddam some room to manoevre and spread his filth and to play
with his political message" (J12). This was because of CNN's presence in Baghdad. We
will look more closely, later, at views of how the CNN helped or changed the Saudi press,
but it is useful at this point to take one specific statement of the principal fact that it
allowed gave Saddam's messages to reach the world:
The meetings with Saddam were to a large extent made possible by CNN
because he knows that western journalists and journalists in the US, the
country of democracy and freedom of speech, have a high standard of
journalistic conduct. In fact a number of journalists kept their own
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opinions to themselves to give Saddam a chance and in the end he
succeeded in putting across some of his ideas to the western world. It is
true that freedom of expression must be upheld but CNN was misguided
and consequently the chances that were given Saddam were considered
as causing harm to the other side. What I want to say is that during the
time Saddam was using the satellite stations, the Saudi press was
rejecting his claims. What was required then was more detailed analysis
and discussion of what should be published, how it should be presented,
whither the material needed explanation, commentary or rejection or
should it be broadcast without any comment, bearing in mind that there
were some communities in the kingdom who were supporting him (J/11).
The press rejected Saddam's claims which he tried to propagate in a number of ways, and
in the end the press was proved right. The rejection of Saddam's claims by the Saudi
media was somewhat closer to Saudi peoples' perception about the political issues, even
though they were detached from it. Referring to the two most important daily newspapers,
namely, al-Riyadh and Okaz, one said that "the performance of al-Riyadh newspaper was
characterised by being logical and scientific whereas Oka7 relied on excitement to attract
the readers by presenting the information in a simple and different way" (J14). He added
that "ffie Saudi press have succeeded very well in rejecting the Iraqi claims which aimed to
mislead the general public in an attempt to keep the Arab and Islamic masses ignorant of
what was going on around them" (J14).
One journalist took a more liberal stand on the press performance. He disagreed with all
the above respondents and believed "that Saudi Arabia also disseminated propaganda
during the Conflict" (J15). He said that
it is common knowledge that in dealing with the other media the Iraqi
media has acted with stupidity and propaganda and both the Saudi and
Iraqi media were inward looking. We treated the Iraqi media in the way
it treated us and we did not deal with the facts. At the time when
Saddam did not make use or did make use of television stations,
especially CNN, the Saudi press rejected his accusations and claims (J15).
He commented that he used to play his part 'intentionally'. He said: "The work of the
Saudi media during the Gulf war was of a propaganda nature with a varying degree of
intensity because it was not based on information"(J15). He added that:
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I deliberately used propaganda for two reasons. I am officially required
to use propaganda. I had no information to stop using the propaganda
work. There might be a third reason which is, as a Saudi national, I felt
that there was a danger facing my country and this type of work satisfied
me emotionally and I accepted the propaganda work. In addition this
kind of work arouses people and rally them around the political
leadership and professionally this was required (J15).
When I asked, 'What do you mean by propaganda?' he replied: "By that I mean the
concepts, i.e. it is based on emotions, scarcity of information and you hammer on that to
get across the point of view you want. In other words, you totally ignore neutrality and
objectivity" (J15). When I pressed him to be more specific, he said
Neutrality is a 'big lie' even in the US media even though there is
objectivity in the American media. The media there cannot, for example,
describe a man and say he is black when he is white, but it can use
information to promote the person it wants and discredit the one it does
not want. In other words, it edits whatever it wants to report and scares
you to win the point in its favour (J/5).
If this is true, then the Saudi press would be an instrument for political messages. One
interviewee claimed that:
The standard of the Saudi press has fallen and became detached from the
basic issues. It became engaged in personal and trivial matters such as
the character of Saddam or the articles and poems that glorified him and
other useless material in the media. In other words, the media was not
dealing with the issues with full awareness and it was depending on its
voice in arousing the individuals (MA/5).
According to one respondent, initially Saddam's propaganda went unchallenged: the Saudi
media, "in its treatment of the problem in its earliest stages did not do well for a simple
reason, which is the lack of information. How do you reject Iraqi claims when you do not
have information?" (J/12) 22 . Another media academic believed that propaganda was
spread by other countries concerning the political crisis in the Gulf and especially for the
societies in this area. For example:
n ( J/12) Saudi Journalist, Saudi Resarch Publication CO, Jeddah,
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American propaganda played a major role in the Gulf conflict and war.
It claimed that it came to the Gulf to liberate Kuwait in the name of
international law but this was no more than propaganda because
international law has been broken on many occasions before and the US
did not move a finger on any of these occasions. This means that the
main aim of the US involvement in the conflict was to protect its
interests in the area. Hence the political message to the outside world
was in the name of upholding international law. It was not meant to
serve the politicians in any way because they know everything and have
accurate and full information, and it was the general public which was
misled by this and lead to believe that the aim was to uphold international
law. For this reason there was a political acceptance of the US in a
number of countries, to such an extent that it was portrayed as the
world's 'hero' even though the motive was not the protection of the
international law ( MA/3).
In fact, the American president himself had repeatedly reiterated on CNN that the aim was
to protect American interests. This question of American interest, "should have been
hi  hlighted by the American and the Gulf press and it should have been made clear and
more realistic" (MA/3).
4.4 CNN and the Saudi Press Performance
CNN is an influential news organisation, breaking the news first wherever, whatever and
under any circumstances that it can. It is a great example of McLuhan's assertion that
television would create, indeed, 'a global village'. It is a primary source of news and
information and affects not only international public opinion but also the decision-makers
of governments over the world. Indeed the media, as Taylor said,
act not simply as observers of events but also as participants and
sometimes even as catalysts, as in the case of television pictures of the
Kurds prompting John Major to suggest Operation Provide Comfort to
the Americans in 1991 or Bill Clinton's reversal of American policy in
Somalia after watching pictures of a butchered American airman being
dragged through General Aideed's camp (1996:281).
Despite its different audience, the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict, particularly in the
actual war, faced a challenge from CNN in making and presenting the news, in that CNN
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were more politically experienced, had greater financial resources, and were able to
present information more freely and attractively. Thus, the Saudi press had to produce a
level and quality of coverage that would bear comparison with CNN and satisfy a public
who were now being exposed to ideas from other sources. To what extent did this
challenge affect the Saudi press in its coverage? Both media academics and journalists
gave their opinions on this matter. It might be understood that one of the main reasons
for the effect of the CNN coverage on the Saudi press was that it:
brought the war from the field to people's homes across the world
because of its relation with the American military intelligence. It took
the viewer from his living room directly to the nearest point of military
operations. The soldiers in the battle field did not see the exciting
events. Missiles were launched from the Red Sea or the Arabian Gulf
using electronic brains with pin- point accuracy. The ferocity of the
attack could be seen right in front of your eyes (MA/7).
He regarded the effect of CNN on the Saudi press as positive. He said: "We must admit
that there are some positive aspects in CNN and the Internet such as their big influence on
the general public. For some people following the war news became an enjoyment and the
media channel became dependent on the events" (MA/7).
Such is the reputation of CNN that it occupied a special place on Saudi television
The Ministry of Information allowed Channel Two on the Saudi
television to cover some CNN news in English. It was thought that this
link between CNN and Channel Two of the Saudi television would make
people have more trust in the Saudi media on the account that CNN has
instant world wide reporting of news, analysis and, in most cases, realism
(MA/8).
Journalists had been challenged and stimulated by the way CNN presented the news. As
one respondent put it: "We would watch CNN and it was as though we were watching a
live play or a film We found that CNN presented ready, simplified and complete
information within any effort on our part. This was a widening of our experience in
dealing with media coverage of the war" (J/4). Another journalist said that "Although all
the conflict news issued at the end of every day by the coalition forces was taken into
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consideration, we were, also concerned with news from CNN, Reuters and reports from
the correspondents on the field as well as from the battle field" OM. But the fact is, that
only a few Saudi people who have satellite dishes and who are familiar with English would
be able to watch CNN. Therefore, it was not the only medium that challenged the Saudi
press. As one respondent explained:
Unfortunately, or fortunately, there were not too many satellite dishes
during the crisis period. The only few dishes which were available were
owned by the wealthy people and those who lived in US and Britain and
who relied on satellite broadcasts to get the information they required.
Therefore, the threat came from the radio at that time (J/8).
One media academic commented on the value of foreign news thus:
Resorting to foreign radios for news does not mean that there is a lack
of credibility in the Saudi press but arose because of people's awareness
that they have advanced media techniques. The presence of various
channels to listen to was one of the basic demands, especially for
journalists. We quite often see a chief editor possessing an expensive
radio set costing between 166-250 pounds, they can listen to different
news from different stations (MA/9)23.
Not only CNN but VOA, BBC and Satellite channels were also followed and the reason
was that "People listened to other radio stations because they wanted to know the opinion
of the other side about the Gulf conflict because they had [already] listened to one side of
the story" (J/8).
One journalist noted his own dependence on the foreign media: "I get most of the
information from the BBC which, to a large extent, says the truth. Yes, it has its own
agenda, but I do not find the information I need anywhere else" (J/7). Another journalist,
however, disputed the influence of foreign media such as CNN, claiming that his paper had
maintained its independence. He explained: "We have nothing to do with CNN because it
has its own point of view and it has a different strategy" OM. Nevertheless, he
acknowledged the role played by CNN in exposing Saddam Hussein:
23 (MA/9) Saudi Media academic, King Abdul Aziz Univeristy, Jeddah.
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I believe that CNN was clever and it presented Saddam to the American
people in his true colour. Moreover, bearing in mind that the American
people do not know Saddam, CNN presented the true picture of Saddam
and it was stupid of him to allow this to happen, although he always
maintained that he is courageous and that he never stayed in one place
for more than two hours during the whole of the conflict. CNN also
showed the human shields he used to shelter behind such as what
happened in Al-Ma'mariyeh
One journalist explained that he saw CNN as playing a strategic role in serving American
political interests:
CNN stripped naked the Iraqi regime. Everyone knows that by getting
himself engaged in correspondence and audio recordings Saddam fell
into the trap. The Americans were playing with him and tried to portray
him as a champion but in a different way. They were laying his fears
because time was needed to build a high technology firing power that
would be effective but cause minimum loss of life in the region because
it was certain that the war would take place (J19).
Another journalist considered that it was possible for CNN to broadcast Saddam's
addresses in a way that might not have been possible in some countries, because of
differences in the political and media awareness of the public: ". . . in the US they have
self control and even if you broadcast hostile news it would not be immediately accepted
but would be listened to with caution. This is something which does not exist in some
other countries" (J/9).
However, another journalist looked at CNN from a different perspective, that of the effect
of CNN not only on the Saudi press but also on the Saudi culture. He saw this as a
dangerous situation and said:
Unfortunately the Arab societies, including the Saudi society, fell an easy
prey to the media messages of CNN and others. Some sort of paralysis
prevailed at the beginning of the invasion and the subsequent occupation
of Kuwait. Who were the readers and the Arab society at large to
believe? And from whom and from where could they get the truth? This
problem was created by the foreign media channels and its main aim was
to control people's thinking, behaviour and relationships with others.
This was a kind of cultural invasion. Even France fought the American
invasion more than any other Arab country by using censorship,
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subtitling and even changing the scenario itselt in order to protect
French citizens from American propaganda (J/10).
A similar view was taken by another journalist who believed that the presence of foreign
news media provided an opportunity for some Saudi citizen to raise issues and grievances
unrelated to the war, and that their exploitation of the media attention focused on the
country was socially disruptive:
Western media channels and the American media . . . influenced a
number of social aspects including the presence of foreigners and foreign
forces on the land. Some Saudi girls, for example, took this opportunity
to make certain demands and drove their cars in the streets of Riyadh to
make their voices heard. This happened at a time when the country was
facing a crisis situation and could not cope with any of these demands
and all this happened because there was media openness at the time (J/6).
The problem, however, was not the presence of the Western media per se. Saudi society
has in fact been exposed to western films and technology since the 1970s, and no social
disturbance of this kind has occurred previously. Moreover, to the extent that the Western
media have been influential on Saudi culture, the blame must be shared by the Saudi press,
on the basis that the Western media would have less influence if the domestic alternative
was more attractive.
4.5 The Suspicion between the Military and Journalists
During a war, those who assess the situation are not the media people nor the military
people. The military simply carry out specific orders based on political decisions. In the
final analysis, it is politicians who control both these groups. They control the armed
forces and guide the media into the desired direction. The media people want to obtain
information and to be the first to break the news, while the military may not be authorised
to give it, or have only limited scope to do so, since their priority is accomplishment of
their military task to serve a political objective. During the Gulf war, there was some
flexibility on the part of the military through press conferences and frequent news briefings.
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A media academic explained the conflicting roles and interests of the military and
journalists, which sometimes led to suspicion and tension:
The military sometimes do not realise the importance of information
which would serve them because they want to direct that in their own
way. This is because they do not know the media procedures, on the one
hand, and if they do not see a direct benefit to their cause, it is easy and
beneficial to hide it, on the other. By contrast, journalists do not know
the security, military and political dimensions (MA/4).
He added that
Journalists' responsibility is to report information. To some journalists
the problem is really one of values because the journalist cannot report
things without scrutiny based on the ethics and values of journalism.
Even the freedom of the press in the west is not absolute and it is not
utopian. There are information leaks in the western media which serve
certain lines and interests (MA/4).
This raises the question as to whether there is any external control on what is reported. It
was explained by interviewees that the editor, or chief editor, takes responsibility for what
he writes. The press watch dog has no time to make sure whether the information given
is correct or not but the supervision in Saudi Arabia "usually follows after and not before
the incident and it is the responsibility of the editor and chief editor" (MA/8).
However, post-mortem treatment is of little use if the incident represents the border
between life and death. The fact is that
Sometimes disseminating information could lead to a catastrophe, either
to the military troops on the ground or to the cities such as, for example,
the bombardment of Riyadh city by the Iraqi Scud missiles. Some of
these missiles fell near the Saudi Ministry of Defence and a television
reporter at that time came on the screens and addressed the viewers by
saying 'I greet you from near the Ministry of Defence' and then told the
viewers that some Scud missiles had fallen near the site he was reporting
from (MA/8).
Such reports and information could only help the enemy, enabling them to take extra
measures to ensure that their missiles, next time, hit their targets. It was suggested that
121
this was probably the reason why, in other conflicts, American and British leaders had
taken decisions to exclude reporters from certain sensitive areas.
Nixon, for example, barred reporters from reporting military and security
emergency activities which many cause negative social, military or
psychological problems. On the other hand, Mrs Thatcher demanded
that the press and the media should be barred from giving personal
accounts or reporting emergency and battle field news and to make sure
that what they report is true (MAJ8).
To report the truth requires access to the information and the event itself but the fact is
that information gathering from the media centre was insignificant. The media centre of
the allied forces "was more of a public relations office than it was a media centre and there
is a big difference between having a public relations office and a media centre. As a
result, journalists were not creating the events but they were just reporting them from this
media centre which was under the direct control of the allied forces" (MA/3).
But journalists believed information from the field is important and that there had been co-
operation from the military authorities. One journalist said:
At the beginning of the invasion I was one of those who went to the
front line and we were welcomed by military commanders who gave us
some information. Some of what we were given was that we had
received ten group of tanks including their personnel and ammunition
(supplies) and all that was published regardless of it being military
information which should not have been announced QM.
Another journalist said:
I do not think that there is a suspicion or a lack of trust between the
military and the media people. It is only a matter of obeying pre-agreed
upon rules. The military are usually given orders in broad terms and they
must adhere to army discipline and not talk about them. There are,
however, personnel from the general security, public affairs, and the
armed forces who are dedicated for this specific purpose (J/6).
This interviewee, however, contradicted himself Having denied the existence of suspicion
or lack of trust, he later commented "the military fears the press in its quest for news and
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information. The journalist might pick up something from an officer and then embarrass
him in front of his superiors" (J/6).
Confirming what J/6 said, another interviewee explained that "the relationship between the
military and the media was first started when the Saudi Ministry of Defence and Air Force
organised a tour for the chief editors and took them to the front, during which journalists
saw the level of preparations and the huge number of tanks". He added that:
I remember one day one of the military leaders had a map in front of him
and he showed us the positions of our forces and from his knowledge of
Saddam's tactics in the Iraq/Iran war he explained to us the possibilities
of Iraq attacking us from the various sides.
Secondly, the war was a television war. Planes flew from Al-Mahraq [in
Bahrain] air field or from aircraft carriers and they were reported by
television cameras from the minute they left their bases until they finished
their operations returned to base and so on. In addition, it was possible
to record on television cameras the launching of a cruise missile from the
moment it left its launching pad until it hit its target. This was in
addition to the recording of the disarray of the Iraqi forces on television
cameras and their low fighting spirit. Even the bunkers looked like the
First World War bunkers (J/1).
However, even this co-operation between the military and the media was subject to some
sort of voluntary restraint:
I cannot report how hard a leader or an official works and broadcast this
information about him all over the kingdom, while he is in fact sitting all
the time in his bunker. I cannot kiss the fighter pilots in their positions to
say to them thank you for your good work. This is simply not on in our
press. The soldier or the officer is like my brother, my first cousin, or my
relative and he spends his time defending me so that I can relax (J/8).
It is quite clear that there were differences of opinion between these two groups and even
within each group. It was thought, therefore, that more light would be shed on the issue
by looking in more detail at the role of war corespondent as practised in Saudi Arabia
during the Gulf conflict.
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4.6 The Saudi War Correspondents
All media academics and journalists agreed that the Saudi press had no professional war
correspondent that could give the press quality news during the coverage of Gulf conflict.
Some reasons for this can be derived from the responses of journalists, since their
responsibility is to report actual events. One major reason why there were no professional
war correspondents was general lack of experience among journalists. Saudi Arabia had
fought few wars in recent times and there was no tradition of the press sending its
correspondents to 'other people's wars'. As one interviewee commented:
a group of colleagues who are experienced in the local news went to
Kuwait and they had no previous experience in war correspondence. For
example, they did not know what mines do and this could have put them
in great danger. They did not know how to deal with people facing
invasion or anything about military plans or strategies (J/6).
Journalists' lack of experience in reporting on such situations was elaborated on by
another interviewee who also highlighted the impact of that lack of experience on the
quality of news coverage. He said:
Our experience in coverage events in the field as well as understanding
ideological war is very little because this a new situation which we have
not experienced before. Most of the newspapers' plans were new and
they focused with merely reporting news events rather than analysing
them. If any analysis was to be found then it was only in leading articles
or in the opinions of newspapers writers. There was no existing organ
within the newspapers to carry out this analysis until some days after the
beginning of the war (J14).
This is not to say that the papers did not cover military topics. Such coverage was made
possible because many of the local newspapers recruited retired Saudi military officers,
though even their military analysis was limited. As (J/6) explained:
Retired Saudi military personnel have no war experience nor a proper
understanding of the media work to identify alternative military options
and present them in the form of a media message. Basically they lack
military experience in the field (J/6).
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He added, "The war has revealed a huge deficit in military comment in the media and
unfortunately so far the press institutions have not found military analysts and if we have to
enter into another war, we would still have to rely on the help of Egyptians or Syrians to
do the military analysis for us" (J16).
Even those few journalists who had reported from other conflict areas around the world
did not have direct battlefield experience. "We have journalists who went to Afghanistan
or Bosnia but stayed away from the battle fields. Even in our own newspaper we cover
the preparations, tendencies, and manoeuvres but not the war itself' (J18).
Some journalists were to report from field during the Gulf war. One of them recounted
the experience, highlighting the important role played by co-operation between Saudi and
foreign journalists, the local knowledge of the former being pooled in exchange for access
to the facilities of the latter:
I lived the life of a fighter and saw how the soldiers eat and how they
send their letters and greeting cards to their families and relatives. I
reached the battle field a day after the land attack. We were ten people.
We were woken up by the noise of the engines of tens of buses coming
from Kuwait full of Iraqi prisoners and we did the reporting to al-
Zaheerah newspaper, a subsidiary of the London based al-Sharq al-
Awsat newspaper, and to the Saudi press. The success of our mission or
ability to report information was due to the co-operation of the CNN
reporters, who had a telephone line via satellites. We struck a deal with
them: we took them all the way to Kuwait and across all barriers and in
return they allowed us to use their telephone line. I remember I had to
disguise myself at check points as a plain clothes officer accompanying
the media photographers who were with us and this continued until we
reached Al-Kh4i and joined the battle field (J/12).
Another who was with J/12 criticised Kuwaiti journalists for not participating during the
conflict and the actual war. He said:
Ahmed Al-Jar-Allah the chief editor of al-Siasah newspaper where was
he during the crisis? I challenge anybody to say that there was a Kuwaiti
journalist in the battle field. There were only Jordanian journalists,
American journalists and a few Saudi journalists. Journalism is not to sit
in a luxurious chair or in a hotel and wait for the news (J/7).
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He went on to describe the way he and his colleagues had concealed their identity in order
to penetrate the scene of the fighting:
J/12 and I witnessed in Al-Jabiriyah hospital the Iraqi soldiers pulling
out of Kuwait on the 24-25 February, and they were asking us who we
were and we told them that we were from India (because of the
similarity of our colour to the Indians), so we would not be exposed to
them.
When we went from Al-Dhahran to Kuwait we could hear the
bombardment as we drove our two Jeeps in the dark: J/12, myself and
ten non-Saudi journalists. When we came to a military check point we
quickly recognised the accent of the soldier. If they were Saudis, for
example, we played a Madonna audio tape and told them that we were
American journalists and they gave us the all clear to pass and vice
versa. If we came to an American check point we played an Arabic
audio cassette by Urn kulthoum [the famous Egyptian women singer]
and so on, until we entered Kuwait. The bombardment was still going
on when we reached Kuwait and as we drove through we saw the dead
bodies and some Iraqi soldiers getting out of their bunkers with their
hands raised above their heads and some carrying their weapons. We
were in real danger but nothing happened to us (J/7).
Another interviewee who had spent a short time with the above journalists had taken the
opportunity, during an international media gathering, to attach himself to the American
forces:
On my way to the joint information bureau I read a sign giving the
Saudi journalists the chance to join the American forces. I went with
my colleague [J/12] with the US army. . I said that I wanted to join
and obtained all the necessary personal safety equipment including a
bullet proof vest and a helmet. I was allowed to join the marines troops
in the logistic base responsible for supplies, provided that I did not stay
for more than three weeks. . . and that all the reports I wrote must be
given to the communications officer first (J/13)24.
He noted the difficulty of reporting events, given his poor English and the fact that reports
in Arabic would be subject to censorship by the Saudi Armed forces. He also recalled his
sense of isolation: "I was completely cut off from the outside world and our only link with
24 (J/13) Saudi Journalist, al-Riyadh Newspaper, Riyadh.
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the world was what we heard from the radio and sometimes we took a summary of what
we heard on the radio and wrote our reports" (J/13).
J/12, quoted earlier, emotionally and tearfully recalled an incident which indicates how
close to danger some of the reporters came:
When we entered Kuwait it was the second day of the Iraqi forces'
pull-out and it was about dusk with petroleum oozing out from oil
fields, a lot of smoke, oil wells fires and cars' speed was restricted to 20
mph. About one quarter of the way, a strange car caught us and a man
stepped down from it with his gun pointed at us. I said to my colleague
[J/11] "This is an Iraqi and either we stop or we die". I told the group I
would speak on their behalf and no one should say a word. The soldier
asked pointing his gun to my face: "Where are you from?" I said to
him" From there !!! "Where are you from ?" I said, "From there !!!.
"Who are you?" I replied, "We are journalists". "From where?" I
murmured unrecognisable words with my eyes on his colleague who
was standing behind his car with his gun pointed at us. All of a sudden I
pulled myself together and asked him, "Who are you ?" He said, "I am
from the Kuwaiti resistance." I said to him "You scared us". We then
entered Kuwait. There were corpses of Iraqi soldiers everywhere on
the side of the road. We saw a nurse in Al-Mubanik hospital in a
hysterical state. One person shouted, "Iraqis are coming" and my
colleague J/7 and myself entered the Kidney Operating Theatre (J/12).
As this story shows, the journalists, despite lack of training and experience, were prepared
to put themselves at risk in the effort to follow events and uncover stories. A sad irony is
that often the journalists braved these dangers to no avail; they reached the area of conflict
and witnessed history-making events, only to find themselves unable to report them due to
lack of a telecommunications link.
4.7 Academics' and Journalists' Opinions of the Saudi Press Performance after the
Liberation of Kuwait
It emerges clearly from the interviewees' comments that the Saudi government played a
dominant role in the way information on the conflict was disseminated, and that the Saudi
press was used as an intermediary between the public and the government. In view of the
increasing importance of the government in all phases of domestic and foreign handling of
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the Gulf conflict, the question arises whether the Saudi press performance changed as a
result of the social, political, economic and psychological impacts of the war? How did the
media academics and journalists look at the role of the press in the post- war period?
4.7.1 Academics' Opinions of the Saudi Press Performance after the Liberation of
Kuwait
The researcher was interested to know whether the experience of the conflict and contact
with media professionals from other counties brought any change in the approach of the
Saudi press, which might be reflected in its performance after the liberation of Kuwait.
One media academic said: "the Gulf conflict has given the Saudi press and the chief editors
of newspapers practical experience on Saudi soil by giving them a chance to make use of
mixing with western and American journalists and listen to news briefings and see how the
freedom of expression is practised" (MA/1). Another media academic said that:
There is no doubt that the Saudi's view has changed after the conflict,
but the question is, has this change had any impact on journalistic work?
Has the press started to change its concepts of values and the
relationship with other countries? I believe not, because there are still
some unresolved matters; more specifically, perhaps, is that there is not
enough courage. Being open and honest about something involves
confrontation because what is actually happening is that we tend not to
talk about certain things and try not to stir problems. In addition, the
press feels that there is no strategic orientation or a strategic change,
though you find some degree of openness and in-depth analysis of some
aspects in some of the newspapers even though in very broad terms
(MA/4).
Although in the first part of his response, MA/4 suggested that a change of view has
occurred as a results of the conflict, MA/6 agreed with him that there has been little real
change in practice:
The press has remained largely unchanged and it had not made any use
of its past mistakes or its past work experience. It had not carried out a
single study or research on its past performance After the war has
ended there was no post-mortem analysis, political or otherwise, to tell
us what lessons we learned from our past mistakes. In future there
should be some predictions of what are the likely events and scenarios,
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accompanied with analysis at the social and political levels, to bring
down the psychological barriers in society (MA/6).
The view of these respondents was echoed by one of the journalists, who commented:
"The Saudi press after the war went on doing the same things it was doing before and
during the war" (J18). He contrasted the Saudi experience with that after World War Two,
when the role of the media had been analysed, and argued the need for the Saudi press to
learn to target their messages more effectively:
The media must try to change its language and the method it is using in
getting its message across and the way it addresses people. The media
has a theory but if you do not understand how the person you are
addressing thinks, you would not be able to arouse him. In short the
psychological factor is important in convincing others of your view
(MA/5).
He went on to suggest that "the media should have treated the issues that were difficult to
discuss during the conflict or to deal with them in talks and meetings specifically held for
that purpose"(MA/5). He thought this would be an effective way of ensuring that the
desired messages were effectively disseminated, in line with Mowlana's note that "Almost
all governments around the world set up 'information' and 'propaganda' agencies, hired
public relations firms, and organized regular and systematic briefing' meeting and lavish
diplomatic parties . . ." (1997: 8). Kuwait itself took such an approach, hiring an
American public relations firm at more than '1,000,000' dollars per month to gain
American public support for the liberation of Kuwait (Lacey & Longman, 1997: 7).
Another media academic MA/3, like MA/5, contrasted Saudi and Western experience,
concluding that "the Saudi press should have a strategic plan specially in the political
sphere and should take a stand from the general issues confronting it on the basis of this
conflict as a basis". He went on to assert the importance of informed political opinion:
We, in the Arab world, especially in the Gulf states, suffer from the
problem of politicising the culture or educating the authority which
should be based on a careful reading of our political situation. The
indisputable fact is that the authorities need educated people especially
those with a political culture. There are decision makers who are not
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qualified, as well as there are unqualified journalists, but this does not
mean that there are no qualified people. There are a few highly educated
individuals (MA/3).
In the view of one media academic, the major impact of the conflict as far as the media
was concerned is that it has accelerated the rate of technological advance: "The Gulf war
helped to bring about an information revolution, with direct broadcasting and satellite
channels. All these things would have come in due course but the war speeded up their
arrival to the kingdom" (MA/10) 25 . He did not, however, believe that this would
necessarily lead to more openness in reporting: "The function of the media is to report all
events but in reality this was not possible because not everything one knows can be
reported and not everything said can be written" (MA/10).
The above opinions of media academics suggest that any change in the quality and manner
of press performance is subject to political constraint. The ultimate objective of any
change would be a sharing of political power, in the sense that journalists are considered as
the carriers of the political agenda.
4.7.2 Journalists' Opinions of the Saudi Press Performance after the Liberation
of Kuwait
The journalists were inclined to a belief that the Saudi press has been changed in its
dealings with analysis. One journalist gave examples of what he saw as the increased
power of the Saudi press:
One of the consequences of the Gulf War was that it opened the eyes of
the Saudi media and increased its ability to confront the media campaign
against Saudi Arabia. For example, some of the Egyptian newspapers
staged a campaign against Saudi Arabia after a teacher in one of the
government schools was accused of having gay sex with an Egyptian
pupil and this nonsense and accusations and counter accusations nearly
severed diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. I think
that the Egyptians were surprised by the strong counter attack from the
Saudi press and consequently backed down and stopped the heated
25 (MA/10) Media academic, Umm al-Qura Univeristy, Makkah.
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campaign against the kingdom. Another example is the 1995 tour by
journalists and press representatives of local military establishments and
some of the areas that were previously regarded as sensitive areas, which
was regarded by some as some sort of media triumph (J/12).
Another linked journalistic and political work and said:
Unfortunately when we are confronted with a particular crisis, we always
tend to feel the enormity of our responsibility but for only a short time
and when the crisis passes away we think of it as a temporary situation
that no longer exists. Thus, there is a need to put our house in order by
activating the Gulf Co-operation Council to ensure that the council takes
more actions and does not confine itself to meetings, circulars and a final
resume (J/9).
The assumption is that after the liberation of Kuwait, there would be major changes, at
least in people's attitudes toward the press function and the way journalists gather and
present the news. One respondent noted that viewers and readers have become more
critical and questioning, though he doubted whether the Saudi media have, as yet,
responded to this changed environment.
After the war people became more open and critical of what had
happened. People who call for the truth are the ones who experienced
the crises. As far as the press is concerned nothing has changed and
most of the writings in the papers are below standard because there is
no information and in addition the Arab press have continued to praise
and report the movements of the officials. . .. Thus, people started to
look for other sources of information with more honest treatment,
especially with regard to those stories which have psychological and
social influence, as well as the news of other disasters in the world and,
hence, the move to the American and European media (J/7).
Referring to the accusations and propaganda that dominated the scene before the liberation
of Kuwait, as claimed J/5, raised the rhetorical question: "why was there no counter
propaganda work to stop the Iraqi accusations after the liberation?" He went on to
comment that:
The media channels did not discuss these Iraqi accusations to find out
their causes and to bring the matter to a close. Rather, we became
obsessed by the Oslo Accord and forgot the problem, as if the accord is
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so important to the extent that it prevented us from discussing these
details at a time when it is perfectly legitimate to discuss the past (J/5).
He went on to imply that the sudden dropping of the discussion of the Gulf conflict
reflected inability on the part of the Saudi media to discuss it objectively and analyse it
critically. The press, some thought, "was not used in an effective way before, during or
after the war" (J/4). One interviewee cited an example which in his view showed that the
Saudi press had failed to learn the lesson of the Gulf conflict:
It is shameful to say that we are a nation without a memory and the
proof is what happened in Tel Aviv as a result of the suicidal bomb
attack a month ago in January 1997 when Okaz newspaper came out
with its main headline saying "the Mossad did it against Tel Aviv". The
opening page of the paper said it was the Mossad who did this, at a time
when photographs from news agencies, France and Reuters explained the
situation, identified the name of the bomber, reported that his house was
demolished and said that the organisation behind the attack had claimed
responsibility for it. The next day the same newspaper came out with a
big heading saying `11AMAS reiterates its threat to repeat such attacks'.
This had happened within 24 hours !! (J/8).
In addition to the continued weaknesses in political interpretation, he believed the Saudi
press had still not sufficiently embraced its role as a source of information and debate on
social issues. He commented:
The fact is we did not make any use of the Gulf War, either at the level
of the media message, the tactical level, news or at the level of our
awareness. How can we discuss social issues like drugs, or
homosexuality for example? We started the debate and there is no
objection to putting it across but the problem is how to deal with it and
at the same time not to spread it. This unprofessional work is not useful
and neither the media nor the political leadership will accept it. We want
to create a complete citizen, upright, pure and the information available
to him is clear because the press of today is an information press (J/8).
Another journalist suggested that the Saudi press still lacks credibility, compared with
other sources of information:
When a political incident occurs, the ordinary reader goes to buy the
London-based Arabic newspapers like al-Sharq al-Awsat or al-Hayat
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because our newspapers are poor and what they give us is not 100 per
cent correct. In the end it is a piece of news perhaps with slightly
different analysis because our press is still young and lacks specialist
cadres and professionals (J/14)26.
Another commented on the local media's failure to explain the consequences of the war:
If there is no journalistic feeling then this will be reflected in three things:
political matters, security issues and professional matters and if we added
to this list economic issues, then what did going to war mean to us?
How to prepare public opinion to bear the economic consequences of the
war? Very soon it became public that Saudi Arabia paid 36 billions to
meet the expenses of the war and its consequences. The Saudi media did
not address this question. It could have explained that there would have
economic losses far in excess of what Saudi Arabia has paid, if the
economic establishments had been destroyed (J/3).
In other words, the press could have hi .
 blighted what Saudi Arabia stood to lose if Iraq
had succeeded in attaining its ambitions. If Saudis Arabia had been defeated in the
conflict and overrun by Iraqi its economy would have been destroyed. By exploring such
issues, the press could have helped people to assess the situation more realistically.
Another respondent, pointing out that the press role had been largely reactive, rather than
proactive, noted that, with better planning, this need not be the case, given that Saudi
Arabia has a clear media policy and that the technical requirements for development of the
media's role are met. The answer, however, seems to lie at government level. "The
methodology is available and the general policy is known and the high Media Council is in
place and in these circumstances the Ministry of Information's role would be to implement
these policies and translate them into studies, then into policy and afterwards apply them
into practice" (J/3).
Another journalist elaborated on the impact of government influence on Saudi information
policy, thus:
After that [i.e. the Gulf war] every Minister of Information started to
make an effort in every aspect big and small. If the minister is open and
26 (J/14) Saudi Journalist, al-Yaum Newspaper, Dammam.
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understanding, like al-Hajlan [the first Saudi Information minister] or
Mohammed Abdh Al-Yamani [the second Saudi Information minister],
the media in turn will become open. On the other hand, Ali al-Sheir
[the former minister during the Gulf conflict]closed the media. The
minister usually lays down the policies and then carry out this policy.
The body responsible for policy making is the Council of Ministers and
the specialised advisors but in the absence of any directive the minister
lays down the policy (J/5).
Thus, both media academics and journalists highlighted the connection between the
government (decision makers) and information policy. They noted the gap not only
between journalists and politicians or decision makers but also "between the journalists and
the role they play because they do not know the nature of their role" (J/3). The
interviewee who made this comment went on to explain that the communication process
consists of senders, recipients, and a message and the absence of correct
understanding of the message can create a gap between you and the job
you are doing because you are not qualified to do this job in a proper
way. This will be reflected in the relations between the official and the
journalist because if the journalist does not understand his duties, he
would have inadequate relations with the official and consequently in
some cases may reveal some things and this is not good for the country
(J/3).
The extent to which journalists understand their duties will depend to a large extent on the
explicit information of media policy. However, although the Saudi media policy written in
well structured language in the form of a constitution, with highly sophisticated concepts,
it contains contradictions and ambiguities, leaving it open to interpretation.
Historically, if we go back to the phrases that were written when the
broadcasting station was first opened we find the following: In the Name
of God the Most Compassionate the Most Merciful . . .. From King
Abdul-Aziz to (his) son Saud 27
 . . .. With the help of God we open the
broadcasting station as the first media channel which must mention what
we usually mention and not mention what we usually do not mention'.
27 The respondent was not sure to whom the King had sent the letter, so the researcher made a
point of investigating this matter. The letter was, in fact, to the King's son Faisal, dated on 23,
Ramadan (The ninth month in the Islamic Lunar calender). See Abdul Rahman Shobaili, 1980.
A History and Analytical Study of Broadcasting and Press in Saudi Arabia, Doctoral
Dissertation, Ohio State University.
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This short message encompasses more meaning than it might appear.
For example, what did HRH mean by "what we usually mention" and
what he means by "things which we usually do not mention"?
We deal with the media policy as rigid phrases and this is what causes
conflict between the journalist and these policies, either knowingly or in
good faith and sometimes the journalist may dictate his own vision which
is not really part of the country's policy on that particular subject (J/5).
The same journalist added that: "If there is no political leadership to give a directive, the
Saudi media tries to look for a directive from within itself' (J/5). When asked, "How?" he
said that:
There are big figures in the Saudi press, like the chief editor of Okaz
newspaper, for example, and the papers follows the directives of these
figures, whichever direction they take. The reporting of the Iranians'
massacre dining one of the Hajj [The Muslim pilgrimage which involves
setting out for the Kaba, Arafat, and Mina and performing specific rites
during the days 8-13 in the month of Du al-Hija] seasons perhaps is
intimately connected with the political regime (J/5).
Does the above argument mean that there should be more freedom and less structure for
the Saudi press? One journalist replied:
I do not ask for absolute freedom of expression because if that happened,
tomorrow there would be an attack on religion or disorderly pictures in
our media on the ground that this is a free society. No. In Saudi society
we have the holy book and the prophet's (peace be upon him) traditions.
However, the media should stop perpetuating the myth that our society is
the best place in the world and has no problems. This is not the land of
milk and honey and the best proof is the Gulf war (J/7).
Conclusion
The comments of the interviews highlight deficiencies in the Saudi press coverage of the
events leading up to the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and of the war itself Before
the war, the press seemed to be largely taken unawares by the course of events and played
little or no role in analysing the initial diplomatic manoeuvring nor in predicting the
possible outcomes of the conflict, though some journalists maintained that at least they had
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not been seduced by Iraqi propaganda as, they claimed, was the case in some neighbouring
states.
For some time, the Saudi press remained largely silent. Moreover, despite the proactive
role taken by some individual journalists during the conflict itsell in their effort to
penetrate the scene of the conflict, often at great personal risk, the impression remains that
Saudi coverage was largely reactive in nature, and included little comment or analysis.
Three main reasons emerged for this limited role. The first was lack of information. The
second was, it was claimed, a lack of political awareness in Saudi society as a whole,
including amongst its journalists, that prevented the press from thoroughly analysing and
skilfully interpreting such information as was available. The lack of experience of Saudi
journalists, even those who had previously covered international events such as those in
Bosnia, was frequently commented upon. Above all, however, the role of the Saudi press
in relation to the conflict was limited by political constraint. The Saudi Press Agency
played an intermediary role between the Saudi government agenda and the journalists,
represented by the chief editor (who significantly is himself appointed by the Ministry of
Information) the person accountable before the authorities, for what is published. The fine
line between press policy and state policy is illustrated by the silence maintained by the
Saudi press at the outset of the Gulf conflict, until the official stance of the state had
become clear.
The consequence was a loss in credibility in the Saudi press, which strengthened the
competitive impact of other media, particularly the foreign news media, such as the BBC
and CNN. Although the direct influence of the foreign media was to some extent
mitigated by the comparatively small proportion of the population who had access to it
(e.g. through satellite dishes) and who possessed the requisite foreign language skills, there
is no doubt that the more educated Saudis turned to such sources of information, which
were perceived as providing a better service. The Saudi journalists themselves gained
much of their information about the conflict from foreign sources. Moreover, through
watching, listening to and reading foreign news coverage, and by direct contact and co-
operation with foreign journalists in the field, they gained new insights into ways of
obtaining and presenting information.
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It might be expected that the psychological, experiential, and technical consequences of the
Gulf war itself may have had a lasting impact an the Saudi press in the post-war period.
There was little evidence that such is the case. Although the journalists acknowledged
some change in their perceptions of the potential press role, they reported that in practice,
little has changed, due to inadequate planning, lack of sufficiently trained and skilled
journalists, and the continued constraints imposed by the press's relationship with
government.
In the next chapter, we will examine the nature of the Saudi press news coverage during
the Gulf conflict, and analyse the characteristics pertaining to the selection of conflict (i.e.
war) news. Both examination and analysis will be quantitative in approach. It will provide
us with the opportunity to note textual differences through the analysis of reports, and in
this way identify the overall agenda of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict.
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Chapter 5
The Performance of the Saudi Press during the Gulf Conflict of
1990 - 1991: A Quantitative Content Analysis
The purpose of this chapter is to present the nature of the Saudi press news coverage
during the conflict, and the characteristics pertaining to the selection of news.
The focus of the Chapter is primarily quantitative; in other words, it concentrates on
presenting information about the frequency and percentage distribution of news items and
leading articles according to themes etc. in order to test the research hypotheses. A brief
interpretative discussion of these findings is presented at the end of the chapter. More
detailed interpretation is, however, reserved to Chapter 7, where the findings are
integrated with those of other chapters and with the relevant theory.
5.1 Research Findings
During the sample period, 297 issues each of Riy, Oka and Yau daily newspapers were
analysed. A total of 3,609 individual news items were analysed, of which 2,183 were
related to the Gulf conflict. Over half (60.49%) appeared on the front pages. Table 5.1
shows the total frequency of Gulf conflict news stories in all the newspapers under review
in each period of study, and their average (mean).
Table 5.1 Total Frequency of Gulf Conflict News Stories in Saudi Press durini the Gulf Conflict
Period of study Riy Oka Yau Total Mean
Before Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0
2 July 1990 -1 August 1990 (86) (90) (82) (258) (86)
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait 324 248 289 861 287
2 August 1990-16 January, 1991 (220) (246) (225) (691) (230.33)
The liberation of Kuwait 388 354 406 1148 382.67
17 January 1991- 28 February, 1991 (130) (142) (114) (386) (128. 67)
After the liberation of Kuwait 58 43 73 174 58
1 March, 1991-30 March, 1991 (22) (29) (40) (91) (30.33)
* The numbers in parenthesis relate to non conflict news stories by frequency.
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In addition to the front page news stories, leading articles were also analysed. A total of
297 leading articles were looked at, of which an overwhelming majority of 252 (84.85%)
related to the Gulf conflict. Table 5.2 shows the total frequency of Gulf conflict leading
articles in the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict, and their average (mean) in each period
of study.
Table 5.2 Total Frequency of Gulf Conflict Leading Articles in Saudi Press during the Gulf
Conflict
Period Riy Oka Yau Total Mean
Before Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
2 July 1990 - 1 August 1990
0 0 0 0 0
Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait
2 August 1990 - 16 January, 1991
36 36 39 111 37
The liberation of Kuwait
17 January 1991- 28 February, 1991
39 40 44 123 41
After the liberation of Kuwait
1 March, 1991- 30 March, 1991
6 6 6 18 6
The findings from all four periods of the study were remarkably consistent and enabled a
number of the research questions to be answered, and the hypotheses to be tested. In
presenting the findings, the order adopted is, however, not necessarily that of the
hypotheses used in Chapter one; rather the sequence is determined by the procedure which
the Saudi journalists go through in selecting material for publication. They usually starts
by reading the main news topic, its type and tone, then they ask who are the personnel
involved, and what is the location and the source of the news. This, therefore, is the order
in which the topics are analysed in the following sections.
5.1.1 Period L Before Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait (2 July, 1990 - 1 August, 1990)
An analysis of 21 issues of each newspaper showed that all Saudi press front pages and
leading articles were devoted to subjects other than the Gulf conflict (see Tables 5.1 and
5.2). None of the research questions or hypotheses could, therefore, be answered or
tested in relation to the newspapers for this period. The reason is that the Saudi media in
general, including the press, the radio, and television, could not deal freely with external
issues, such as the Gulf conflict, the border problems between Kuwait and Iraq, Iraq's
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accusation that Kuwait and UAE had conspired to steal its oil., or their conspiracy to lower
oil prices by increasing their production. All these issues were well known to those in
charge of the press, which has close very links with the Ministry of Information through
the appointed Editors-in-Chief or through the radio and television which are controlled by
the Ministry of Information. Nevertheless, as discussions with the Saudi media academics
and journalists presented in Chapter 4 revealed, it was natural for the press to adopt the
state policy. The government views issues such as the Gulf conflict as political rather than
media or press issues. Saudi Arabia has always adopted the principle of "wait and see"
and prefers not to delve into such matters hastily but wait until things become clearer.
Only then will a political decision be taken and made public through the Saudi Press
Agency which releases it to all the media channels, including the press. It is then that the
press comes into play, and its reporting is constrained by the written media. Such
constraints are reiterated in the meetings that take place between the officials and the
journalists.
5.1.2 Period II. During Iraq's Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait (2 August, 1990 - 16
January, 1991)
5.1.2.1 Main News Topics, Types and their Tone
Question two centred on the main news topics, type of news (domestic, international or
foreign) and the tone of these main news topics that were carried by the Saudi press.
Table 5.3 lists the main news topics, their type and tone. As can be seen, the Saudi press
agenda during the Iraqi invasion and occupation is obvious. Most immediately striking is
the prominence of political stories from domestic, international and foreign sources
(62.60%) reported both positively and negatively in tone (positive 94.62%; negative
5.38%). Foreign political news topics accounted for 50.83% (positive 91.20%; negative
8.80%), international political news topics comprised 33.21% (positive 98.32%; negative
1.66%), while domestic political news topics constituted 15.96% (positive 98.84%;
negative 1.16%).
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Not surprisingly, during this period, there was a preoccupation within the Saudi
government and reflected in the press, on the course of diplomatic negotiations to resolve
the Kuwait conflict and avert, while 'negative' items focused on Iraqi aggression and lack
of co-operation with the international community.
Second in prominence were military/defence items with 18.12% (positive 86.54%;
negative 13.46%). Of this, foreign military/defence news comprised 55.13% (positive
81.40%; negative 8.60%); international news 32.05% (positive 90%; negative 10.00%)
and domestic news 12.82% (positive 100%).
Third was crime/law/justice items with 8.01% (positive 7.25%; negative 92.75%), totally
(100%) from foreign sources (positive 7.25%; negative 92.75%). It is surprising that no
international and domestic crime/law/justice news topics were cited, since it might have
been expected that crimes perpetrated by Iraq and affecting Saudi Arabia or its nationals
would have attracted attention. It seems likely that the silence on these issues was part of
a conscious "wait - and - see" policy; in other words the government, through the press,
did not want to inflame the situation, but preferred to await developments.
Fourth was economic items with 3.48% (positive 70%; negative 30%). Of this figure,
foreign news comprised 73.33% (positive 68.18; negative 31.82%); international news
20% (positive 66.67%; negative 33.33%) and domestic news 6.67% (100% positive).
Fifth was social service, items with 2.21% (positive 73.68; negative 26.32%). Of this,
foreign news comprised 57.89% (positive 63.64%; negative 36.36%) with international
news 26.34% (positive 80%; negative 20%) and domestic news 15.77% (100% positive).
Hypothesis Ia predicted that political and military/defence developments in the Gulf
conflict would be considered more newsworthy than any other news topics.
A summary of the information used to evaluate hypothesis Ia is given Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4 A Summary of Main News Topics durin g the Iraqi Invasion and Occu pation of Kuwait
Newspapers
Main News Topics Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Political and Military/defence 257 206 232 695
Other main news topics
(economic, crime/law/justice, social
service, sport, education, etc. )
67 42 57 166
Total 324 248 289 861
For the three newspapers, it was found with a 95% level of confidence, that the proportion
of news items concerned with political and military/defence developments was between
78.09% and 83.35%. There was a statistically significant difference between level of
coverage of political and military/defence developments, and other main news topics,
which accounted for only 19.28% of all stories in all three newspapers. Therefore, this
hypothesis Ia was supported.
Regarding the type of news, hypothesis lb predicted that, for political and military/defence
developments in the Gulf conflict, news items would largely be domestic rather than
international and /or foreign.
The data collected on the type of news are given in Table 5.3. A summary of this
information, used to evaluate hypothesis lb, is provided in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 A Summary of Type of Political and Military/Defence News during the Iraqi Invasion and
Occupation of Kuwait
News 3apers
Type of news Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Domestic 28 50 28 106
Other
( international & foreign)
229 156 204 589
Total 257 206 232 695
For the three newspapers, with a 95% level of confidence, the proportion of domestic
news items of a political or military/defence nature was between 12.68 % and 18.06%.
This shows there is a statistically significant difference in the coverage of political and
military/defence news from domestic sources and that from other sources, since we
observed that 84.74% of all types of political and military news for the three newspapers
were from international and foreign sources. Thus, hypothesis lb was not supported.
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For the tone of news, hypothesis Ic predicted that for political and military/defence
developments, it would generally be positive rather than negative. See Table 5.3 for the
data collected on tone. A summary of this information used to evaluate hypothesis Ic is
given in Table 5.6 below.
Table 5. 6 A Summary of Tone of Political and Military/Defence News Stories during the Iraqi
Invasion and Occu pation of Kuwait
News apers
Main news topic
P
Riy
N P
Oka
NP
Yau
N
Riy, Oka &Yau
P	 N
Political & Military/defence 239 18 194 12 212 20 645 50
P= positive 1\1= negative
With a 95% confidence level, the proportion of the news items of a political and
military/defence nature that were positive in tone lay between 91.83% and 93.79%. There
is a statistically significant difference in the proportion of news items of a political and
military/defence nature that were positive and those that were negative, since it was
observed that 7.19% of political and military news in all three newspapers was negative.
Thus hypothesis Ic was supported.
5.1.2.2 Themes of News Items
Question three asked: what was main theme of news items chosen, and their tone in the
Saudi press? While news items covered a wide range, it is possible to identify those news
items during Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait which were given prominent
coverage by the Saudi press. The first ten news items classified in Table 5.7 are the main
themes emphasised in all Saudi press taken together. These first ten themes accounted for
more than half (55.40%) of all the themes in toto. The most dominant themes were SA
diplomacy in connection to the UN, EC, US, and others, and the level of Iraq's crime
and injustice (see over Table 5.7).
Hypothesis II predicted that there would be similar themes in the news items presented by
the three newspapers. The data collected on news themes are provided in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7 Frequency Distribution of Items by Themes of all three Newspapers during the Iraqi
Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait ( 2 August, 1999 - 16 January, 1991)
Theme Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka
& Thu
SA diplomacy as a means of solving the problem - in connection
with UN, EC, US, Arab Nations (excluding Iraq, Yemen, Jordan,
Sudan) 47 27 28 102
Level of Iraq's crime and injustice - both inside and outside Iraq
e.g. foreigners held hostages, killed etc. 34 12 26 72
US reaction to the problem 28 12 24 64
SA government official communication (broadcasts, speeches, etc. 25 20 8 53
Support for SA's position - countries, organisations and individuals 18 17 15 50
Kuwait's Royal government e.g. visits, speeches, receptions, etc. 17 9 18 44
Reaction of Kuwaiti people and government, both inside and
outside Kuwait 11 6 10 27
Royal visits to troops, reception of Saudi citizens etc. 10 4 8 22
Diplomacy as a way of solving the problem - (excluding SA) 8 4 10 22
SA & Gulf Co- operation Council (GCC) meetings 10 6 5 21
Others
US technological effects in Gulf conflict 0 1 0 1
UK & Egypt reject the connection between Israeli occupied
Palestine and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 1 0 0 1
Social services provided to countries affected by sanctions (i.e.
Egypt, Jordan & Turkey) 1 2 0 3
Iraq's evacuation of Kuwait 0 1 1 2
Spain's blueprint for moving troops to the Gulf 1 0 0 1
Kuwait's security arrangements in relation to Kuwaitis returning
to Kuwait following liberation 1 1 0 2
Meeting of five major nations' foreign ministers 1 0 0 1
Schwarzkopf s announcements to stop oil well fires & their
environmental impact 0 1 3 4
Foreign media display 3 1 7 11
Possible withdrawal of Soviet military advisers from Iraq 0 1 3 4
Support for UN resolution and aggression (positive) by:
Russian reaction to the problem 9 4 4 17
US & Russian summit meetings 1 1 2 4
France 5 0 2 7
India 1 0 0 1
United Arab Emirates 0 0 3 3
Egypt 2 3 14 19
Bahrain 0 1 1 2
Japan 1 0 3 4
Kenya, Uganda & Ethiopia 1 0 0 1
Indonesia 0 0 1 1
UK 7 5 7 19
Oman 0 1 0 1
Australia 0 0 1 1
Argentina 0 1 0 1
Turkey 1 0 0 1
Holland 1 0 0 1
Canada 0 1 0 1
Pakistan 1 1 0 2
Belgium 1 0 0 1
Iran 0 4 1 5
Austria 1 0 1 2
Algeria 1 1 0 2
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Table 5.7 (continued)
Theme Riy Oka Yau Riy,Oka
& Yau
Tanzania 0 1 1 2
Bulgaria 0 1 0 1
Syria 0 0 1 1
Qatar 0 1 2 3
China 2 0 4 6
Egypt welcomes Saudi debt cancellation 0 1 0 1
Neutral Position - Iran's neutral reaction to the problem 1 0 1 2
Poetry 1 0 0 1
Citizens' views (letters to the editor/public forums, etc.) 0 20 0 20
Debate among Arab nations 0 0 1 1
Preparation of mass distribution of gas masks in Israel 0 0 1 1
Satellites (8) used to check Iraq's military activities 0 0 1 1
Military capacity- ships, aircraft, etc. 0 1 1 2
Saddam asks Iraqis to turn their private yards into food producing
units 0 0 1 1
Jordanian aircraft falls out of sky 0 0 1 1
American aircraft assignment for Kuwait 0 0 1 1
Anti- government leaflet distribution in Iraq 0 0 1 1
International Monetary Fund increases its loans for belligerents 0 0 1 1
Bahrain & Iran agree that changes in the redrawing of the map
are unacceptable 0 0 1 1
International Labour Organisation discusses Egypt's claims against 0 0 1 1
Iraq
Tunisia asks Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait 0 0 1 1
Liberation of Kuwait strengthens other Gulf states 0 0 1 1
American Navy prepares to bombard Kuwait 0 0 1 1
The greatest challenge for the world is to force Iraq from Kuwait 0 0 1 1
Extent of Arabian diplomacy urging Iraq to withdraw from 0 0 1 1
Kuwait
Iraq invades Kuwait 0 2 0 2
Iraq insists its position in non negotiable 2 2 2 6
Iraq's political system - history etc. 0 2 2 4
Iraq's nuclear & chemical weapons capabilities 0 1 1 2
Iraq's use of decoys (e.g. printing false plans to help Iraq identify 0 1 0 1
US military locations)
Oil wells alight/ belching smoke 1 0 0 1
Oil prices rise 2 6 1 9
Effects of economic sanctions because of the conflict 1 4 2 7
Economic sanctions as a way of solving the problem 3 3 0 6
Summit meeting of the five permanent members of the UN Security 2 0 0 2
Conical
UN resolutions in relation to the conflict 2 2 4 8
Failure of French peace initiatives 0 1 0 1
Failure of Russian peace initiatives 1 0 3 4
Failure of UN Secretary General De Cuellar's peace initiatives 2 1 2 5
Failure of SA peace initiatives 0 1 0 1
EC role in peace initiatives - meetings with other countries 2 2 8 12
Allied military incompetence - French patrol loses its way 1 0 0 1
Allied military skills 0 0 1 1
Possibility of fighting 0 4 0 4
Military build-up in SA 6 4 7 17
Kuwait TV station transmitted SA TV station 1 0 0 1
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Table 5.7 continued
Theme Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka
& Yau
PLO's mistake in supporting Iraq 1 1 1 3
Reasons behind overtures to OPEC 0 1 0 1
Level of support among non-Muslims for Sharia law 0 1 0 1
Backstage diplomacy could undermine Gulf puzzle 0 1 0 1
Iraq asks to withdraw from Kuwait by giving guarantees not to
attack the Rumaila oil fields
1 0 0 1
Saddam asks for asylum 0 0 1 1
Iraq's failure to stand (e.g. trouble of relations with Iraqis) 7 6 3 16
Saddam as an atheist, and co-operation with, is a break with
Islamic outlook 0 1 0 1
Military aggression and breakdown of Iraqi regime 0 1 0 1
Sudan's reaction 1 0 0 1
Jordan's reaction 1 0 1 2
Yemen's reaction 4 1 2 7
Sudanese, Jordanian and Iraqi citizens are affected by their
governments' behaviour 1 2 2 5
Iraq the loser, both politically and militarily 0 1 0 1
Yemen searches for an exit from Saddam's "rat trap" 0 1 0 1
Iraq connects its withdrawal from Kuwait with resolution of
Palestine problem 0 2 1 3
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait before expiry of deadline 0 1 0 1
Support for sending of troops to SA (US, (iK, Egypt) 5 0 0 5
Meeting of SA, Egypt and Syrian foreign ministers 7 3 2 12
SA Armed Forces - ready 1 1 1 3
Skill of SA Troops (pilots, soldiers etc.) 0 3 0 3
SA Council of Ministers' meetings 2 0 0 2
SA Ulema (Religious Scholars) reactions 1 1 0 2
SA prepares for war - jobs, draft, military areas opened, etc. 1 4 2 7
SA's treatment of Kuwaitis and other Arab people, prisoners of
war, etc. 4 2 0 6
Meeting of Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), Egypt and Syrian
foreign ministers 2 0 1 3
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) reaction 3 1 2 6
The Arab League's reaction 2 2 3 7
Non- Aligned Organisation's countries' reaction to the conflict 1 0 1 2
Islamic countries' meetings/reactions 0 2 2 4
The results show that there were differences among the three newspapers in the number of
2
themes presented. Between Riy and Oka it was x = 106.45; between Rzy and Yau it was
9
2	 2
x = 62.03; and between Oka and Yau it was x = 44.1.
9
	
9
Because of these pronounced differences among the three newspapers, hypothesis 11 was
not supported.
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5.1.2.3 Personnel in the News
Question four asked: which personnel did the Saudi press give coverage to in each news
item? Table 5.8 overleap shows the origin of each individual, institution or organisation to
which the Saudi press gave coverage. The figures in Table 5.8 indicate a high level of
concentration on personnel from the SA government (15.91%) Multi-region governments
(15.68%) and the Middle East (14.40%).
These were followed by the US (9.64%) Asia/Pacific (8.48%) Western Europe (8.36%)
Iraq (4.65%) Yemen (1.51%) Jordan (0.81%) and Sudan (0.46%). Beyond these
countries, the secondary spheres of interest contributed between 0.23%-8.40%. Individual
and institutional contributions are also itemised in the Table.
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Hypothesis ifi predicted that Saudi press coverage would rely more heavily on SA
government officials than on other personnel. The Information used in evaluating
hypothesis ifi is given in Table 5.9 below.
Table 5.9 Personnel Covered by the Saudi Press during the Iraqi Invasion and Occupation of
Kuwait
News )apers
Personnel Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Domestic (SA government
officials)
59 42 36 137
Other (other government,
non government officials,
individuals and institutions,
etc. )
262 206 252 720
Total 321 248 288 857
It was found, with a 95% level of confidence, that the proportion of news items employing
SA government officials as sources for all these newspapers lay between 12.85 % and
18.97 %. This shows there is a statistically significant difference between the employment
of SA government officials personnel and other personnel, since it was observed that
84.09% of news items for the three newspapers originated from non-Saudi government
officials. Thus hypothesis III, also, was not supported.
5.1.2.4 Geographic Origin of News
Question five asked: to which geographically newsworthy locations of news did the Saudi
press pay more attention? Table 5.10 shows the locations of news events during the
coverage of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
It can be seen that the Saudi press paid greater attention to some areas of the world, and
less to others. All the locations were geopolitically significant in relation to the reactions
to Iraq's invasion, which explains the newspapers' reliance on these areas of the world, for
both political and diplomatic reasons. Nearly a third of the news items (29.38%)
originated in SA.
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These figures show also the extent to which news was concentrated on countries which
were politically important to SA. Middle Eastern countries, for example, comprised the
second most significant location (19.40%).
This was followed by the US (10.92%), Asia/Pacific (10.45%), Africa (10.22%) and
Western countries (9.99%). Other geographical areas were represented to various
degrees, in the vicinity of 6.39% or less.
Hypothesis IV predicted that Saudi press coverage would pay greater attention to Gulf
conflict news stories originating in the SA region, than to stories from other geographical
locations. The relevant data are presented in Table 5.10.
A summary of the information used in evaluating hypothesis IV is given in Table 5.11.
Table 5.11 A Summary of Geographical Locations of News Stories during the Iraqi Invasion and
Occu ation of Kuwait
Newspapers
Geographical Locations Riy Oka Yau Ria, Oka & Yau
Domestic (SA) 113 89 51 253
Other geographical Locations
(East Europe,	 West Europe,
Middle East, etc.)
211 147 237 595
Total 324 236 288 848
It was found, with a 95% level of confidence, that the proportion of news items originating
in SA for all the newspapers lay between 26.77% and 32.89%. This shows there is a
statistically significant difference between the proportion of stories from SA, and those
originating in other regions, since it is observed that 70.17% of news items in all three
newspapers were from other geographical locations. Thus hypothesis No. IV was not
supported.
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5.1.2. 5 News Sources
Question six asked: On which news sources were the Saudi press dependent for their news
presentation? Table 5.12 shows the sources of Gulf conflict news stories during the Iraq
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. An examination of all three newspapers together
revealed that the news was obtained entirely from a variety of local, international and
foreign agencies.
For instance, as Table 5.12 shows, the newspapers obtained nearly two- thirds of their
Gulf conflict news stories from the following: SPA (26.25%) their own staff (21.49%)
multi-sources (17.07%) other agencies, such as the Egyptian, Qatari and Iranian news
agencies (14.75%) and Reuters (11.73%). Use of other sources ranged between 0.12%
and 6.62% for the three newspapers.
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Hypothesis V predicted that Saudi press coverage of the Iraqi invasion would depend
more heavily on domestic sources (own staff the Saudi Press Agency [SPA] and
government officials) than on other sources. A summary of the data collected on sources
is given in Table 5.13 below and is used for an evaluation of Hypothesis V.
Table 5.13 A Summary of Sources of News Stories during the Iraqi Invasion and Occupation of
Kuwait
Newspapers
Source Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Domestic
(Own staff, SPA, etc.) 180 146 85 411
Other sources
(Reuters, AFP, AP, etc.) 142 100 201 443
Total 322 246 286 854
Using the statistical test described earlier (see Chapter 3), which was used for all
hypotheses testing, it was found that with a 95% level of confidence, the proportion of
news items from domestic sources ranged between 44.78% and 51.48% for the three
newspapers. This shows there is a statistically significant difference between the level of
reliance on the sources of news stories, since it was noted that 51.87 % of news items for
all three newspapers were from other sources. Thus, hypothesis V was not supported.
5.1.2.6 Leading articles
Question seven asked: what was theme of the leading articles, their tone, and to whom
were they directed or related? The selection of leading articles largely reflects the interests
and attitudes of journalists. Table 5.14 below lists some 111 themes, most of which were
directed towards the Iraqi government (47.74%) and were negative in tone, while the SA
government received 15.32% and the Allied coalition 14.41%, all positive in tone.
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Table 5.14 Main Themes/Headlines of Leading Articles of each Newspapers during the Iraqi
Invasion and Occu pation of Kuwait 2 August, 1999 - 16 January, 1991
Theme/ Headline	 Riy Newspaper
The Arab diplomatic efforts in the Iraq- Kuwait crisis
Saudi Arabia (SA) as the centre of Arab meetings
Can Arabs overcome their own problems?
Are Arab nations 40 years behind the times because of lack of co - operation?
The Arab World looks like a train carrying explosives (with many entrenched problems)
Antichrist- Saddam
Saddam's preaching and lies to his own people
Iraq and the death of restraint
Saddam two faced
Iraq destroys all chances
Saddam and the promoters of lost causes
Saddam pretending to be the sole representation of Islam
Enemies and friends in the war against Iraq
Who will reinstate confidence in Arab relations?
The eye of political extortion over message to Saddam
Will international warships invade Iraq?
Will security files be opened?
Kuwait as a vehicle to open the facts of the region
Who can rescue/save Arabs from themselves?
Saddam is between military bombing and nerve war
First warning from Yemen
Baker's war file is diplomatic move
More secrets have opened about Saddam
The necessity of security in the region
Decisions, war and peace
The perfection of treatment-SA-
Gulf security in war and peace
Enduring peace with SA
The centre of Arab countries -reaction to the situation
Is the Arab question complicated?
Iraq between peace and war
Arabian and blood (the only Arab world situation to their problems is bloodshed)
Iraq for war or peace?
Who wins peace and who will announce war?
Our leaders - SA government- and forces in the one trench
King Fand and his speech on peace
Oka Newspaper
Saudi Govt. offerings to reach agreement
No to destroy the UN unit-refers to the international community
The real power- Arabs standing by
Holding together the chance of safety
Those who agree with the Arab solution, where are they?
DeCuellar is the only alternative to Saddam
The world's doors closed in the wavers' faces- Saddam-
Hitler died before being judged, but Saddam will be condemned
This is the Egypt that we know
Arabs reveal suspicious attitudes
Will Saddam get the message before it's too late?
What does it mean to internationally agree against Saddam?
Comparisons of sadness (message to Saddam )
Even the wavers repented
Iraq the executioner; his inevitable fate
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in
Theme/ Headline	 Oka Newspaper
The last contentment (the world contentment)
Jazan' basis (a town in the south of SA) and the extent of our - SA country devastating power
Saddam's terrorism is a declaration of failure
Hypocritical comments and Satanic acts - Iraq's regime
The war is worthily accepted by the world as a means of ensuring long term peace
Our immortal message in spite of mercenary deception (comment on the King of SA's
message)
Will Iraqi dictatorship be weakened ?
The Gulf states' unity is answer to the waverers
Test of the newly operational Iraqi regime
The Gulf States' co-ordination and the future of the crisis
Maintaining commitment is the only way of ending the crisis
The world appreciates the SA position
Kuwaiti liberation at any cost
The Gulf States' summit is desirable, but challenging
Will Saddam understand the peace message?
No procrastination and stalling
A lack of realisation at the last decisive moment
Geneva - chance for peace- meeting between Baker and Aziz
What does the Iraqi dictator want?
This is our position - SA in front of the world
Last words for Iraq's dictatorship
Yau Newspaper
SA usually supports Islamic co-operation
The importance of Arab unity
Israel - the only one to benefit from Arab weakness
SA responsible for Arab reconciliation
The danger of procrastination
Saddam afraid of ending the conflict
Obstinacy of Iraq's executioner
No escape but withdrawal from Kuwait
SA as instigator for push for peace
What kind of Jihad is Saddam ( the executioner) after?
Saddam in power is an insult to Iraqi people
Saddam and his deadly mistakes
The difficult choice
Saddam and Israel -Saddam's contact with Israel behind the backs of his Arab neighbours
Unity and theft
Saddam and his dishonourable escape
Iraq conspiring against both the Arab and Muslim Worlds
Saddam chooses the road to war
People paid the price - the Arab leaders' situations
The repercussions for Iraq
Saddam scared to face international community
The last initiative, what does it mean?
Wanted - Saddam- alive
Kuwait's liberation
The end of a tyrant
Prince Sultan - SA Minister of Defence- visiting his armed forces
A distinguished relationship - Egypt and SA
Saddam is confused/bewildered
Shield and security (meeting of the Gulf states ministers of defence)
SA and Bush initiative - SA agrees with his approach
Saddam claims false allegations
Table 5. 14 (continued)
Theme/Headline	 Yau Newspaper
The game of hostages
The uprising and Saddam's risk
The parameters of Saddam's withdrawal are established
Saddam and his aggressive tendencies
The decisive movement
Saddam's perception of political negotiations
The commander with his solders - King Fand
The continuation of wisdom - SA convinces Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait
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The Arab world was the object of 18.92% of leading articles, with 47.68% of these
positive and 52.32% negative. Other themes, such as economic and military matters and
those related to the conflict, received 2.70% all positive in tone, while anti-UN resolution
leading articles appeared hardly at all (00.9% ) but were again positive in tone.
Hypothesis VI predicted that the tone of the leading articles within each theme would
generally be positive, rather than negative. The data collected on the themes of the leading
articles are given in Table 5.14.
A summary of this information, used to evaluate hypothesis VI, is given in Table 5.15.
Table 5. 15 A Summary of the Tone of the Themes/Headlines of Leading Articles during the Iraqi
Invasion and Occupation of Kuwait by Fre uenc
Category Riy
P	 NP
Oka
N
Yau
P	 N
Riy, Oka &Yau
P	 N
Saudi Arabia 5 0 5 0 7 0 17 00
Arab World 3 7 4 3 3 1 10 11
Allied coalition 5 0 9 0 2 0 16 00
Iraq 0 14 0 14 0 25 0 53
Anti-UN resolutions (e.g.
Jordan, Sudan, Yemen, PLO,
etc.)
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Other 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 0
Total 14 22 19 17 13 26 46 65
With a 95% level of confidence, the proportion of themes in the leading articles that were
positive in tone lay between 32.27% and 50.61%. There is a statistically significant
difference between the number of positively and negatively treated themes, since it was
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observed that 58.56% of leading articles in the three newspaperswere negative.
Hypothesis VI , therefore, was not supported.
5.1.3 Period Ill During the Liberation of Kuwait (17 January, 1991 - 28 February,
1991)
5.1.3.1 Main News Topics, Types and their Tone
Question two asked: what were the main news topics, the type of news (domestic,
international or foreign) and the tone of these main news topics that were carried by the
Saudi press? Table 5.16 lists the main news topics, their type and tone. The negotiations
of the previous 166 days having failed, this was the period of the concerted military
intervention by the allied coalition. Thus, primary concerns of the press in this period were
to justify the war and report on the progress of the air and ground campaigns. These
reports were predominantly positive, in the sense that the military action was seen as
achieving the aims of the UN resolutions.
Most immediately striking is the prominence of military/defence items with 41.99%
(positive 92.53%; negative 7.47%). Of this, foreign military/defence news comprised
(30.50%) (positive 93.20%; negative 6.8%); international military/defence news 62.66%
(positive 92.05%; negative 7.95%) and domestic military/defence news 6.84% (positive
93.94; negative 6.06%).
Second came political stories, with 39.29% (positive 94.01%; negative 5.99%). Foreign
political news topics accounted for 54.10% (positive 91.39%; negative 8.61%);
international political news topics for 34.81% (positive 96.82%; negative 3.18%) and
domestic political news topics for 11.09% (positive 98.00%; negative 2.00%).
Third was crime/law/justice, with 7.67 % (positive 22.72%; negative 77.28%). Of this, the
foreign component was 87.5% (positive 5.58%; negative 84.42%); international
crime/law/justice comprised 3.41% (positive 66.67%; negative 33.33%) and domestic
crime/law/justice comprised 9.09% ( positive 75%; negative 35%).
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Fourth was religion, with 2.79% (positive 87.5%; negative 12.5%). Of this, foreign
religious news comprised 15.63% (positive 60%; negative 40%) with international
religious news 43.75% (positive 85.71%; negative 14.29%) and domestic religious news
40.62 % (100% positive).
Fifth was economic, with 2.53% (positive 68.97% ; negative 31.03.%). Of this, foreign
economic news comprised 41.38 % (positive 58.33%; negative 41.67%) with international
economic news 41.38% (positive 75%; negative 25%) and domestic economic news
17.24% (positive 80%; negative 20%).
Equal fifth was other news, with 2.53% (positive 100%). Of this, foreign other news
comprised 20.7% (positive 100%) with international other news 24.14% (positive 100%)
and domestic other news 55.17% (100% positive). The prominence of 'other' news can
be interpreted in two ways: as an effort to fill the newspaper, bearing in mind that
censorship would prevent the publications of some news in, for example, political and
military categories; and to raise moral and mobilise patriotic sentiment. An example is the
publication of the poems of Lt. Colonel al-Oteibi, referred to in an earlier chapter.
Hypothesis Ia predicted that the political and military/defence developments in the Gulf
conflict would be more newsworthy than other main news topics.
A summary of the information used to evaluate hypothesis Ia is given Table 5.17 below.
Table 5.17 A Summary of Main News Topics during the Liberation of Kuwait
Newspapers
Main news topics Riy Oka	 I	 Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Political and Military/defence 324 259 350 933
Other main topics
(economic, social service, crime/
law/justice, sport, education, etc.)
64 95 56 215
Total 388 354 406 1148
All three newspapers, with a 95% level of confidence, featured predominantly of news
items of a political and military/defence nature accounting for between 79.02% and
83.52%.
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This shows there is a statistically significant difference between the coverage of political
and military stories, and that of other main news topics, since it was observed that 18.73%
of all stories in all the newspapers were of a political and military nature. Thus hypothesis
Ia was supported.
For the type of news, hypothesis lb predicted that for political and military/defence
developments in the Gulf conflict, the news would largely be domestic rather than
international and/or foreign.
The data collected on the type of news is given in Table 5.16. A summary of this
information, used to evaluate hypothesis lb, is provided in Table 5.18 given below.
Table 5.18 A Summary of Type of Political and Military/Defence News during the Liberation of
Kuwait
Newspapers
Type of news Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Domestic 23 34 26 83
Other (International &
foreign)
301 225 324 850
Total 324 259 350 933
The three newspapers, with a 95% level of confidence, featured domestic news items of a
political and military/defence nature, in proportions ranging from 7.07 % and 10.71%.
This shows there is a statistically significant difference between the coverage of domestic
and other political and military/defence news, since it was observed that 91.10 % of all
political and military/defence news for the three newspapers was either international and
foreign in origin. Thus hypothesis lb was not supported.
For the tone of news, hypothesis Ic predicted that for political and military/defence
developments, the tone of the news items would generally be positive rather than negative.
See Table 5.16 for the data collected on tone. A summary of this information, used to
evaluate hypothesis Ic is given in Table 5.19.
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Table 5.19 A Summary of the Tone of Political and Military/Defence News Stories during the
Liberation of Kuwait
Newspapers
Main news topic Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
P	 NP N P	 NP N
Political & Military/ Defence 300 24 247 12 323 27 870 63
P = positive N = negative
With a 95% confidence level, the proportion of news items of a political and
military/defence nature that were positive in nature was between 91.64% and 94.86%.
This shows there is a statistically significant difference between the proportion of positive
and negative of news items of a political and military/ defence nature, since it was observed
that only 6.75% of political and military news in all three newspapers was negative in
tone. Hypothesis Ic, therefore, was supported.
5.1.3.2 Themes of News Items
Question three asked: what was the main theme of the news items chosen, and their tone,
in the Saudi press? While the themes of the news items were wide-ranging, it is possible to
identify those news items, during the liberation of Kuwait, to which Saudi press gave
prominent coverage. The first ten news items that are classified in Table 5.20 are the main
themes emphasised for all Saudi press together. The first ten themes comprised around
half (47.56%) of all the news themes mentioned. The most dominant themes were Iraq's
failure to stand and aggression as a way of problem solving (see Table 5.20).
Hypothesis II predicted that there would be similar themes within the news items that
Saudi press presented. The data collected on news themes is provided in Table 5.20. The
results show that there were differences among the three newspapers in the number of
2
themes presented. Between Riy and 01w it was x = 157.46; between Riy and Yau it was
9
2	 2
x = 106.92; and between Yau and Oka it was z = 51.34.
9	 9
Because of these pronounced differences among the three newspapers, hypothesis II was
not supported.
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Table 5.20 Frequency Distribution of Items by Themes of all three Newspapers during the Liberation of
Kuwait 17 January, 1991 -28 February, 1991
Theme Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka
& Yau
Iraq's failure to stand - e.g. prisoners of war, destroyed aircraft
shelters, air bases, abandoned military hardware, elements of
the Republican Guard in Kuwait, number of dead, damage to
military equipment, etc. 31 21 47 99
Aggression as a way of problem solving - e.g. Allied air attack of
Baghdad, bombing of military target, bases, etc. 40 23 15 78
SA diplomacy as a means of solving problem - in connection with
the UN, EC, US, Arab world (excluding Iraq, Yemen, Jordan
and Sudan) 29 15 27 71
SA government's official communications
( broadcasts, speeches, etc.) 28 22 11 61
US support for UN resolutions and aggression 21 16 23 60
Level of Iraq's crime and injustice - both inside and outside Iraq —
e.g. foreigners held hostage, killed , terrorism , etc. 25 4 14 43
Egyptian support for UN resolutions and aggression 5 14 17 36
Support for SA position - countries, governments, organisations,
tribal, personal 7 12 16 35
Kuwait's Royal government e.g. visits, speech, receptions, etc. 8 8 18 34
Oil wells on fire/smoking 5 12 12 29
Others
Military capacity( ships, planes, etc.) 13 5 4 22
Patriots shoot down Iraq's scuds 13 2 6 21
Allies' military preparation for ground war 6 7 3 16
Liberation of Kuwait - Island, City 8 1 6 15
The ground war begins at 4.00 am (Saudi time) 1 0 0 1
US technological effects on the Gulf War 1 0 0 1
Liberation of Al-IChafj1 2 5 1 8
Saudi army enters Kuwait 1 0 0 1
Defusing of mines in Kuwait could take up to 16 months 0 1 0 1
Iraqi citizens evacuated from Kuwait 1 0 1 2
Closure of Saudi schools 1 0 0 1
Bush and Major believe Gorbachev peace plan insufficient 1 0 0 1
Schwarzkopf and Lt. General Prince IChalid receive Iraqi prisoners 0 1 0 1
American and Saudi military vehicles crash in Jeddah 1 0 0 1
Schwarzkopf announcements - e.g. oil fires won't stop Allied
mission, Iraqi pilots tried to bomb Saddam, etc. 5 2 4 11
Foreign media display 12 5 10 27
Support for UN resolutions and aggression by:
Malaysia 0 1 1 2
Senegal 0 1 1 2
Italy 0 1 0 1
Mauritania 0 1 0 1
Philippines 0 1 0 1
India 0 1 0 1
United Arab Emirates 0 2 2 4
Bahrain 0 0 2 2
Japan 0 1 1 2
Russia 11 2 7 20
France 4 2 2 8
UK 6 2 8 16
Australia 0 1 1 2
Turkey 0 4 5 9
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Table. 5.20 (continued)
Theme Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka
& Yau
Pakistan 2 3 1 6
Afghanistan 0 1 1 2
Iran 4 5 8 17
Austria 0 1 1 2
Germany 2 4 2 8
Libya 1 0 0 1
Algeria o 0 1 1
Holland o 1 0 1
Tanzania o 0 1 1
Morocco 3 1 0 4
Syria I 8 2 11
China o 2 0 2
Thailand 1 1 0 2
US Intelligence - on Saddam 1 1 0 2
Swedish reaction to UN and aggression o 0 1 1
Libya's Qaddafl: Saddam will make mistake if he intends to ask
me to fight against Israel 1 o 0 1
Egypt welcomes Saudi debt cancellation 1 0 o 1
Scholars, Experts, Analysts study the Gulf conflict - e.g.
economic, military, social, etc. perspectives 0 9 7 16
Saudi Citizens' letters to the editor 0 24 2 26
Iraq's use of human shields 1 0 1 2
Saddam insists on his position 8 2 3 13
Saddam's political system, history, etc 1 7 5 13
Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities 1 1 6 8
Iraq's use of propaganda 0 1 1 2
VVhy Iraq set oil fields alight 0 1 0 1
Iraq's Republican Guard crushed by joint Allied forces 1 0 0 1
Saddam asks for asylum in India and Algeria 0 1 1 2
Iranian criticism of Iraq's aircraft using Iranian air space 3 3 2 8
Iraq sends Scuds to Jordan 4 0 1 5
Sudanese reaction to UN and aggression 1 0 1 2
Tunisian reaction to UN and aggression 0 1 0 1
Yemen reaction to UN and aggression 0 1 0 1
Sudanese, Yemeni, Jordanian, Iraqi citizens are affected by their
governments' attitudes 2 3 2 7
Korea (South) 0 0 1 1
Yemen seeks exit from Saddam's "rat trap" 0 1 0 1
War is against injustice and Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait 0 2 0 2
Turkish citizen spies for Iraq 0 1 0 1
200 Kuwaitis go to America for military training 0 1 1 2
Allied Coalition reach Font River and surrounds Iraq's
Republican Guard o 1 o 1
Iraq refuses meeting of prisoners of war with outside world o o 1 1
Five Iraqi aircraft land in Tunisia o o 1 1
Strain in Iraq / PLO relationship o o 1 1
American people urge CNN to leave Iraq o o 1 1
Allied forces refute Iraqi claims o o 1 1
Egypt and Iran angle for normalisation of relations
Kuwaiti flag flies once again in Kuwait City
o
o
o
o
1
1
1
1
Military communiqué (# 38) starts the liberation of Kuwait o o 1 1
End of Allied warning- military forces continue invasion of Iraq o o 1 1
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le 5.20 continued
Theme Riy Oka You Riy, Oka
& You
Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait 0 0 2 2
Land mines 0 1 1 2
2000 aircraft used in first attack 0 0 1 1
$ US. 17 billion aid given to Iraq by Kuwait before invasion 0 0 1 1
700 journalists sign up to visit Kuwait 0 0 1 1
Iraqi Scuds buried in Jordan 0 0 1 1
A new shelter for Saddam 0 0 1 1
Air attack against Saddam was defeated because of weather
conditions 0 0 1 1
69 Iraqi aircraft escape from Iraq 0 0 1 1
Various countries received 2000 Iraqi refugees 0 3 1 4
Iraq's Ambassador in Kuwait shelters Austria 0 0 1 1
5 million leaflets dropped on Iraq, calling on her to surrender 0 0 2 2
Greece asks for Patriotic Missiles 0 0 1 1
650 Sudanese refugees go to Iran 0 0 1 1
Royal visits to troops, reception of Saudi citizens, condolences, etc. 7 3 4 14
Meeting of SA, Egyptian and Syrian Foreign ministers 0 1 1 2
Readiness of SA armed forces 2 1 0 3
SA Army losses 1 0 0 1
Skill of SA troops (pilot accuracy, bombing of Baghdad, etc.) 10 3 6 19
SA & GCC meetings 1 3 5 9
SA Council of Ministers' meetings 2 2 1 5
SA Ulema's (Religious Scholar's) reactions 0 1 0 1
SA authorities' and citizens' attitudes 0 4 1 5
SA prepares for war -- jobs, draft, military areas opened, etc. 2 4 1 7
SA's treatment of Kuwaitis (Arab people, prisoners of war, etc.) 2 0 1 3
Meeting of GCC, Egypt & Syrian Foreign ministers 3 2 1 6
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) reactions 2 0 0 2
The Arab League - reaction 1 0 0 1
UN's favourite countries 0 0 1 1
Oil prices increase 0 5 5 10
$ US 25,734,469,885 given to Iraq by Saudi government before Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait 1 1 0 2
UN calls for solutions & resolutions 4 1 3 8
Failure of Soviet peace initiative 0 2 3 5
European Community (EC) role in peace initiative (including
meetings with other countries) 0 1 3 4
Allied military losses 0 1 0 1
Possibility of war 4 0 4 8
Allied military treatment of prisoners of war 0 0 1 1
Scud launchers (Israel & SA) 7 7 4 18
Diplomacy as a way of solving problem (many countries excluding SA) 0 5 10 15
Military build - up in SA 5 3 3 11
Reaction of Kuwaiti people & government, both inside and
outside Kuwait 4 2 4 10
PLO's mistake in supporting Iraq 1 2 0 3
Chemical weapons forbidden by Sharia law 0 1 0 1
US & France warning to Iraq of reprisals if prisoners are mistreated 0 1 0 1
Iraq - Jordan border closed 0 1 0 1
Why Iraqi planes land in Yemen, Jordan and Sudan 0 1 0 1
Liberation of Kuwait stabilises region 0 1 0 1
Economic effects of the conflict 1 4 2 7
Economic sanctions as a way of solving the problem 3 3 0 6
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5.1.3.3 Personnel in the News
Question four asked: which personnel did the Saudi press give coverage to in each news
item? Table 5.21 shows the origin of each individual, institution or organisation to which
Saudi press gave coverage. The figures in Table 5.21 show a high level of concentration
on personnel from the Allied Coalition (17.33%), the SA Government (15.67%) and the
Middle East (15.24%). These were followed by Western Europe (8.36%) and the US
(8.19%). The Asia/Pacific, Multi region, Iraq, Africa, all shared between 3.22% and
5.23%. Beyond these, personnel from secondary spheres of interests contributed 1.74% or
less. Little coverage was given to personnel from Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Jordan, PLO or
Eastern Europe (see Table 5.21).
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Hypothesis ifi predicted that Saudi press coverage would rely more heavily on SA
government officials rather than on other personnel. A summary of the data collected on
personnel used in the news is given in Table 5.21. Information used in evaluating
hypothesis ifi is given below (Table 5.22).
Table 5.22 Personnel Covered by the Saudi Press durin g the Liberation of Kuwait
Newspapers
Personnel Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Domestic (SA government officials) 71 60 49 180
Other (other government and non-
government officials, individuals,
institutions, etc.)
310 293 352 955
Total 381 353 401 1135
It was found, with a 95% level of confidence, that the proportion of news items employing
SA government officials as sources for all these newspapers was between 13.74 % and
17.98 %. This shows there is a statistically significant difference between the employment
of SA government officials and other personnel, since it was noted that 84.14% of news
items for all three newspapers originated from non-Saudi government officials. Thus
hypothesis UT, also, was not supported.
5.1.3.4 Geographic Origin of News
Question five asked: to which geographically newsworthy locations of news did the Saudi
press pay more attention? Table 5.23 shows the origins of news during the coverage of
the liberation of Kuwait. It showed that the Saudi press paid greater attention to some
areas of the world and less to others. All the locations were geopolitically significant in
relation to the liberation of Kuwait, which explains the newspapers' reliance on these areas
of the world, for both political and military reasons. Close to a half of the news items
(44.08%) originated in Middle East, followed by SA (23.17%). These figures show, also,
the extent to which news was concentrated on so-called 'elite' countries.
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News from Western European countries, for example, comprised the third largest amount
(9.58%) of the news. Then followed the US (8.10%), Asia/Pacific (6.62%) and Africa
(4.18%). Other geographical areas accounted for 1.66% or less of coverage.
Hypothesis IV predicted that Saudi press coverage would pay greater attention to Gulf
conflict news stories originating in the SA region than it would to other geographical
locations.
A summary of the information used in evaluating hypothesis IV is given Table 5.24 below.
Table 5.24 A Summary of Geo ra hical Locations of News Stories during Liberation of Kuwait
Newspapers
Geographical Locations Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Domestic (SA) 91 106 71 268
Other geographic Locations
(R9st Europe, We 	 Europe, Middle East, etc.)
293 245 333 871
Total 384 351 404 1139
The results indicated that, with a 95% level of confidence, the proportion of news items
originating in SA for newspapers lay between 21.06% and 26%. This shows there is a
statistically significant difference in news coverage of different geographical regions, since
it was observed that 76.47% of news items in the newspapers were from geographical
locations other than SA. Thus hypothesis IV was not supported.
5.1.3.5 News Sources
Question six asked: on which news sources were the Saudi press dependent for their news
presentation? Table 5.25 shows the sources of Gulf conflict news stories during the
liberation of Kuwait. An examination of all three newspapers together revealed that the
news was obtained entirely from various local, international and foreign agencies. For,
instance, as Table 5.25 shows, the newspapers received nearly a quarter of their Gulf
conflict news stories from the SPA (24.91%).
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The other sources were as follows: other agencies, such as the Egyptian, Qatari and
Iranian agencies (19.16%), multi-sources (16.89%), their own staff (15.94%) and Reuters
(9.67%). Use of other sources ranged between 0.69% and 7.75% for the three
newspapers.
Hypothesis V predicted that Saudi press coverage of the liberation of Kuwait would
depend more heavily on domestic sources (own staff SPA and government officials),
than on other sources. The data collected on source is given in Table 5.25.
A summary of this information, used for an evaluation of hypothesis V is given in Table
5.26.
Table 5.26 A Summary of Sources of News Stories during the Liberation of Kuwait
News 3apers
Source Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Domestic (Own staff,
SPA, etc.)
163 168 148 479
Other sources (Reuters,
AFP, AP, etc)
222 176 254 652
Total 385 344 402 1131
Overall, with a 95% confidence level, the proportion of news items from domestic sources
lay between 39.47% and 45.23 %. This shows there is a statistically significant difference
between domestic and other sources in the level of use, since we observed that 57.65% of
items in the newspapers were from other sources. Thus, hypothesis V was not supported.
5.1.3.6 Leading articles
Question seven asked: what was the theme of the leading articles, their tone, and to
whom were they directed, or related? The selection of leading articles largely reflects the
interests and attitudes ofjournalists during the liberation of Kuwait. Table 5.27 lists some
123 themes, most of which were against the Iraqi government 59.34% being negative in
tone. Meanwhile, others such as economic, military, and those related to the conflict
received 13% and were positive in tone. Other themes were related to anti- UN
resolutions (11.38%) the Allied coalition (8.13%) and the SA government (4.88%).
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Table 5.27 Main Themes/Headlines of Leading Articles of each Newspapers during the Liberation
of Kuwait 17 January, 1991 - 28 February, 1991
Theme/Headline	 Riy Newspaper
Decisive hour
Statement of account - Saddam's connection with Israel and the idea of an anti- UN coalition
From Thursday to Thursday, 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and 2 August 1991 Allied
coalition attacked Iraq
Saddam and his dictatorial decision
Saddam is enterprising but the blockade cripples him
Iraq is the hostage
To give up or to mock - message to Saddam
Time will destroy the rest of Iraq's power
Devil's game and his bloody empire - Saddam-
Journey to die for - the Gulf crisis
SA military credibility
The other war - embassies expel Iraq's missions
Arab press - misinformation
The environment enters Saddam's thinking about the war
The martyr/ terrorist-Saddam
Saddam's justification of war - who will protect Iraq?!
Saddam's war against his own citizens
Palestine news agency and its destructive wishes
Another internal war in Amman and San'a side
King Hussein gets lost in Saddam's shelter
Two faces on one corrupted coin - one relates to King Hussein and the other to All Saleh
King Hussein is the other face of employment of mercenaries
King Hussein and Ali Saleh are only fractions in the accurate numbers equation
Public invitation for genocide - Saddam's attitude
Saddam's papers burned, his credibility diminished
Saddam and his long absence from reality
Stupid allies - Jordan, Yemen and Sudan
What is the Arab position after the war?
Manoeuvring enacted is inadmissible - Saddam
The last chance - Baker and Aziz meeting in Geneva
Jihad is not a political toy
Baghdad and the moment of evacuating Kuwait
Equitable rights - the right of SA to protect itself
Initiatives with and commitments to international decision
No compensation over principles - message to Saddam
Terminating the war of Kuwaiti Liberation
Saddam and the burden of his nation's wealth
The tyrant - Saddam gave up but remains Iraq's peoples' ruler
Saddam facing international solution to war
Oka Newspaper
Iraqi deafness and `everthing's all right' theory - misinformation of Iraqi people
Iraqi liberation from the tyrant
Goebbels and Iraq's liar
People smarter than propaganda
The tyrant's methods - Saddam
Down with traitors and wavers
When an unpopular regime cannot keep its promises - Saddam's regime
Self defence defeated the rockets and missiles
The fate of the evildoer is decisive - Saddam
No need to hurry, punishment day is just around the corner
The inevitable end to his zigzag policies - Saddam
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Table 5.27 continued
Theme/Headline	 Oka Newspaper
The conspirator allied to the anxious
The criminal's inevitable fate
Saddam's rudeness and Iraqi peoples' suffering
Honour of the victims of the conflict
Why does Yemen support Iraq?
Arab and Muslim images make a mockery of Saddam
The inevitable result of Saddam's foolishness
Lesson of retaliation for invading IChafji
The tyrant speeds to his end
Two weeks for liberation war
Impudence of Iraqi officials and mindless accomplice of Allied-anti-UN resolutions
Neither terrorism nor conspiracy will defend you Saddam
Mercenaries and nobles
The fall of the August criminal coalition
Spineless screams and double standards - message to Jordan, Yemen, PLO and Sudan
There is one goal that is true and one right to the land that is in Kuwaiti - i.e. Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait was immoral
The real killer of Iraq's people - Saddam
Decisive hour of the tyrant - Saddam
The international community holds together, stops Iraqi manoeuvring
Confidence in ourselves and the goal of justice
There is no time for waiting - the world given up
A lesson for every tyrant
The clearer the solution, the more invalid the bargaining
The failure of a tyrant and Iraq's liberation
Where is the Palestine case?
What is going to happen after he is defeated ?
Allied conspiracy - Jordan, Yemen, PLO and Sudan -reveal their real position
The war will not be stopped until all goals, and UN resolutions are met
It is time now for Iraq's people to show their responsibility - Iraq's people should turn against
Saddam
Theme/ Headline	 You Newspaper
The factor behind Saddam's motivation
What will happen after the zero hour?
The end of a tyrant - Saddam
Saddam and his plans of destruction
A hypocritical group - Jordan, Yemen, PLO and Sudan
An accurate political statement - SA position
Suicide path
Patience circle/ring
War crimes - Saddam neglected international conventions
The last route - Sdddam's desperation
Who stopped this tyrant?
A new escalation
The decisive battlefield
Ugly crime
The secession break away
Return to normal life in Kuwait
The last chance
Suicide route
When will Saddam wake up from his dreams?
Power settlement - Saddam aims to control the Khafji in order to control its flow of oil
Kuwaiti liberation
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Table 5. 27 (continued
Theme / Headline	 Yau Newspaper
The era of crime
Despite his weaknesses, Saddam insists on the validity of his position
The world condemns Iraqi regime
The results of obstinacy
A rational plan - SA's position - positive
Kuwaiti security
The international desire/volition
Retreat is the only solution
The humble yearling
Retreat is the only solution
The declaration is born crippled
Jihad (holy war by Moslems) Festival- Jihad is an intricate part of worship
The continuing war
Saddam's manoeuvres to escape defeat
The morality of war
The lie of retreat
Defeat or resignation?
The retreat of a tyrant
The failure of a tyrant
The end of a tyrant
The resignation document
Saddam's real face revealed
The plan and game - Saddam agreed with Russia's plan and at the same time burned the oil wells
The Arab world was the subject of (3.35%) of the leading articles, of which (0.04%) were
positive and (99.96%) negative.
Hypothesis VI predicted that the tone of the leading articles would generally be more
positive than negative. The data collected on the themes of the leading articles are given in
Table 5.27. A summary of this information used in evaluating hypothesis VI, is given 5.28.
Table 5. 28 A Summary of the Tone of the Themes/Headlines of Leading Articles during the
Liberation of Kuwait
Category Riy
P	 NP
Oka
N
Yau
P	 N
Riy, Oka & Yau
P	 N
Saudi Arabia 2 0 2 0 2 0 6 0
Arab World 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 3
Allied coalition 5 0 3 0 2 0 10 0
Iraq 0 20 0 21 0 32 0 73
Anti-UN resolutions (e.g.
Jordan, Sudan, Yemen, PLO,
etc.)
0 6 0 6 0 2 14 0
Other 2 0 8 0 6 0 16 0
Total 10 29 13 27 10 34 47 76
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With a 95% confidence level, the proportion of news themes that are positive in tone was
between 29.63% and 46.79%. This shows that there is a statistically significant difference
between the number of positively and negatively treated, since it was observed that
61.79% of leading articles in all the newspapers were negative. Hypothesis VI was not
supported.
5.1.4 Period IV. After the liberation of Kuwait (1 March, 1991- 30 March ,1991)
5.1.4.1 Main News Topics, Types and their Tone
Question two asked: what were the main news topics, the type of news (domestic,
international or foreign) and the tone of these main news topics carried by the Saudi press?
Table 5.29 shows the main news topics, their type and tone. As can be seen in Table 5.29,
the Saudi press agenda after the liberation of Kuwait appeared clearly. Most immediately
striking is the prominence of political stories, with 55.17% (positive 96.88%; negative
3.12%). The figures for other topics were, for foreign political news topics, 50% (positive
92%, negative 8%); for international political news topics 41.66% (positive 97.5%;
negative 2.5%) and for domestic political news topics, 8.34% (positive 100%). It is to be
expected that, in this period, after the liberation of Kuwait, political news came first, as it
did same before the war, because the concern was to draw attention to the outcome of the
government's policy on Iraq.
Second was military/defence with 20.11% ( positive 97.14%; negative 2.86%). Of this, the
foreign military/defence news comprised 54.28% (positive 94.74%; negative 5.26%);
international military/defence news accounted for 34.28% (positive 100%) and domestic
military/defence news constituted 11.42% (100% positive).
Third was crime/law/justice with 12.64% (positive 27.27% ; negative 72.73%). Of this,
the foreign component was 95.45% (positive 23.81%; negative 76.19%); international
crime/law/justice accounted for 4.55% (100% positive). No domestic crime/law/justice
news was reported during this period.
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Fourth was economic news, with 5.74% (positive 80%, negative 20%). Of this figure,
foreign economic news comprised 90% (positive 70%, negative 30%). There was no
international economic news. Domestic economic news constituted 10% (100% positive).
Fifth was other news, with 2.29% (positive 100%). Of this, foreign other news comprised
50% (positive 100%). No international other news was reported; thus, domestic other
news comprised the other 50% (positive 100%).
Hypothesis Ia predicted that political and military/defence developments in the Gulf
conflict would be more newsworthy than any other Gulf news topic. The data collected
on main news topics are presented in Table 5.29.
A summary of the information, used to evaluate hypothesis Ia, is given in Table 5.30.
Table 5. 30 A Summary of Main News To pics after the Liberation of Kuwait
Newslapers
Main News Topics Ria Oka Yau Riy, Oka &You
Political and Military/defence 39 30 62 131
Other main news topic
(economic, social service, crime/
law/ justice, sport, education, etc.)
19 13 11 43
Total 58 43 73 174
All newspapers, with a 95% level of confidence, contained a preponderance of news items
of a political and military/defence nature, lying between 68.88% and 81.70%. This
shows there is a statistically significant difference between coverage of political and
military stories and other main news topics, since it was observed that only 24.71 % of all
stories in all the newspapers were on other main topics. Thus, hypothesis Ia was
supported.
For the type of news, hypothesis lb predicted that, for political and military/defence
developments in the Gulf conflict, the type of news would largely be domestic, rather than
international and/or foreign.
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The data collected on the type of news are given in Table 5.29. A summary of this
information, used to evaluate hypothesis lb, is provided in Table 5.31 given (below).
Table 5.31 A Summary of Type of Political and Military/Defence News after the Liberation of
Kuwait
Newspapers
Type of news Riy Oka Yau Ri y, Oka & Yau
Domestic 1 5 6 12
Other
(international & foreign)
38 25 56 119
Total 39 30 62 131
For all the newspapers, with a 95% level of confidence, the proportion of domestic
news items of a political and military/defence nature was between 4.22 % and 14.1%. This
shows there is a statistically significant difference between the coverage of domestic and
other political and military/defence news, since it was observed that 98.84 % of all political
and military/defence news for the three newspapers was either international and foreign in
origin. Thus, hypothesis lb was not supported.
For the tone of news, subhypothesis Ic predicted that, as a political and military/defence
developments were concerned, the tone of the news items would generally be positive
rather than negative. See Table 5.29 for the data collected on tone. A summary of this
information, used to evaluate hypothesis Ic, is given in Table 5.32 below.
Table 5.32 A Summary of Tone of Political and Military/ Defence News Stories after the Liberation
of Kuwait
News )apers
News topic
P
Riy
N P
Oka
N P
Yau
N
Riy, Oka & Yau
P	 N
Political & Military/Defence 39 0 30 0 58 4 127 4
P = positive N = negative
With a 95% level of confidence, for all newspapers, the proportion of news items of a
political and military/defence nature that was more positive in tone lies between 94.01%
and 99.89%. This shows there is a statistically significant difference between the number
of positively and negatively treated news items of a political and military/defence nature,
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since it was observed that 3.05% of political and military/defence news in all three
newspapers was negative in tone. Thus, hypothesis Ic was supported.
5.1.4.2 Themes of News Items
Question three asked: what was the main theme of news items chosen and their tone in the
Saudi press? While the news items ranged widely, it was possible to identify those news
items, after the liberation of Kuwait, to which Saudi press gave a prominent role. The
first ten news items that are classified in Table 5.33 are the main themes emphasised for all
Saudi press in toto. These first ten themes accounted for more half (55.74%) of all news
themes mentioned. The dominant themes were SA diplomacy as a means of solving
problems in relation to the UN, and to the individual countries, Kuwait government official
communications and Iraq's failure to stand. (see Table 5.33).
Hypothesis II predicted that there would be similar themes within the news items that
Saudi press presented. The data collected on news themes are provided in Table 5.33.
The results show that there were a differences among the three newspapers in the number
2
of themes presented. Between Riy and Oka it was	 = 17.78, between Riy and Yau it
9
2	 2
was 2( = 60.93 and between Oka and Yau it was 2/ = 28.69. Because of these
9	 9
pronounced differences among the three newspapers, hypothesis II was not supported.
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Table 5.33 Frequency Distribution of Items by Themes of all three Newspapers after the Liberation
of Kuwait 1 March, 1991 - 30 March, 1991
Theme Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka
& Yau
SA diplomacy as a means of solving problem - in connection with
UN, EC, USA, Arab world (excluding Iraq, Yemen, Jordan,
Sudan) 15 8 4 27
Kuwait Royal Government - visits, speeches, reception, etc. 8 4 3 15
Iraqi failure to stand - e.g. prisoners of war, destroyed aircraft' air
bases, number of dead, damage to military equipment, etc. 3 2 6 11
SA government official communication(broadcast, speeches, etc.) 3 4 2 9
Diplomacy as a way of solving problems - except SA 0 0 7 7
French, UK & US troops not to stay in the region 2 2 3 7
US reaction to the problem 2 2 2 6
Support for SA's position - countries, organisations & personal 2 1 2 5
SA & GCC meetings 2 1 2 5
Citizens' articles (personal views) 1 4 0 5
Others
Kuwaiti Ceremonies 0 1 1 2
The victory of natural rights over injustice 0 0 1 1
Iraq's prisoners sent to Baghdad 0 0 1 1
Military negotiations between Allied forces and Iraq in Basra 0 0 1 1
Kuwaiti enforcement of curfew 0 0 1 1
Britain and France welcome Syrian peace initiatives 0 0 1 1
33.000 Kuwaitis missing 0 0 1 1
Death of Saddam's son (Oudi) and execution of his Defence Minister 0 0 1 1
Iraq keeps 22.000 Kuwaitis as hostages 0 0 1 1
2nd March cease - fire negotiations 0 2 0 2
Canada & Japan to ask for compensation 0 1 0 1
Saddam victimises 42 army divisions 0 1 1 2
Dead, deformed bodies found in Sabah Hospital 0 0 1 1
Who can protect Arab achievements from Arab misappropriation? 0 0 1 1
The Arabian security order 0 0 1 1
Destruction of Saddam's portraits in Kuwait 0 0 1 1
Jordan's Crown Prince: "Saddam will not stay in power" 0 0 1 1
Iraqi oppositionists control five cities and march towards Baghdad 0 2 0 2
Iraq decides to return Kuwait's stolen money 0 0 1 1
Has the time come for a Middle East role? 0 0 1 1
Laying of mines in Kuwait 1 0 0 1
Foreign media display 2 0 0 2
Support for UN resolutions and aggression by:
Russia 0 0 2 2
Egypt 0 1 1 2
Japan 0 0 1 1
UK 0 0 1 1
Scholars, Experts and Analysts' study of the Gulf conflict 0 1 1 2
Poetry 2 0 0 2
Meeting of SA, Egyptian & Syrian ministers 0 1 0 1
SA Council of Ministers meetings 0 1 0 1
SA official position and its citizens' attitudes to conflict 0 2 2 4
Meeting of GCC, Egyptian & Syrian ministers 2 0 2 4
Non - Aligned countries Organisation 0 0 1 1
The GCC's summit meeting 0 0 1 1
Oil wells on fire/smoking 0 0 1 1
Economic effects of the conflict 0 0 1 1
, Kuwait thanks SA's King Fand for helping to solve the problem 1 0 0 1
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Table 5. 33 continued
Theme Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka
& Yau
UN calls for solutions & resolutions 2 0 0 2
EC role in peace initiatives - e.g. meetings with other countries 1 0 2 3
Allied military capabilities 1 0 0 1
Reaction of Kuwait people & government both inside and outside
Kuwait 0 1 0 1
PLO's mistake in supporting Iraq 1 0 0 1
Iraq's political system - history etc. 2 0 0 2
Level of Iraq's crime and injustice - inside and outside Iraq 0 0 1 1
Iraqi use of decoys 0 0 1 1
Iraq yields to UN resolutions 2 1 1 4
Iraq promises Iran it will withdraw from Kuwait without condition 0 0 1 1
Iraq yields to international pressure 2 0 0 2
Sudanese, Jordanian and Iraqi citizens are affected by their
governments' behaviour 0 0 1 1
Iraq agrees to all requirements of cease- fire agreement 0 0 2 2
Saddam asks for asylum - i.e. India 1 0 2 3
5.1.4.3 Personnel in the News
Question four asked: which personnel did the Saudi press provide coverage to in each
news item? Table 5.34 shows the origin of each individual, institution or organisation to
which the Saudi press gave coverage.
The figures in Table 5.34 show a high level of concentration on personnel from the Asia/
Pacific region (17.82%), the US (12.07%), the SA Government (11.50%), Iraq (9.20%),
Western Europe (8.62%) and Multi-region (8.05%). Other regions contributed 5.17% or
less. No attention was given to personnel from Sudan, Libya, PLO, Latin America,
Australia, or Eastern Europe (see Table 5.34).
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Hypothesis DI predicted that Saudi press coverage would rely more heavily for Gulf
conflict news on Saudi government officials rather than other personnel. A summary of
the data collected on personnel used in the news is given in Table 5.34. The information
used in evaluating hypothesis DI is given below (Table 5.35).
Table 535 Personnel Covered by the Saudi Press after the Liberation of Kuwait
News 3apers
Personnel Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Domestic (SA government officials) 6 7 7 20
Other (other government non
government officials, individuals and
institutions, etc. )
52 33 63 148
Total 58 40 70 168
It was found, with a 95% level of confidence, that the proportion of news items employing
SA government officials as a source of information, for all the newspapers, was between
7% and 16.08 %. Thus, there is a statistically significant difference between employment
of SA government officials and other personnel, since it was observed that 88.10% of
news items, for all three newspapers, originated from sources other than Saudi government
officials. Hypothesis DI, therefore, was not supported.
5.1.4.4 Geographic Origin of News
Question five asked: to which geographically newsworthy locations of news did the Saudi
press pay more attention? Table 5.36 shows the geographic origin of news events after the
liberation of Kuwait. It shows that the Saudi press paid more attention to some areas of
the world, and less to others. All the locations were geopolitically significant in relation to
the reactions to the conflict after the liberation of Kuwait, indicating the major political
areas of the world upon which newspapers relied for their sources. Over a third (37.93%)
of the news items originated in the Middle East. News from SA comprised the second
largest component with (20.69%).
The figures show, also, the extent to which news was concentrated on 'elite' countries; the
Asia/Pacific area provided 17.24% followed by Western Europe (7.47%) US (6.32%)
multi-region (4.02%) and Africa (3.45%). Other geographical areas that were
unidentifiable comprised 2.30%.
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Hypothesis IV predicted that Saudi press coverage would pay greater attention to Gulf
conflict news stories originating in the SA region, rather than stories from other
geographical locations. A summary of the information used in evaluating hypothesis IV is
given Table 5.37 below.
Table 5.37 A Summary of the Geographical Locations of News Stories after the Liberation of
Kuwait
Newspapers
Geographic Locations Riy Oka Yau Riy, Oka & Yau
Domestic (SA) 18 11 7 36
Other geographic Locations
(East Europe, West Europe,
Middle East, etc.)
40 29 65 134
Total 58 40 72 170
The following, with a 95% level of confidence, was tabulated: the proportion of news
items originating in SA for all newspapers lies between 15.05 % and 27.31%. This shows
there is a statistically significant difference in geographic origins of news, since it was
observed that 78.82% of news items in the newspapers were from other geographic
regions. Thus, hypothesis IV was not supported.
5.1.4.5 News Sources
Question six asked: on which news sources were the Saudi press dependent for their news
presentation? Table 5.38 shows the sources of the Gulf conflict news stories after the
liberation of Kuwait. An examination of all three newspapers together revealed that the
news was obtained entirely from various local, international and foreign agencies. For
instance, as Table 5.38 shows, the newspapers got more than two-thirds of their Gulf
conflict news stories from the SPA (35.06%).
The other sources were: their own staff (19.54%) multi-sources (10.92%) Reuters
(10.92%) and AFP (9.77%). Other agencies such as the Egyptian, Qatari and Iranian
agencies totalled 2.87% while private citizens provided 1.15%.
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Hypothesis V predicted that Saudi press coverage after the liberation of Kuwait would
depend more heavily on domestic sources (own stafC Saudi press Agency and government
officials) than on other sources.
The data collected on sources are given in Table 5.38. This information, used in evaluating
hypothesis V, is summarised in Table 5.39.
Table 5.39 A Summary of Sources of News Stories after the Liberation of Kuwait
Newspapers
Source Riy Oka Yau Rip, Oka & Yau
Domestic
(Own staff, SPA, etc.)
22 12 42 76
Other sources
(Reuters, AFP, AP, etc.)
31 28 22 81
Total
'
53 40 64 157
Overall, it was found, with a 95% level of confidence, that the proportion of news items
from domestic sources was between 40.49% and 56.23 %, while the proportion of items
from other sources was 51.59%, which lies between these two limits, so we can conclude
that there is no statistically significant difference between the sources, domestic or other,
in terms of the extent to which they were utilised by the newspapers. Therefore,
hypothesis V was not supported.
5.1.4.6 Leading articles
Question seven asked: what was the theme of the leading articles, their tone, and to whom
were they directed? The selection of leading articles largely reflects the interests and
attitudes of journalists after the liberation of Kuwait. Table 5.40 lists some 18 themes,
most of which were directed towards the Iraqi government of which 33.33% were
negative in tone and another 33.33% such as economic, military, and conflict- related
items, positive in tone. Meanwhile SA was the focus of (6.66%) of leading articles, all
with a positive tone. Items opposed to the UN resolutions accounted for 11.11% and were
negative in tone. The Allied coalition was the subject of 5.55%, positive in tone. No
part of the Arab world was the subject of a leading article.
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Table 5.40 Main Themes /Headlines of Leading Articles of each Newspaper after
the liberation of Kuwait 1 March, 1991 - 30 March, 1991
Theme/Headline	 Riy Newspaper
Saddam was defeated and the legitimate side won
Each age has its own logic and goals
From Desert Storm to Basra Storm
Algeria and Tunisia have nowhere to manoeuvre
Political setting of Algeria and Tunisia
Saddam caused the war and also destroyed his country
Oka Newspaper
Lessons in crisis and a new method to the build up
Let the defeated tyrant Saddam go away
It is time to rescue the people of Iraq from Saddam
Oppression and Saddam's regime must be eradicated to rescue Iraq's people
Our principles are the source of our real power
Our people should be proud of our leader and his reaction
Yau Newspaper
Victory day
The necessity of Saddam and his regime is concealed
The crime file- international organisations are preparing a file of Iraq's destruction
An important lesson
The salvation sphere - from Iraq's regime
The God equation - King Fand talks to SA's religious leaders
Hypothesis VI predicted that the tone of the leading articles would generally be positive,
rather than negative. The data collected on the themes of leading articles are given in Table
5.40.
A summary of this information, used in evaluating hypothesis VI, is given Table 5.41
below.
Table 5.41 A Summary of the Tone of the Themes/Headlines of Leading Articles after the liberation
of Kuwait
Category Riy
P	 N
Oka
P	 N
Yau
P	 N
Riy,Ok	 & Yau
P	 N
Saudi Arabia 0 0 2 0 1 0 3 0
Arab World 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Allied Coalition 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Iraq 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 6
Anti-UN resolutions 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2
Other 2 0 2 0 2 0 6 0
Total 3 3 4 2 3 3 10 8
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With a 95% confidence level, the proportion of news themes that were positive in tone
was between 32.61% and 78.51%. While the proportion of news themes that were
negative in tone was 44.44%, which lies between these two limits, so we can conclude that
there is no statistically significant difference between the number of positively and
negatively treated themes of leading articles. Hypothesis VI was not supported.
Summary:
In this chapter, we have reported the findings of the content analysis of the Saudi press of
the three chosen newspapers during the Gulf conflict The findings were reported in terms
of the main news topics and their type and tone, the themes of articles, personnel covered
in stories, geographic origin of the news, source of news stories and, finally, the tone of
leading articles and to whom they were directed. In general, it was found that the events
and issues covered, and the treatment given to them, were similar in all three newspapers,
which justified treating them as one group. This is not to say that there were no
differences within the Saudi press regarding their news presentation during the conflict
The proportion of the news stories presented and coded in each newspaper was not the
same and there were considerable variations therein - however, these were not enough to
affect the research operation or our findings.
The findings of this study enabled the researcher to answer the research questions, and
test all the hypotheses posed in Chapter 1. The findings can be summarised as follows:
1. Political and military/defence developments in the Gulf conflict were more newsworthy
than other Gulf news topics. Stories in these categories tended to be from international
foreign sources more than domestic ones and were more positive than negative in tone.
2. The occurrence of the various themes differed from one newspaper to another. The
news during the conflict tended to be positive in tone and to favour the UN resolutions in
relation to Iraq. In addition, news which was opposed to the UN resolutions was related
more to the Iraqi regime, than any other subject.
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3. The Saudi press, in covering Gulf conflict news stories, relied more heavily on
personnel (individuals, institutions and governments) from Western Europe, the US, Asia,
Middle East governments, than they did on SA government officials.
4. The Saudi press coverage paid greater attention to Gulf conflict news stories
originating in Western Europe, the US, Asia and the Middle East, than they did to those
originating in SA itself
5. The Saudi press depended, in their news presentation during the Gulf conflict, more on
international and foreign sources, namely, Reuters, AFP, AP, UPI and other agencies, than
they did on domestic sources.
6. The leading articles of the Saudi press were directed at, more or less the following: SA,
Arab World, Allied Coalition, Iraq, anti-UN resolutions and others such as economic,
military, and those related to the conflict The items on these themes were more positive
than negative in tone during Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, as well as during
the liberation of Kuwait. They were largely directed at Iraqi government officials and
became increasingly positive after the liberation of Kuwait.
These findings are contrary to the assumptions made in chapter one, based on the
authoritarian press model. Why has that model been challenged? Nations in the modem
age are all influenced by global political and organisational co-operation through such
international institutions as the United Nations. The Saudi press has concentrated on
sovereign states with strong leadership in international affairs such as the United States,
the United Kingdom and France, some Islamic states like Pakistan and some Arab
countries like Egypt and Syria. Political and military news occupied a major space during
the Gulf conflict The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its aftermath was not a problem that
concerned Saudi Arabia alone, but the whole of the international community, because of
common interests, particularly the region's oil resources, which induced many countries to
bring their diplomatic weight and economic and military might to bear on the dispute.
Thus, the political and military news had an international character. The outcome was that
the Saudi press was a recipient of political debates which it represented as important news,
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such as the positive views of countries opposed to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. It reported
international diplomatic and military moves during the war without analysis or criticism, in
a reactive manner, without taking, the lead.
The data has shown that the Saudi press, in covering Gulf conflict news stories, relied
more heavily on personnel (individuals, institutions and government) from Western
Europe, the US, Asia, Middle East governments and others than they did on SA
government officials. This was, basically, because the Saudi journalists were in less direct
contact with the day-to-day political developments and had less intimate knowledge of
behind the scene politics. However, the messages that came from the countries of these
sources especially from those with high credibility (such as the US and UK) would to some
extent be delivered with social pressure, because messages often imply social values and
social norms that underlie them. Such social pressure would tend to silence dissenting
views (Theory of Spiral of Silence — see Chapter 3).
The point here is that foreign messages and news, even though they were in agreement
with Saudi official policy, may have contained subsidiary diplomatic, political, economic
and military terms and information which the Saudis might find difficult or unfamiliar,
particularly since Saudi society is, by and large, unpoliticised as revealed by the answers of
the media academics (see Chapter 4).
Regarding the focus in press coverage on news stories originating in Western Europe, the
US, Asia, Middle East, it can be said that these countries are event creators.
Consequently, the work of the Saudi press was like an orchestrated effort to match that of
the US, Western and Islamic allies. At the same time, the ideological perception of the
Saudi press depends on the time and the place and on religious and political influences of
the Saudi government. It could only reflect these efforts after the government had given
the green light for discussion. Nevertheless, the dependence of the Saudi press on foreign
sources ensures congruence between the point of view of the Saudi press and that of the
Western press. It is possible to say that these foreign institutions helped to set the agenda
of the Saudi press.
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Turning to the leading articles of the Saudi newspapers, these broke the journalistic logic
whereby such articles give the press a bigger area for debate and constructive discussion.
The leading articles reflect the opinion of the paper. They should be critical and objective.
This is the place where a newspaper might be expected to offer fresh and challenge insight
and arguments that set the news reports in context and interpret their significance. This
was lacking in the Saudi press. The leading articles confined themselves to the 'safe' topics
of criticism of Iraqi and her allies, and the only facts that appeared in the leading articles
were about the Arab-Arab relationship (see Chapter 7). The Saudi press acted in what it
perceived to be the interests of the country, as an instrument of persuasion and
mobilization. Indeed the performance of the press was very much in accordance with the
Loyalist press model (see chapter 2, section 2.2.2.).
The next question, and the basis of the following chapter, is what did the Saudi
journalists, in response to the survey questions, think of the Saudi press functions in war
time and their respective performances during the Gulf conflict (1990 - 1991)?
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Chapter 6
Saudi Arabian Journalists' Perceptions toward the Saudi Press
Functions in Time of War and its Performance in the Gulf Conflict
The purpose of this chapter is to look at Saudi journalists' appraisal of their press function
in time of war, and their views and level of satisfaction with the Saudi press's performance
in its coverage of the Gulf conflict. However, for convenience, we will first present the
general characteristics of the respondents, then the Saudi journalists' perception of the
press function in time of war, followed by the journalists' views and levels of satisfaction
with the Saudi press performance in the coverage of the Gulf conflict The reading was
accomplished by a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative approaches. A general
interpretation, evaluation and conclusion appears in Chapter 7.
6. 1 General Characteristics of the Respondents
6.1.1 Age, Education & Positions
The respondents (29) ranged in age from 20 to 55 , with a mean of 30.84 years of age.
Three of the respondents had doctoral degrees, one had a master's degree, thirteen had a
bachelors' degree, two had diplomas, eight had high school education, while two were
educated to below high school level. Their years in their positions ranged from 1- 25, with
a mean of  10.08. Table 6.1 (p.195) lists in greater detail their fields of expertise and job
titles.
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6.1.2 Experience
Respondents were asked to indicate if they had ever worked for an academic institution or
press organisation other than the one by which they were currently employed. Eighteen of
the respondents said that they had worked for a press organisation, three for an academic
institution. Seven of the respondents had worked for neither. One respondent said that he
had worked in the government.
6.2 Saudi Press Function in time of war
In this part, the first research question is examined by description of the percentage
distribution of the responses provided by the survey participants to the perception
statements of the questionnaire. The questions (see Appendix G) dealt with respondents'
opinion of the Saudi press function in time of war, and of the press regulation in relation
to its functions in war time. In line with the suggestion of Denis McQuail, (1994), the
functions examined are: information, correlation, continuity, entertainment and
mobilisation (see Chapter 2 for definitions of these functions).
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6.2.1 Information
Items 1 to 18 of the questionnaire were concerned with the information function of the
press. Respondents' views in relation to these statements are presented in Table 6. 2.
Table 6.2 Percenta es of Responses to Information Function Statements
Statement Agree
(%)
Undecided
(0/)
Disagree
(°/0)
1. The press should be accurate and objective. 90 4 6
2. The press should seek to fully report as many sides of the
issue as possible. 59 7 34
3. The press should convey information to the public. 97 0 3
4. The press should be a credible reference source. 100 0 0
5. The press should expose crime and the depth of war. 83 10 7
6. The press should inform readers of forthcoming events. 73 17 10
7. The press should provide background information to help
readers understand events. 100 0 0
8. The press should publish pictures that help explain or
clarify the written story. 97 3 0
9. The press is a community's most important instrument for
bringing together all elements of the war events. 80 3 17
10. The press should emphasise local and military news. 73 3 24
11. The press should print stories that are interesting and
informative although not necessarily timely. 49 13 38
12. The press should depend on information releases
distributed by publicity officials. 66 10 24
13. Information should be a factor in the selection of what
news and information ought to go into the press. 83 7 10
14. The press should be able to sacrifice some accuracy in
reporting if it means getting the news out before any of
the other news media. 27 7 66
15. The press should present a variety of political, social and
military issues directly or indirectly related to the war. 94 0 6
16. The press should assist in the promotion of worthy causes. 97 3 0
17. The press should try to print some "good" news. 97 3 0
18. The press should provide citizens with more information
about the danger to the country in case of attack by the
enemy such as bombing of cities, chemical warfare,
tricks,.	 .	 . etc. 97 3 0
The table shows the high level of agreement among respondents on almost all aspects of
the information fimction of the press in war time. The only item on which agreement was
low (No. 14) concerned the possible need for the press to sacrifice some accuracy in order
to report the news before any other media. This response is consistent with the view that
the Saudi press, in presenting issues, should be accurate and objective (item. 1).
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Two items, 2 and 11, evoked somewhat mixed responses, with more than a third of
respondents in each case expressing disagreement. Regarding the idea that the press
should seek to report fully as many sides of the issue as possible, the relatively high level of
disagreement may have been due to a belief that it is the press function to protect its
readers against propaganda or false statements coming from the enemy. In this respect,
there may be a conflict between the information and correlation functions of the press.
Regarding item 11, the inclusion of the elements of interest and timeliness may have
clouded the issue for some respondents; it is noticeable that this item had one of the
highest levels of uncertain response in this section.
6.2.2 Correlation
Items 19 to 31 of the questionnaire were concerned with the correlation (i.e.
interpretation) function of the press. Respondents' views in relation to these statements
are presented in Table 6. 3.
Table 6.3 Percentages of Responses to Correlation Function Statements
Statement Agree(0/0)
Undecided
(0/0)
Disagree
(°/0)
19. The press should offer its opinions on war events through
its leading page. 83 7 10
20. The press should protect its readers against propaganda
and false statements. 100 0 0
21. The press should help authorities avoid publishing
content that might violate the public trust. 83 14 3
22. The press should interpret stories that appear in local
and foreign mass media. 83 10 7
23. The press should attempt to guide public opinion after
impartially presenting the different sides of an issue. 90 10 0
24. The press should print only those photographs which
have news value. 80 3 17
25. The press has no obligation to separate fact from opinion. 83 14 3
26. The press should promote public service. 83 3 14
27. The press should be required to correct all printed
errors, deliberate or unintentional, as soon as possible. 73 10 17
28. The press should be responsible to follow up officials'
mistakes and inform the public about them. 10 31 59
29. The press' function - as a mass medium - should be
different from that of the electronic media (that is, radio
and television). 93 0 7
30. The press should support and advance the policies of the
government. 66 27 7
31. The press should promote what the people want during
the war time. 94 3 3
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Table 6.3 shows a high level of agreement among respondents concerning the correlation
function of the press on all statements, with the notable exception of their disagreement
over whether the press should follow up on officials' mistakes and inform the public about
them during war time (No. 28). Only 10% of respondents agreed with this, while almost a
third of the sample expressed uncertainty. It may be that some respondents were
suspicious that their responses might be used against them, bearing in mind that, as
indicted earlier, this was one reason why Media Academics refused to respond to the
questionnaire.
Another important point is that the findings in relation to item 20 support the suggestion
that was offered in relation to Table 6.2 (No. 2). All respondents agreed that it is a press
function to protect its readers against propaganda and false statements. It should be
remembered in this regard, that propaganda is not the sole preserve of the enemy. Both
sides have their own agenda, and may have reasons for withholding information or
disseminating biased or misleading information. During the Gulf war, for example, the
Saudi press was required to follow Saudi and coalition information policies. There was,
however, a high level of uncertainty among respondents as to whether the press have a
duty to support and advance government policies (item 30), perhaps because to do so
might conflict with the anti-propaganda stance upheld in item 20, and the concern for
objectivity evinced in response to the information items of the questionnaire.
6.2.3 Continuity
Items 32 and 33 of the questionnaire were concerned with the continuity function of the
press. Respondents' view in relation to these statements are presented in Table 6. 4.
Table 6.4 Percentages of Responses to Continuit y Function Statements
Statement Agree Undecided Disagree(0/) (0/) (%)
32. The press should present material that is not morally and
religiously objectionable during the war time. 83 10 7
33. The press should be the voice of its readers. 83 3 14
_
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Maintaining continuity of social and religious values and reflecting the voice of the readers
are seen as elements of the press function during war time. Since the Islamic religion is
highly important for the Saudi public at all times' in war time, when the culture faces
external threat, people are likely to turn more strongly to such values. Journalists are not
free from the impact of religion in the way they look at the press continuity function.
Only a small minority were prepared to risk offending religions sensibilities, or were
undecided on this issue. Given that war, by its nature, entails many activities that are
condemned by Islam, as indeed by other religions, it could be said that accurate reporting
will inevitably entail the reporting of some actions that are morally and religiously
objectionable. That does not, however, mean condoning such activities. There is a
distinction between the press reporting morally repugnant issues, and itself taking a
morally and religiously objectionable stance. It may be that those respondents who did not
agree with one or other of the 'continuity' statements had this distinction in mind.
6.2.4 Entertainment
Items 34 to 36 of the questionnaire were concerned with the entertainment function of the
press. Respondents' views in relation to these statements are presented in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5 Percentages of Responses to Entertainment Function Statements
Statement Agree Undecided Disagree
(%) (%) (%)
34. The press should entertain readers. 56 24 20
35. The press should run photographs that don't offend the
reader. 66 13 21
36. The press should be neat and attractive in appearance. 90 3 7
The table shows a spread of opinion among respondents concerning the entertainment
function of the press. A third of respondents either disagreed with or were uncertain
about the proposition that the press should run photographs that do not offend the reader,
perhaps because they recognised that it would hardly be possible to convey the devastation
of war without using photographs which might offend or upset some readers. The lowest
level of agreement (56%) was with item 34 which referred explicitly to entertainment, and
there was a high level of uncertainty in relation to this item, perhaps because the word
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"entertain" was seen to have frivolous connotations. Respondents may have felt that for
the press to be entertaining is inappropriate, or even impossible, when most of its content
is taken up with war coverage.
6.2.5 Mobilisation
Items 37 to 39 of the questionnaire were concerned with the mobilisation function of the
press. Respondents' views in relation to these statements are presented in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6 Percentages of Responses to Mobilization Function Statements
Statement Agree Undecided Disagree
(%) (%) (')/0)
37. The press should inform its readers about political and
military developments during the war time. 86 7 7
38. The press should refrain from use of information that
might damage the national image of Saudi Arabia or the
allies. 90 0 10
39. The press should be a crusader. 100 0 0
Since Tables 6.2 - 6.5 showed a high level of agreement among respondents concerning
the importance, information, correlation, continuity and entertainment functions of the
press, it is not surprising that they also gave strong support to what might be considered
the essence of the press function during war time, namely, the mobilisation function of the
press whereby the press brings people together, informing readers about political and
military developments, and fostering a sense of national identity and pride.
With regard to the statement No. 38, however, it may not always be possible to give news
and information on political and military developments because, during war time,
restrictions are often placed on the press for reasons of national security. This was the
reason that respondents, next, were asked their views on the regulation of the press during
war time.
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6.2.6 Regulation
Items 40 to 44 of the questionnaire were concerned with the regulation of the press during
wartime. Respondents' views in relation to these statements are presented in Table 6.7
below.
Table 6.7 Percentages of Responses to Regulation Function Statements
Statement Agree Undecided Disagree(%) (0/0) (0/)
40. There ought to be an agency of some kind to see that the
press act in the right direction. 69 24 7
41. The press is more a public utility than a private
enterprise. 94 3 3
42. The press should follow the Saudi Arabian policy and
not be dictated to by anybody during the war time. 97 3 0
43. The press regulation should come from the press
journalists. 100 0 0
44. The press should have access to all meetings of
government and others who have influence in order to
act as a mediator. 97 3 0
The findings presented in the table suggest a strong sense of social responsibility on the
part of the journalists surveyed, consistent with their views expressed in the preceding
sections. They accepted a need for some kind of regulation (item 40) but resisted external
interference, favouring instead self-regulation. Thus, the views expressed in relation to the
first section of the questionnaire suggest that, in journalists' perceptions of the Saudi press,
it has a duty in times of war to keep readers informed of events as accurately as possible,
but at the same time they recognised the role of the press in interpreting events, upholding
social and religious values, mobilisation of public opinion and, to a lesser extent,
entertaining the public-functions which they expected to perform in the manner of self-
regulating professionals.
The following section, concerned with answers to the second part of the questionnaire,
will shed light to on the extent to which the Saudi press was thought to have achieved
these ideals in practice during the Gulf war.
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6.3 The Performance of the Saudi Press during the Gulf Conflict
The second research question asked: "What do journalists' views, and their level of
satisfaction, reveal about Saudi press' performance in coverage of the Gulf conflict,
particularly while the war was under way?" This part encompassed ten issues: press
coverage, the adequacy of coverage of various media, primary sources of news, press
agenda of Gulf war, negative events, publication of Saddam Hussein's speeches,
intervention by military authorities, military authorities' censorship, limitations of the Saudi
press, dissatisfaction with the press coverage, and whether journalists followed news of the
Gulf conflict after the liberation of Kuwait.
6.3.1 Press Coverage
The Saudi press coverage of the Gulf conflict, particularly during the period of actual
fighting, was rated by respondents as follows: excellent 27%; good 31%; fair 24%; not
good 17%. (see Table 6.8 below).
Table 6.8 Rating of the Job the Saudi Press had Done in covering
the Gulf Conflict, Particularly during the time of Actual
Fi htin
Rating of Saudi Press during Gulf
conflict
Journalists
29
Excellent 8 (27%)
Good 9 (31%)
Fair 7(24%)
Not good 5 (17%)
Those who rated press coverage as 'not good' were asked to give reasons. Three out of
five (10% of the whole sample) replied, giving three reasons: that the press was not
informative enough; that coverage did not attract ordinary Saudi citizens who were forced
to turn to other sources of information; that there was limited coverage of other events.
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6.3.2 Perceived Adequacy of Coverage of Various Media
The great majority of respondents (72%) felt that the press proved an adequate medium of
coverage during the Gulf conflict, particularly during the time of actual fighting. Twenty-
four percent felt that Saudi Arabian Television proved a better medium of coverage, and
none of the respondents favoured Saudi Arabian radio coverage.
Table 6.9 Perceived Adequacy of Saudi Media Coverage of the Gulf conflict
Media journalists *
28
The Saudi Arabian Radio 0 (00.%)
The Saudi Arabian Television 7 (24%)
The Saudi Arabia Press 21 (72%)
* One (3.45%) did not respond.
6.3.3 Primary Source of News
While the majority of respondents said the press provided adequate coverage of the
conflict and war, 65% of respondents did not use the press as their primary initial source of
information.
Table 6.10 Press as the first source through which Respondents Gained
Information about Political and Military Developments and other
Subjects during the Gulf Conflict
Response Journalists
29
Yes
No
8
19
(27%)
(65%)
* Two (6.90) did not respond.
Table 6.10 does not tell us anything about Saudi T.V. and radio, so we asked respondents
to further clarify their main of source of information and news about the Gulf conflict The
great majority of respondents (68%) relied on foreign media (e.g., CNN, BBC, VOA);
13 % on the Saudi Arabian press; 10% on Saudi Arabian television; and 6% on the Saudi
Arabia radio. (See Table 6.11).
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Table 6.11 The Main Source of Information and News about the Gulf Conflict
Media Journalists
29
The Saudi Arabian Radio 2 (6%)
The Saudi Arabian Television 3 (10%)
The Saudi Arabia press 4 (13%)
Other sources (e.g.. CNN, BBC, VOA) 20 (68%)
6.3.4 Press Agenda of the Gulf War
The respondents were asked to rank the main news topics that should have greater space
devoted to them by the press in terms of their importance to Saudi Arabian society during
the Gulf War. They were given twelve such topics and, according to the results of the
study, the respondents overwhelmingly ranked military/defence as the most important
topic. The ranking of the other 11 topics appears in Table 6.12.
Table 6.12 The Main News Topics to be devoted space by the Press in
terms of Their importance to the Saudi Arabian Society
during the Actual Fighting
Main News Topic Rank
Military/Defence 1
Politics 2
Religion 3
Economics 4
Crime/Law/Justice 5
Natural Disasters/Accidents 6
Social Services 7
Ecology/Envi ro n ment 8
Science/Technology 9
Sports 10
Education 11
Culture/arts 12
6.3.5 Negative Events
It could be argued that reporting immediately all negative events during the Gulf War such
as coalition planes being shot down, the bombing of a bunker/shelter in Baghdad that
resulted in heavy civilian casualties, coalition pilots captured by Iraq, coalition air attacks
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on Iraqi forces along the road to Basra while Iraqi forces were withdrawing from Kuwait,
and the Saudi Military dead in al-4i could all have had harmful consequences, not only
for the Saudi government, but also for the military coalition. The respondents were asked
to record what the outcomes of reporting such negative events could be (see Table 6.13).
Nearly all respondents (89%) thought that reporting all negative events supported the
Saudi government and its mass media by reducing the likelihood of audiences looking at
other media, which might present the outcomes of the events in a way that led to
perturbation in the military and the nation as a whole. A significant group of respondents
(10%) opposed this view suggesting that reporting all negative events during the Gulf war
led to a lack of confidence in both the government and the mass media, and that greater
confusion and attention could be created in the military forces and in the nation at large.
Table 6.13 Re ortin of Negative Events
Reporting Negative Events Journalists
29
Reporting all negative events could support 	 the
Saudi government and it mass media, which by
reducing the likelihood of audiences to looking at
other media, which might present the outcomes of
the event in a way that led to perturbation in the
military and the nation as a whole. 26 (89%)
Reporting all negative events could lead to	 lack
of confidence in both sides of the government and
mass media and more confusion and attention
could occur in the military force and nation. 3 (10%)	
.
6.3.6 Publication of Saddam Hussein's Speeches
The publication of Saddam Hussein's speeches is a critical issue for a variety of reasons.
Analysts and critics differed as to the impact of his speeches and their differing effect on
European, American, and Arab countries during the Gulf conflict The respondents were
asked to select one of the two statements, presented in Table 6.14, in order to indicate
their views on this topic. The results show that 48% of respondents accepted the view
that the publication of Saddam Hussein's speeches helped the world to understand better
that Saddam was the aggressor, as well as prompting the world to take the necessary
steps to intervene.
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The second view, that publication helped Saddam gain support from several Arab nations
for his invasion of Kuwait, created suspicion about the ability of Arab leaders and their
governments to solve the problem and convince their respective peoples, and the world of
their policies, was supported by 34% of respondents.
Table 6.14 Perceived of Effect of Publication of Saddam Hussein's Speeches
Publication views Journalists
29*
This publication helped the world to better
understand that Saddam was the aggressor
as	 well	 as	 helping	 the	 world	 take	 the
necessary steps to intervene. 14 (48%)
This	 publication	 helped	 Saddam	 gain
support from some Arab nations for his
invention of Kuwait, and created suspicion
about the ability of Arab leaders, and their
governments	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 and
convince their respective people, and 	 the
world of their policies. 10 (34%)
* Five (17%) did not respond.
6.3.7 Intervention by Military Authorities
The relationship between journalists' freedom and the requirements of the military
authorities was another area treated by the survey. Respondents were asked to choose a
response indicating how necessary they felt was the requirement by military authorities that
the media "pool" their reports submitted to the 'Joint Information Bureau' (M3) that
would examine and censor all copy relating to the Gulf conflict and particularly to the
fighting. As we can see in Table 6.15, respondents were divided in their views about
military attempts to control the media during the Gulf conflict Seven respondents (24%)
thought that the requirements were very necessary; 24% somewhat necessary; 24%
somewhat unnecessary; and 24% unnecessary.
Table 6. 15 Journalists Perceptions of Media "Pool" and Submission of Reports to
the Joint Information Bureau (JIB)
Was Military Intervention necessary? Journalists
29*
Very necessary 7(24%)
Somewhat necessary 7(24%)
Somewhat unnecessary 7(24%)
Unnecessary 7(24%)
* One (3.44%) did not respond.
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6.3.8 Military Censorship
Respondents were also asked to give any reason (s) that could warrant the attitude of
military commanders that sources of military information, communiqués and news must all
be completely controlled by the military, and that those sources of information should not
be seen by citizens or given to journalists for publication during the conflict
Results were ranked as follows: a journalist would normally tend to publish stories which
excite and attract the reader (65%); a journalist thrives on conflict rather than conflict
resolution (27%); a journalist often takes refuge in the concept of 'objectivity' (13%); a
journalist may be considered as a 'spy' (6%); and a journalist is not capable of dealing
adequately with war issues and the cannot fully treat even a tiny part of these issues (6%).
Six respondents (20%) added further reasons. These were: that media coverage may
compromise military operations; that there has to be a trust between the press and the
military; that the mass media are not sufficiently developed to provide adequate coverage;
that some information needs to be withheld by the government in the interests of national
security; that the military underestimate the importance of the press; and that the press is
considered a part of the military weapon, and so should be protected for military purposes.
Table 6.16 Reasons for Military Control Information, Communiqués and News
Reasons Journalists
- Journalists would normally tend to publish stories which
excite and attract the reader. 19 (65%)
- A journalist often takes refuge in the concept of
'objectivity'. 4 (13%)
- A journalist may be considered as a 'spy'. 2 (6%)
- A journalist is not capable of dealing adequately with war
issues and the cannot fully treat even a tiny part of these
issues. 2 (6%)
- A journalist thrives on conflict rather than conflict
resolution. 8 (27%)
- Other reason. 6 (20%)
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6.3.9 Limitations of the Saudi Press
Given that the majority indicated that their main source of information and news was the
international media, each of the interviewees was made aware of the assumption that,
during a conflict, any country follows a different information policy and deals with the
press and broadcasting organisations differently than during peace time. As a result, a
newspaper might not provide its reader with detailed information. This will, thus, affect
the press in presenting its news; this could be considered as a limitation of the Saudi press
during the Gulf War. A majority of the respondents (65%) believed that this occurred
because of co-operation between the press that the government in their treatment of the
conflict in conforming to the government's military strategies and tactics. It was believed
by 34% of respondents that it happened because the press conformed to the new
information policy; and by 17% because of the benefits that the enemy could have gained
in their military plans and psychological operations if there had been no censorship.
Still other respondents (10%) argued that the press should not give more information and
news because other media (radio and television) have the capacity to broadcast events as
they happened (Table 6.17).
Table 6.17 Constraints on Press Information and News during the Gulf Conflict
Reason Statement Journalists
- Insufficient information and facts available to
the press organisations 5 (17%)
- Conformity to the new information policy 10 (34%)
- Co-operation with the government in treatment of
the conflict to compilation of its military strategies
and tactics 19 (65%)
- The benefits that the enemy could gain in their
military plans and psychological operations 5 (17%)
- Other 3 (10%)
6.3.10 Dissatisfaction with Press Coverage
It was expected that the respondents would have good reasons for their dissatisfaction
with Saudi press coverage during the Gulf conflict. The respondents were accordingly
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provided with a list of possible reasons for their feeling of dissatisfaction. They were also
given a chance to offer other reasons if they wanted to. The majority of respondents
(51%) believed that the general reason for their dissatisfaction with the press coverage of
the Gulf conflict, particularly during the war, were first, that it was not informative
enough, and secondly (37% of respondents) they believed that there was too little
coverage, followed by the feeling that it was not always trustworthy (31%). The relevant
data on this issue are presented in Table 6.18.
Table 6.18 The Reasons for Dissatisfaction with Press Coverage of the Gulf Conflict
Reason Rank Journalists
Not informative enough 1 15 (51%)
Too little coverage 2 11 (37%)
Not always trustworthy 3 9	 (31%)
Not up- to - date 4 6	 (20%)
Too much speculation 5 4	 (13%)
Other reasons 6 3	 (10%)
Did not always keep to the facts 7= 2	 (6%)
Disrupted normal news 7= 2	 (6%)
Boring 9= 1	 (3%)
Too much space devoted to the war 9= 1	 (3%)
Not very balanced 11= 0	 (00%)
Unethical news 11= 0	 (00%)
Interestingly, only three journalists (10%) gave other reasons for their dissatisfaction.
Their reasons were: government restrictions limited their chances to gather information;
the news was contrary to professional journalistic standards; and the content suggested it
all originated from the one source.
6.3.11 Journalists Following the News after the Liberation of Kuwait
The question as to how closely the respondents followed the news, and more specifically
the results of the Gulf conflict since the liberation of Kuwait, is important in providing
information as to the importance of the Gulf region in terms of global significance. The
majority of respondents (44%) said they did not follow very closely the news and the
results of the Gulf conflict. 27% of respondents admitted to following it very closely, while
24% said they followed the news fairly closely (Table 6.19).
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Table 6.19 Journalists Following the News and the Results of the Gulf conflict
after the liberation of Kuwait
Level of following news Journalists
29*
Very closely 8 (27%)
Fairly closely 7 (24%)
Not too closely 13 (44%)
Not at all closely 0 (00%)
* One (3%) did not respond
In the case of those who did follow the news, their reasons included the following: that
the conflict in the region had not ended; the importance of the Gulf area; that Iraq had not
fully obeyed all the United Nations resolutions; to follow the impact of the economic
sanctions imposed by the UN resolution No. 661 on Iraq; to understand humanity; to find
out about the economic impact resulting from the war; to gain fresh insights into what
happened during the conflict; the nature ofjournalistic work; to discover items that were
not broadcast; because they believed it was the war of the century and to keep up with
any new information that may emerge about events during the conflict
Those who did not follow the news, nor the results of the Gulf conflict, said that they did
not do so because of the difficulty of finding reliable sources.
Summary
This chapter has reported the findings from the questionnaire survey into Saudi journalists'
perceptions of the Saudi press' function in time of war, and their view and level of
satisfaction with the Saudi press performance in its coverage of the Gulf conflict. In
summary, the principal findings were the following:
The first part of the survey concerned perceptions of how the Saudi press should function
in time of war and whether there is a need for press regulation. The majority ofjoumalists
endorsed all the press functions. There was evidence of a reluctance to sacrifice accuracy
in the interest of a "scoop". However, a possible conflict emerged between the
information function and the correlation function, in that reflecting varied perspectives on
an issue may conflict with a desire to protect people from propaganda. Other areas of
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disagreement concerned the 'entertainment' and 'continuity' functions, in the sense that
accurate reporting of the horrific events of war, including, perhaps, publication of
photographs, would inevitably upset certain sensibilities.
The respondents' views on regulation of the press revealed a strong sense of social
responsibility, in that they recognised that totally unfettered reporting and comment might
sometimes serve enemy interests. On the other hand, they showed a definite distaste for
external interference, preferring self-regulation.
The Saudi press was thought to have done fairly well in offering adequate coverage of the
Gulf conflict, and was brought to have done better than local television and radio; none of
the Saudi sources, however, were relied on as main sources of information or perceived as
favourably as the non-Saudi CNN, BBC radio and VOA.
Concerning the press agenda of Gulf war, the majority of journalists ranked military/
defence as the most importance news to be presented to Saudi society.
Concerning the outcomes of reporting negative events, a significant number of journalists
(89%) favoured the reporting of items which both supported the Saudi government and
informed the public.
Saddam Hussein's speeches during the Gulf conflict was seen by almost half the journalists
(48%) as helping the world to understand Saddam as the enemy, highlighting his objectives
in relation to the war, and prompting the West to take the necessary steps to intervene.
This view was, however, opposed by a third of the journalists. There was also a high level
of non-response on this subject, suggesting that it was perceived as a sensitive issue.
In line with the new information policy adopted during the conflict which reflected the
requirements of military authorities, some journalists favoured the idea of the media
'pooling' their reports, and submitting them to the 'Joint Information Bureau', but an
equal number viewed it as unnecessary. There was, nevertheless, an acceptance that
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military censorship might be justified, particularly as journalists had a tendency to
sensationalism.
A significant number of journalists (65%) believed that one of the major reasons why the
Saudi press performance had limitations was because it co-operated with the government
in its treatment of the conflict, mainly to complement its military strategies and tactics.
Concerning dissatisfaction with press coverage, a significant number of journalists
complained that the press' coverage was insufficient and not informative enough.
Regarding whether journalists followed the news during the Gulf conflict and after the
liberation of Kuwait, it is interesting that 44% did not do so very closely and the main
reason given for this was lack of reliable sources. Those who did follow up the story gave
a variety of reasons for doing so, some personal and some professional.
This chapter has presented the views of the Saudi journalists in the Saudi press
organisations, regarding the Saudi press finictions in time of war and its performance in
Gulf conflict The aim was to determine whether the coverage given by the Saudi press to
the conflict was consistent with journalists' ideas regarding the press function in times of
war. The questionnaire and interview responses presented here and in chapter 4 indicate
that there was an imbalance in the way the Saudi press covered the conflict The
journalists believed that the western media with their international wire service could have
biased the Saudi press in its gathering of news and information. Journalists, even though
they were the people who had gathered and disseminated the news, were dissatisfied with
the press performance, which they saw as insufficient in quantity, and not informative
enough. Thus, there was a discrepancy between the coverage journalists thought (based
on professional reporting values or expectations of what would interest the readership)
they should have provided, and what they actually presented.
This discrepancy can be interpreted in the light of the content analysis presented in the
previous chapter, since, as that chapter showed, the Saudi press coverage of the conflict
was dominated by Western definitions of news value (see Galttmg and Ruge's criteria,
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presented in Chapter 2, Figure 2.2). Nevertheless, they also felt a pressure, or a sense of
responsibility, to promote Saudi policy goals and cultural views. This would create a set
of conflicting values whereby 'positive' topics would be regarded as more newsworthy
than 'negative' ones, or matters which might be regarded as newsworthy were nevertheless
supressed. This is to be expected, since the ftmction of the Saudi press cannot be
separated from govenunent policy and religious values. A good example is the case of
Saudi women driving cars in Riyadh during the conflict period. According to Gaining and
Ruge's criteria, this might have been considered a "newsworthy" event, in terms of its
significance in Saudi society, unexpectedness, and negative connotation as an implied
criticism of the role accorded to women in Saudi society. Yet it was little reported in the
Saudi press, because such behaviours was not culturally acceptable, particularly to the
religious scholars, and at a time of crisis, the need for conformity and cohesion in Saudi
society took precedence over the newsworthiness of women's rebellion. In general,
"negative" items were only newsworthy to the Saudi press if their target was Saddam
Hussein or his allies; government policy had to be presented, both explicitly and implicitly,
in a favourable light.
Thus, since the Saudi press coverage of the conflict was largely reactive in nature, included
little comment or analysis and was limited by political constraint, it can be argued that the
Saudi journalists' practice was not in accordance with their professional ideals.
It now remains to assess how, overall, the Saudi press performed during the Gulf conflict
(1990-1991) in the light of the evidence presented in this and the previous chapters.
Analytical and critical appraisal will be followed by recommendations and suggestions for
further study pertaining to the Saudi Arabian press.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Recommendations
This research started from the premise that the performance of the Saudi press system was
in line with the authoritarian press model during the Gulf conflict (see Chapters 1 and 2).
It was assumed that the Saudi press would be subject to censorship during the conflict,
particularly during the actual fighting and that, in addition to national pride and patriotism,
coverage of the Gulf conflict would be affected by lobby groups such as those led by
religious leaders, which would exert pressure to either support or reject the
administration's policy in the face of enemy aggression. The press, it was expected, would
have disseminated the official political attitude toward the events: shaping the beliefs of the
elite and the wider public.
The aim of this last chapter is to answer the original question, namely how did the Saudi
press perform during the conflict and why? To answer this question, we need to consider
whether the Saudis were given a fair opportunity to assess both sides of the conflict by
looking at the themes of news and leading articles within the Saudi press, drawing together
the information obtained from content analysis, interviews and questionnaire responses,
and interpreting it in the light of press theories discussed earlier in the thesis.
7.1 The Performance of the Saudi Press during the Gulf conflict
In the evaluation of the Saudi press performance, the discussion here considers first its
performance before, during and after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. One important note is that
the presentation will follow the same sequence as the arguments presented in Chapter 1 in
questioning the validity of the 'authoritarian press theory' hypotheses. One major reason
is that the first argument was about the source of news, specifically the heavy dependence
on foreign sources, as exploration of other factors such as the geographic, personnel
aspects etc. would logically depend on that one.
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7.1.1 The Performance of the Saudi Press before the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait
In July 1990, immediately before the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, the Saudi Arabian
government and society as a whole were preoccupied with an important annual event in
the Muslim calendar, the Haji pilgrimage to Makkah city. This is a major national event,
when many Islamic officials, along with a great number of people from other Islamic
countries, visit Saudi Arabia. Managing such an event required careful governmental
planning, and the preparations for the pilgrimage occupied much of the attention of the
Saudi press. A content analysis carried out by this researcher of July, 1990 over a one
week period of all three newspapers under investigation showed that on average 46.4% of
the paper was taken up by reports on this topic: al-Riyadh newspaper 57.8%, Okaz
newspaper 55.7% and al-Yaunz 38.7%.
Interestingly, none of the news or information within these publications warned of or even
hinted at the forthcoming invasion. The Saudi press, quite simply, did not tackle the issue
of the Gulf conflict The general tone of all news items was positive, whether regarding
political news, economic or social affairs, although there was some indication of tension
between Iraq, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). For example, al-Yaum
newspaper reported that Saddam Hussein had sent a letter to U.S. President George Bush,
expressing Iraq's desire to cultivate a good relationship with the USA. In reporting this
communication, the article mentioned American allegations that Iraq was working towards
the creation of chemical weapons. There was, however, no official Saudi government
statement within this article, and none of the other Saudi newspapers discussed the Iraqi
situation. In short, the issue of Iraqi chemical weapons was not acknowledged in a Saudi
government statement, nor was it on the press or public agenda.
A significant news item was presented on 8 July 1990 on the front pages of al-Riyadh and
al-Yaum newspapers. This was that the Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral
Resources had carried a message from King Fand to Saddam Hussein. The Saudi minister
had met the United Arab Emirates' Minister of Petroleum before travelling to Iraq where
he met first, the Iraqi Minister of Petroleum and then Hussein himself. No more
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explanation or comment was offered in either newspaper. This should come as no surprise
in light of the lack of analysis noted throughout this thesis.
Al-Yaum newspaper's leading article commented on the diplomatic negotiations under the
title "Movement in appropriate time". The tone of the article was positive, but its title may
be interpreted as reflecting the newspaper's awareness of the danger of the situation.
However, it did not explain or comment on this situation further. The reasons are clearly
obvious. The issue was a political one given the Iraqi claim that Kuwait was destroying
Iraq's economy, violating its territory and stealing its riches. These issues could not be
discussed in the press without goverment sanction via the Saudi Press Agency. The
public therefore were unaware of the real situation.
However, the conflict did not start when Iraq invaded. The conflict started when Saddam
Hussein gave a remarkable speech in late May 1990 suggesting an Arab oil boycott against
the United States if the latter persisted in their support of the Israeli state. Further, in July
1990, Saddam accused Kuwait and UAE of violating export quotas, alleging that Kuwait
had stolen Iraqi oil from the huge Rumaila oil field. The final straw came when Saddam
announced Iraq's new international policy agenda, saying that Iraq possessed advanced
chemical weapons and would use them against Israel if any attacks were made on Iraq. All
of these events were significantly 'newsworthy' items. There were three key issues: 1) the
use of oil as a political weapon, recalling the events of the 1973 October war between
Israel and Arabia; 2) the accusations levelled against Kuwait and UAE, which was a
political and economic affair, and 3) the threat of using chemical weapons to destroy
another nation. Yet none of these issues were tackled within the Saudi Arabian press.
Even when, on Tuesday July 31, 1990, talks being held in Saudi Arabia between Kuwait
and Iraq broke down, the press still failed to comment. Indeed, they had little information
with which to do so.
An official source gave the Saudi Press Agency a statement: "that the role undertaken by
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the meeting of brothers had been confined to provide a
cordial atmosphere between the two sides [Iraq and Kuwait]. Without any participation
on the part of Saudi Arabia, a bilateral meeting was held behind closed doors between the
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representatives of the two countries" (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1991: 14-15). In this
atmosphere of secrecy, the trend of events was not brought to light in the Saudi press. It
seems, as indicated by the Saudi media academics and journalists (see Chapter 4), that the
press was acting as an instrument for government policy, and could not tackle this issue
without official permission. For those Saudi citizens interested in external events, they
would have to turn to foreign news services rather than domestic sources.
7.1.2 The Performance of the Saudi Press from the Iraqi Invasion until after the
liberation of Kuwait
The night of Thursday August 2, 1991 was a holiday in most Saudi governmental
departments. As people prepared to carry out their normal activities, they heard the news
that the people of Kuwait were leaving their homes and fleeing towards Saudi Arabia.
Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait, was already crossing the Saudi
eastern border.
Saudi Arabia was at internal and external risk. Saudi citizens knew nothing of these
serious security issues. Information about the invasion might have been gained from
foreign media broadcasts (such as VOA and BBC World Service, Monte Carlo or Middle
Eastern radio stations) since large numbers of countries world-wide knew of the invasion,
and their media reported the Iraqi aggression on the same day, but the Saudi press did not
report it in detail until three days later.
7.1.2.1 The Sources of Gulf Conflict News
The performance of the Saudi Arabian press can be viewed, first, from the point of view of
the sources used in covering Gulf events. Saudi journalists were undoubtedly concerned
about the quality of news, proclaiming adherence to "professional news standards of
timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, balance and relevance" ( Rumbal & Adam, 1990: 93). At
the beginning of the study, it was suggested (hypothesised No.V) that Saudi Arabian press
coverage of the Gulf conflict would depend more on domestic sources than foreign
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sources. Looking at each source individually, this may be true; the Saudi press appeared
to be more dependent on the SPA than on any other single source. This is to be expected,
since the Saudi press is indirectly controlled by the Saudi government, and it is the press
duty to carry the government agenda via briefings from the SPA, which is under Ministry
of Information supervision. However, if information sources are grouped into domestic
and external sources, it becomes clear that the Saudi Arabian press depended more on
external sources, particularly Reuters, AFP, AP, UPI and other agencies, than on domestic
sources. Figure 7.1 shows the frequency of sources of the news stories of Saudi press
over three periods [(51.87% to 48.13%) (57.65% to 42.35%) (51.60% to 48.40%)].
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Figure 7.1 Frequency of the Saudi Press News Sources during the Gulf Conflict
It is clear that the Saudi press, immediately following the government's announcement that
it would allow the United States, Western and other Islamic and Arab forces to use its land
to counter the Iraqi military, looked to information outside Saudi Arabia, particularly from
the US.
One reason why the Saudi press depended on foreign sources was a lack of Saudi staff
writers, reporters and specialised editors. Saudi journalists are seldom in a position to
cover the Saudi government's movements and opinions, as has been indicated from the
research findings. In the absence of sufficient professional Saudi correspondents, the
Saudi press editorial managers increased the effectiveness of their messages by using
sources that were recognised for their credibility. In contrast, the credibility of Saudi
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sources may be in doubt. The Saudi Arabian press reported, for example, that "Uday,
Saddam's eldest son, had been killed, during battles in Basra following the invasion of
masses to the southern town, information that came from Iranian news agency" (Okaz,
issue No. 8995, 5 March, 1991). It was also reported according to one media academic
(MA/5) that Uday married the Israeli minister's daughter. Both these stories were
incorrect. The former bulletin was later corrected with an announcement that Uday was
alive; and the latter news was patently ridiculous. The point here is that such mistakes
would make readers suspicious about the way the Saudi press presented the news. As a
result, many viewers turned to the foreign media services such as BBC and CNN. What is
interesting is that the Saudi journalists themselves turned to these sources not only to
gather news but also for understanding the conflict itself. Evidence of this came from the
survey findings that although 72% of Saudi journalists believed that the Saudi press was a
more adequate medium than Saudi radio and television, 68% believed that other external
sources such as CNN, BBC and VOA were the main sources of information and news
about the Gulf conflict Significantly, 65% journalists believed that the limitation of the
Saudi press was due to their co-operation with the government in their treatment of the
conflict
However, this researcher would argue that constraints imposed by the military authorities
were another reason why the Saudi press could not fully rely on domestic or external
sources. Intervention by the military, indeed, also limited the international wire services as
well as the world media. Fialka quotes Michael Garther, President of NBC news, as
saying on the front page of the Wall Street Journal (August 30, 1990): "here's something
you should know about that war [sic] that's going on the Gulf much of the news that you
read or hear or see is being censored . . . There is no excuse for this kind of censorship
[which] exceeds even the most stringent censorship of World War II" (1991: x).
In this respect, the Saudi journalists surveyed all agreed that press regulation should come
from the journalists themselves. But since there was no choice, nearly half of Saudi
journalists (48%) favoured the media 'pooling' their reports, and submitting them to the
Joint Information Bureau; an equal number, however, viewed this as 'unnecessary'. On
the subject of the reasons censorship had been implemented, the majority (65%) suggested
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that it was because the authorities believed that journalists would sensationalise stories to
excite and attract readers, and that they thrive on conflict rather than conflict resolution.
One point that should be noted is that the Saudi press gave little attention to the Russian
news agency, Tass. It used one item quoted during the Iraqi invasion and occupation and
nine during the liberation and none after liberation of Kuwait. This is because Saudi
Arabia does not accept Soviet Communist ideology, and also because Russia opposed the
use of force to free Kuwait from Iraq. Another element was that unidentifiable sources
ranked seventh during the Iraqi invasion and occupation and fifth both during and after the
liberation of Kuwait. The reason is uncertain. Presumably the Saudi press assumed the
items were newsworthy, but such items may have been a part of propaganda or intelligence
tactics. For example, an instance that Iraqi tanks had been defeated later proved to have
been falsely planted by the CIA to try to encourage defections (Zoglin, 1991: 56-7).
However, a significant implication was that the Saudi Arabian press tended to focus on
other sources to learn world opinions about Iraqi aggression, so the press presented the
news from the points of view of other world news sources or resources. These tended to
give most attention to the American perspective because of US military and economic
dominance in the world (Vandijk, 1988: 42). Moreover, American sources, in particular,
had greater access to information than the Saudi sources, because of their superior
technology. This conclusion would support the long-established academic theoretical
tradition of 'media imperialism', especially US media imperialism. However, it tends
towards the school that argues that such 'dependence' is due to indigenous factors within
a less advanced media system rather than as a result of an imperialistic 'conspiracy' by a
more advanced technologically media system. The CIA example, cited above, acts as a
slight corrective to this. Nonetheless, this thesis inclines towards the view that Saudi
dependence of western sources was due to inadequacies within the Saudi media system
itself
Modification from the individual press gatekeeper was insufficient. First, the Saudi press
were not independent reporters, since news and information were to a large extent
borrowed from outside Saudi Arabia. Second, the wire services and other foreign sources
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stories would have taken the local papers' basic point of reference, interviewing perhaps
the same people, and considering the same events as being newsworthy. In addition, the
press remained passive, because Saudi journalists did not inquire what was being left out
of the news stories presented. Indeed, the foreign news flow to Saudi Arabia could have
contained hidden bias and propaganda; a few interviewees asserted that such external
sources pursue their foreign policy objectives through official international broadcasting
such as the VOA and the British Broadcasting Corporation.
In the researcher's judgement, the importance given to the external sources of the Saudi
Arabian news items was not justified and what was presented to the public reflected the
perspectives of foreign governments rather than the Saudi government. Because of the
perception that these sources had more knowledge and understanding of the Gulf conflict,
the Saudi press had to assimilate the views of the USA and UK. Also relevant in this
respect are the issues of geographic origin of news and the personnel to whom the Saudi
press gave coverage.
7.1.2.2 The Geographic Origin of Gulf Conflict News
Given that the Saudi press depended in their news presentation during the conflict more on
foreign than domestic sources, it is likely that this would influence the geographical
perspective of its news coverage, i.e. it would concentrate on some areas of the world and
ignore others. This is particularly significant given the frequent research findings that
Saudi press material was more influential in topic areas about the conflict in the Gulf on
which the Saudi readers were ill-informed before the Iraqi invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. Indeed, it was clearly revealed (Chapter 5) that the Saudi Arabian press coverage
of the Gulf conflict paid greater attention to stories originating in the Middle East, the
USA, Western Europe and other foreign locations, than to those originating in Saudi
Arabia, contrary to hypothesis No. IV. Figure 7.2 shows the frequency of geographical
locations of Gulf news covered by the Saudi press over three periods [(70.17% to 29.83%)
(76.47% to 23.53%) (78.82% to 21.18%)].
•Other geographical Locations (US, West
Europe, MiddleEast, Asia/Pacific, etc.)
I Domestic (SA).
1200 —
1000 —
o
• 
800 —
a)
• 600 —c-
o
400 —
200 —
0
223
During the	 During the
	
After
Iraqi Invasion	 Liberation
	
the Liberation
and Occupation	 of Kuwait
	 of Kuwait
Periods
Figure 7.2 Frequency of Occurrence of the Saudi Press Geographical
Sources of News during the Gulf Conflict
The content analysis research findings (Chapter 5) shed light on why the Saudi press paid
attention to Gulf news located in foreign areas. Firstly, Saudi journalists felt an obligation
to provide a world perspective to the Saudi government and Saudi society as a whole. In
particular, Saudi readers, as Muslims, are interested in perspective of the Islamic world,
the more so as Saudi Arabia, as the custodian of the Holy places, is viewed as a leader
among the Islamic states.
So priority, also, was given to news from the Islamic states such as Egypt, Syria, the Gulf
states, Indonesia, and Pakistan. This would suggest that the preconditions of greater
regional/religious news exchanges already exist. States with mutual syneirgies of new
topics perhaps need to work together more to improve news exchange mechanism. After
all, in Saudi Arabia itself which hosts foreign workers from many of these Islamic states,
there would be a demand amongst this audience for more news from these 'home nations'.
Two factors explain the greater attention given to news from industrialised countries such
as the US and UK. First, perceptions of these countries had already been formed through
such influences as the Arabian-American oil company (ARAMCO) or the power of the
VCR which has exposed audiences to programmes from abroad. Second, media and
agency correspondents tend to be concentrated in commercial centres and major trade
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posts in the colonial territories and the major capitals of the western Europe and North
America. These are what Lyengar and Kinder called "news capitals" and it is their regular
output rather than occasional news originating from 'news provinces' which is most
influential in the world media (1987: 153-4). Therefore, news from the USA and western
Europe received more attention from the Saudi press for historical and perhaps inevitable
reasons.
Another reason for the dominance of American and Western news was the 'chess game' of
politics. Saudi Arabia did not agree with the Soviet communist ideology, so it supported
the capitalist states. Saudi journalists often have no other explanation for the absence of
news from particular areas. News or events in Eastern Europe almost disappeared from
the Saudi press. Our investigation (for the three study periods) revealed that Eastern
Europe received the least attention from the Saudi press, which is remarkable given the
break up of the Warsaw Pact that was taking place at the same time as the Gulf conflict
One reason, in Russia's case, is its reaction to the Iraq aggression and its support of the
Iraqi regime For example, during the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the Saudi
press presented only four items from Soviet Union and their theme was 'possible
withdrawal of Soviet military advisers front Iraq'. Even when Russia supported the UN
resolutions and aggression, still only twenty stories were presented by the Saudi press
during the liberation of Kuwait.
The major implication in this respect, is that 'geographic proximity', trade and political
factors had an impact on the amount of Saudi Arabian press coverage the Gulf conflict It
might be argued that the coverage of geographical locations was a natural consequence of
these countries' involvement in the Gulf conflict and their interests in the region. During
the bi-polar context of the Cold War, the Saudi press had clearly taken sides. It provided a
'world-view' that explained world events in terms of 'good guy versus bad guy'. It was a
black-and-white world, simple and straightforward in terms Saudi readers could
understand. It helped position sides in the Gulf Conflict and eased the way for momentous
changes in Saudi foreign policy, especially the arrival of American troops on sacred Saudi
soil. Yet despite the massive potential for change, the very fact that Saudi journalists
reverted after the war to old ways of reporting, even though the Cold War was almost
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over and a New World Order' had arrived in its place, the inherent conservatism of Saudi
society prevailed.
7.1.2.3 Personnel in Gulf Conflict News
Just as some geographical locations received more coverage than others, a few people
merited the daily attention of Saudi journalists, while many others escaped their attentions
entirely. It was found that the Saudi press coverage during the Gulf conflict relied heavily
on other personnel than from the Saudi Arabian government; for example, from the Middle
East, the USA and Asia. Again, this was contrary to hypothesis No. ILI.
Figure 7.3 shows the proportion of foreign to domestic personnel covered in news stories
by Saudi press over the three periods [(84.01% to 15.99%) (84.14% to 15.86%) (88.10%
to 11.90%)].
Figure 7.3 Frequency of Personnel Covered in News during the Gulf Conflict
In this matter, we looked at the origin of personnel, government authorities, individuals
and institutes to see who was covered in news stories by the Saudi press (see Chapter 5.
Tables 5.8, 5.21 & 5.34). The figures in these tables, which listed sources individually,
showed that Saudi Arabian government personnel ranked first, since the state attracted
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strong criticism, particularly in the Muslim and more importantly the Arab world, for
welcoming Western forces to liberate Kuwait.
Multi regions and countries, more than governments involved in solving the conflict,
ranked second. One significant note is that the USA itself ranked after the Saudi
government. Again, as in the case of sources and geographical locations discussed earlier,
the Saudi journalists did not give attention to Eastern Europe or other proponents of
communism, such as Cuba and North Korea. Also, the Saudi Arabian press had a duty to
concentrate on major elite figures such as foreign heads of state, political leaders and
significant individuals and institutions, and publications such as the Times, the New York
Times and the like.
The reason is clear that those public figures and publications, with their role in the conduct
of government affairs and influence on public opinion, played a major role in influencing
the course of the Gulf conflict until the Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait.
Another important objective was to involve the Saudi religious institutions and make them
understand that the Saudi Arabian government did not wish to go to war with another
Islamic state, but was forced into its stance by Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait. For
example, General Schwarzkopf, Commander of the Coalition Central Forces said ". . . the
Saudis themselves showed little interest in going on the offensive, so attacking the Iraqis
from Saudi territory seemed out of the question. Khalid's [Commander, Saudi forces]
attitude reflected that of King Fand, Prince Sultan, and the rest of the royal family.
Sometimes Khalid would say, 'Saddam has got to be destroyed,' or, 'we can not let him
get away with this, but his next sentence was always, 'But we can not attack our Arab
brothers" (1992: 436). Quoting SPA, Oka:- newspaper reported in its issue No. 8988 on
26 February 1991 that the Saudi Council of Ministers has called for "the liberation of
Kuwait with the minimum of losses among the joint forces and the Iraqi forces and to treat
the Iraqi prisoners of war with dignity according to the teachings of Islamic sharia".
This routine coverage of the political elite inevitably produced a large number of news
stories. Their views were obviously regarded as having news value. But one problem was
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that the Saudi press focused more on personalities than on social groups. For example, the
UN was the subject, in the three periods, of only 1.63%,1.74% and 1.15% of all news
presented. Some stories referred to the UN resolutions but as a reference point rather than
as the main theme of the news.
The Saudi press paid more attention specifically during the liberation of Kuwait (see
Chapter 5, Table 5.21) to the allied coalition (ranked first) while the Saudi government
authorities came second and the Middle East, notably Egypt, ranked third. The reason for
this is that the Saudi press were more concerned to present the Saudi government's policy
in peace time than in war time.
Much coverage during the Gulf conflict was given to elite to people such as the President
of USA, Ulama (religious scholars) and public figures. It appears to have been the view of
the Saudi journalists that reference to these names gave their news stories greater interest.
In the light of the above discussion, the next section evaluates the Saudi press performance
via its agenda.
7.1.2.4 The Saudi Press Agenda during the Gulf Conflict
Since the Saudi press is controlled indirectly by the government, the Saudi press is
considered as an instrument of government policy. It is likely, then, that Saudi government
policy would be carried out without any challenge from the press itself: More specifically,
the coverage of Saudi government activities as well as those of other states' leaders who
supported the UN resolutions would be positive in tone.
Five main types of news will be discussed to examine the Saudi press agenda. These are
political and military/defence news, crime/law/justice, economic and religious news. They
were chosen because they were the themes found most frequently in the newspapers
surveyed. However, before going into more details, it seems appropriate first to review
briefly the theme of news items revealed from the content analysis of the Saudi press
during the periods of analysis.
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7.1.2.4.1 Themes of the News Items of the Gulf Conflict
Hypothesis No. ll suggested that within the Saudi press, individual newspapers would give
similar levels of coverage to various themes within the news items presented. The data
from the content analysis led to a rejection of this hypothesis and confirmed that there
were differences among the Saudi press in the number of themes presented. Attention is
drawn to Table 7.1 derived from the top ten themes for each period of the conflict shown
previously in Chapter 5, Tables 5.7, 5.20 and 5.33.
Chapter 5 showed some themes that were common to two or more periods, while others
were confined to a single period. Thus, over the conflict as a whole, a total of 17 major
themes can be identified. The data in Table 7.1 indicates the major themes of the press
news items for the samples analysed in the three periods. The theme appearing most
frequently was diplomacy to resolve the situation. Perhaps surprising is that the second
highest frequency score was for criticism of Iraq's crime and injustice, voiced while the
peace negotiations were in the early stages. In that respect, the press agenda contained
contradiction.
During the liberation of Kuwait, contradiction also existed. The themes appearing the
most frequently were the Iraqi collapse, and aggression as a way of problem solving,
though the Saudi Arabian government was engaged in diplomatic moves to stop the war if
Iraq accepted the UN resolution. After the liberation of Kuwait, as during the Iraqi
invasion and occupation period, the theme achieving the highest frequency score was the
Saudi government's diplomacy, in the terms of 'diplomacy justification' as a means of
solving problems. One explanation is that there was pressure from Saudi or allied
governments to justify their stance.
Equal coverage of themes, as the content analysis shows, was not achieved. Undoubtedly,
the news favoured Saudi and allied countries. It is not surprising that the press did not
give equal opportunity to the enemy's point of view; it was not an election campaign, but a
war campaign. Evidence on this matter is clearly as a result of the propaganda operation
on both sides, conveying different messages but with the same purpose.
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Table 7.1 The Major Themes of News items during the Gulf Conflict
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Kalb quoted Walter Lippmann who worked for the Committee on Public Information, the
first USA propaganda and censorship agency, during World War I, that "We must
remember that in time of war what is said is always propaganda and what is said on our
side of the front is truth and righteousness" (1994: 7). A good example was Lacey and
Longman who referred to Maggie O'Kane's investigation into the reporting of the Gulf
War in December 1995. She accused George Bush and Margaret Thatcher of going to
war based on a propaganda `lie' (Lacey & Longman, 1997: 7).
This propaganda lie involved the claim that more than a quarter of a million of Iraqi
troops were massing on the Saudi border to take over the Saudi oil fields. Subsequently,
satellite photographs showed an empty deserted space where thousands of troops should
have been billeted. The photographs were and are classified for security reasons, although
other commercial satellites have photographed the Middle East. Lacey and Longman
quoted O'Kane as saying that "There was no massive build-up. But by then, the war was
fought and won and it did not matter that the 'proof of Saddam's bloodthirsty intentions
was a fraud" (1997: 7).
Whatever the truth of these claims, the anti-Saudi messages conveyed in the Iraqi media
(see Chapter 4) which would have taken some time to prepare, suggest that Saddam did in
fact, have hostile intentions towards the country.
7.1.2.4.2 Political and Military Gulf Conflict News
The findings of the content analysis in relation to hypothesis I which stated that political
and military/defence developments in the Gulf conflict would be more newsworthy than
any other Gulf news topics, their type of news would be largely be domestic rather than
international and foreign, and generally positive rather than negative in the tone, revealed
mixed results (see Figures 7.4, 7.5 & 7.6).
Certainly, the political and military/defence developments in the Gulf conflict were
regarded as more newsworthy than any other Gulf news topics, but the news was largely
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international and foreign, rather than domestic, and generally positive rather than negative
in all the three periods. However, for more explanation we shall take each of these two
news topics separately for more clarification of the most important issues of the Saudi
press agenda.
7.1.2.4.2.1 Political News of the Gulf Conflict
There is no doubt that Saudi journalists found themselves in a challenging situation
because of the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait as well as under pressure from
both the Saudi government and Saudi society in the mission that they were assigned
regarding reporting the events. One major problem, as identified by both media academics
and journalists, was the lack of information available to them, and the fact that they could
not work without political permission. This situation is contrary to the journalistic
principles, where news values takes precedence over other considerations.
Thus, the Saudi press themselves were required to adopt the official focus which focused
on peace negotiations, even though the response of the international community to Iraq's
annexation of Kuwait made it increasingly likely that war was imminent.
However, during the period of the Iraqi invasion and occupation, most immediately
striking, as the content analysis revealed, was the prominence of political stories. Foreign
political news topics predominated. One reason, as indicated in previous discussion in
relation to the source of news, was that the Saudi press depended on foreign sources more
than on Saudi officials or the SPA, because of a lack of editorial resources to write
background stories. In addition, for Saudi journalists, the major criterion of news value
was reference to elite nations and people. The Iraqi occupation had involved the USA,
Western Europe and Egypt more than any other countries, and the concern was to present
their points of view.
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In addition, reference to Kings and presidium members or other notable public figures such
Bush, Baker, Secretary Cheney, Colonel Powell, General H. Norman Schwarzkog
Margaret Thatcher, John Major and Mikhail Gorbachev were important for the Saudi press
because they were believed to be good source of information and to have credibility in the
public eye.
Support for the Saudi Arabian position from different countries, organisations and
individuals abroad was also presented as good news. International peace movements as a
way of solving the problem, summit meetings of the five permanent members of the UN,
and news about the failure of peace initiatives by France, Russia, UN Secretary General
DeCuellar and the EC were reported. By so doing, the press was demonstrating the Saudi
government's involvement with these international initiative. To illustrate this point,
coverage of the Saudi press of the views and movements of world leaders can be summed
up in these words from a Saudi paper: "all world leaders and personalities have tried
everything possible up to the last moment and they felt that every single chance of
maintaining peace has been shut by Saddam" (0/ca:, issue No. 8845, 6 October, 1990).
The paper went on to add that "the conclusions reached by the whole world was sufficient
to convince the collaborators and those deceived from the Arab world, to rethink their
positions for the last time and before it is too late to do so. All that the world leaders have
tried to achieve in search of peace and in search of solutions has collapsed. The world has
become convinced that the only way to deal with people like Saddam is to use force and
force only. Saddam alone must bear the responsibility and the consequences of going
down this road which be has imposed on the world" (Oka:, issue No. 8845, 6 October,
1990).
The reason for Saudi press concentration on foreign political news was clear. As well as
the political, military and economic status of these sources, there was concern for the
criterion of 'timeliness' and, hence, the press needed to utilise the technology of rapid
communication, with which the US sources were better equipped than the Saudis, as
indicated by J/9 and JR I in relation to CNN which has an advanced media equipment (see
Chapter 4).
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The focus on foreign political news does not mean, however, that the Saudi press ignored
the Saudi government. Saudi Arabia played a major role in solving the Gulf conflict as a
part of the international community It is to be expected that any national press will
highlight the role of the country's leaders in world events. So the Saudi press gave
positive coverage to the King, the Crown Prince, the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs
and the Interior, as well as princes and other Saudi authorities, including religious leaders.
In this respect, the press in relation to Saudi political and military/defence news most often
placed the King at the centre of news (60%), reporting his trips within the country,
meetings with foreign ambassadors and correspondence with other national rulers. In
addition, public addresses by the King, the Crown Prince, and the Minister of Defence
were extensively covered. Such speeches are considered Saudi government policy. Thus,
the only comments reported in reaction to local or international events were from major
Saudi figures. In this way, the government would influence the press agenda, which in
turn would shape public opinion at home.
Cultural proximity, too, was an important criterion in the Saudi press reports of other
countries' reactions to events. Saudi diplomacy as a means of solving the problem was a
major focus of attention. Egypt received attention since it was a part of the Arab Unity
Council but it disagreed with the Iraqi aggression. For example, Okaz wrote in its leading
article "This is the Egypt that we know" (issue No. 8815, 6 September, 1990).
During the liberation of Kuwait, however, the prominence of political stories ranked
second, since the air campaign led to military/defence news being allocated greater space
(see Chapter 5). Nevertheless, foreign political news accounted for 39.29% of all news
topics presented. As was the case during the Iraqi occupation, foreign countries' political
moves were highlighted in this period, for example news about the US reaction, President
Bush and John Major's statements about Gorbachev's peace plan; support for the UN
resolutions and counter-aggression by the world wide community, including Russia, which
had previously refused to use military action as a way to solve the problem; and Iran's
stance on the return of prisoners from the Iraq-Iran war.
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After the liberation of Kuwait, political news remained first on the Saudi press agenda.
One remarkable political news report was that the Crown Prince of Jordan had said that
"Saddam will not stay in power" (Oka:, issue No. 8995, 5 March, 1991) though King
Hussein had supported the Iraqi invasion. This statement can be seen as a pragmatic
attempt, once it became clear that Iraq could not win, to build bridges with the victors for
Jordan's future benefit. One more note is that after the liberation of Kuwait, the theme of
news in the Saudi press in general changed to Saudi diplomacy as a means of solving the
problem, Kuwait's Royal government and the diplomacy of other counties. Kuwait was
liberated and the tone was one of congratulation. So the press as well as the public was to
copy the government policy, rather than interpret events and set its own agenda. This was
due to the political and religious values that leaders must be obeyed.
The performance of the Saudi press toward the Gulf conflict can be compared with that of
countries which have different political structures but had the same interests to solve the
Gulf conflict The American Networks such as CBS and NBC, for some sixty days before
Iraq's invasion, were discussing the Iraqi regime, the power of Saddam Hussein in the
region and the risk to resources on which the US depended. The aim of these reports
seemed to be to prepare the nation for war, as part of the USA government's
Psychological preparations to gain public support. The US press discussed the issue
openly and confidently manipulated public opinion in the name of national interest. The
Saudi press could not do this. As indicated by the Saudi academics and journalists (MA/3,
MA/5 & J/5) the Saudi press lacked the experience to analyse the trend of events, and to
convey psychological messages. It might be thought, however, that a government
controlled press might be more capable of preparing for war than a democratic one. That
this was not the case reflects the government's own lack of media awareness and the
reactive nature of its policy towards Iraq. Saudi Arabia's hope and concern, up to the last
possible moment, was to avoid becoming embroiled in a regional conflict By the time it
accepted the inevitability of the conflict, it was too late to engage in psychological
preparation, even if it had a sufficiently sophisticated understanding of the use of the media
to enable it to do so.
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Closely related to political news was the bureaucratic- technical discourse of the diplomats
and diplomatic experts. Indeed, there were three groups involved, specifically the US
President Bush; Gorbachev, who strongly opposed the use of military force; and Saddam
Hussein and his allies who insisted there would be no withdrawal from Kuwait. The news
about the USA in the Saudi press concerned its support for the UN resolutions and the
US's unshakeable position toward the Iraqi aggression. Russia did not get priority in the
Saudi press; recognising that Russia is a nuclear state and superpower, the press dealt
carefully with its position, offering little news until Russia agreed finally with UN
resolution 678 on the use of 'all necessary means' to liberate Kuwait, passed on 29
November 1990.
But the discourse was different during the Iraqi invasion and occupation. This shows one
difficulty the peace movement faced. If there had been more coverage of Russia's stance,
not only in the Saudi media but in the world media, more force may have been given to the
argument in favour of an alternative solution short of war. For although the Saudi press
had long since taken 'sides' within the context of the Cold War, Russia remained a
significant international player - as Primakov's frequent visits to Baghdad during the war
revealed. We know now that the Soviet Union was on the road to internal collapse, plus
that Soviet military authorities during the war were becoming increasingly alarmed at the
ability of coalition air-forces to penetrate largely Soviet-designed Iraqi air defences. But
the analytical shortcomings of the Saudi press ensured that none of these complexities
would gain attention. The nation was about to go to war and the Soviet Union was
sympathetic to 'the other side'; it thus warranted less attention than the contribution of
'friends' and allies, such as US and UK.
7.1.2.4.2.2 Military News of the Gulf Conflict
An issue that concerns both journalists and the military is the 'right to know'. The former
believe that military tasks, movements and changes in military policy must be presented to
the public; the latter is concerned primarily with operational security. However, during the
Gulf conflict, a new information policy emerged not only for the Saudi press but also for
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all journalists and broadcasters who participated during the course of the conflict. The
military requirement, as pointed out previously, was that journalists' reports be pooled,
and submitted to the Joint Information Bureau in Riyadh. In relation to the Saudi
journalists, there was a Saudi press information policy that had to obeyed.
During the Iraqi invasion and occupation, military news ranked second amongst Saudi
journalists' concerns. It is no surprise that it should rank after political news. One reason
is that diplomatic negotiations for peace were going on. Another important point was that
the debate among Arab nations as well as religious scholars in Saudi Arabia and the
Organisation of Islamic Conference had not yet finished. In other words, editors regarded
the military news as 'political news' since news presented during this period included the
impact of US technology in the Gulf conflict, movement of troops into the region, possible
withdrawal of Soviet military advisors from Iraq, and military capacity such as ships,
aircraft, etc.
As the UN resolutions and initiatives of the US, UK, France and other countries, and even
Russia, failed, the possibility of fighting emerged. As one paper said, 'American Navy
prepares to bombard Kuwait' (al-Yaum, issue No. 6457, 18 February, 1991). The
objective of the Saudi press then was to send a message to Saddam Hussein to withdraw
from Kuwait. No mention of aggression as a way of solving the problem, e.g. Allied air
attack, bombing, etc. appeared in the papers.
The most striking feature of the press content during the liberation period was the
prominence of military/defence items, accounting for 41.99% of all news reported. Of
items on this topic, 92.53% were positive, i.e. favourable to the UN resolutions. When the
war started, political news ranked second. The Saudi Arabian press concentrated first on
Iraq's failure to stand against the allied forces, e.g. news about Iraqi prisoners, destroyed
aircraft, air bases, etc. (note the war began on Iraqi territory not in Kuwait). The second
type of military story presented the coalition forces' activities, such as news about the
allied air attack on Baghdad and the bombing of military targets.
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The effect of the extensive military news during the war was that citizens became afraid
that Iraqi Scuds might reach Riyadh, so many people tried to escape either to the west or
south of Saudi Arabia. So, news of deaths was a significant theme during the war. For
example, during the liberation of Kliafii, the Saudi press announced those who had died
from the Saudi Military and reported Government officials' visits to their families. The
bombing of the Baghdad shelter, on 13 February 1991, was a significant event showing the
important role that mass communication, particularly television, can play during a war.
The incident was reported by CNN's Peter Arnett on his satellite phone and later using
pictures from independent television news [ITN]. Macgregor explained that "a dozen
crews had been taken there that morning and stressed it was a shelter [not a Bunker] and
made it clear that bodies were being removed" (1994 :243). Indeed, during war time,
there is no certain guarantee against mistakes' but military mistakes mean people's deaths.
The point here is that the reporting of this event showed that the military was not able to
exercise full control of information; events will inevitably be reported by other sources
because technology gives them physical access to information that the military might have
preferred to withhold (Macgregor, 1994: 265).
As the bombing continued, reports came from Baghdad via CNN that allied bombs had
killed and wounded a number of civilians. This posed a dilemma for the press; events such
as the bombing of al-Amariya were difficult to justify; they appeared inconsistent with the
official message that the role of the foreign forces was to oust Saddam from Kuwait or
that the war was not being fought against the Iraqi people. If this was not what was
happening, Saudis might question whether the political decision to allow foreign forces
into Saudi territory was justified.
The leader of the "Peninsula Shield" and the leader of King Abd 20th Squadron
say: "the size of the Iraqi chemical weapons is exaggerated and they are technically
backward" (al-Yaum, issue No. 6318, 2 October, 1990). This was also confirmed by a
British expert who believed that Iraq does not possess the technology of chemical weapons
(al-Yaum, issue No. 6429, 21 January, 1991). This indicates a lack of a real understanding
by the leaders of the extent of the chemical weapons programme. The publication of such
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statements reflects a belief on the part of the papers that this issue was not important and
there was no need for alarm.
Another example, even though it reflects the situation of journalists in Saudi Arabia, is the
permission to publish in one of the inside pages on 16th
 January 1991 an item of news
quoted from the Reuters News Agency which said that "an American senator had said that
Saddam has made his intentions four months before his army carried out the invasion of
Kuwait" (al-Yaum, issue No. 16, February, 1991). This item, however, implicitly accuses
the Saudi Intelligence Service of being less efficient (less intelligent) and it also accuses the
journalists in the paper, who after all were Saudi nationals, of being insensitive.
So one implication that can be drawn is that the objective during the Gulf war was to
support the coalition goal of liberating Kuwait but an additional objective of the foreign
forces, namely those of the US and UK, to eliminate Saddam Hussein's military machine,
particularly his chemical weapons programme, was not acknowledged in the Saudi press.
The war was one in which the allied forces with their modern weapons defeated Iraqi
forces which lacked communication and mobilisation of soldiers and military supplies to
the battlefields. The presentation of news about human and material Iraqi losses is
important to the political decision makers and those with an interest in the outcome of the
Gulf conflict, but might be distressing to the general public about the crimes of the Iraqi
regime and its refusal to abide by the United Nation resolutions and its irrational behaviour
are all important to preclude world opinion, and especially Saudi public opinion, from
thinking about the losses that had resulted from the air and land campaigns, things which
could stir up unfavourable Arab opinion. For example, under the heading, "Saddam and
his Aggressive Tendencies", al-Yaum commented: "Anyone following the initiatives and
announcements by the Iraqi leader since the beginning of the Kuwaiti crises, and even
before that, can easily see the aggressive tendency that dominates the thinking of the Iraqi
leader and which govern his behaviour and shape his political moves" (issue No. 6411, 3
January, 1991).
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This does not mean that there was no news about the Iraqi casualties and those who were
killed on the Iraqi side during the conflict, but were these where reported, the emphasis
was on undermining Saddam's credibility. For example, the leading article of al-Yaum
under the title "Saddam Fears Confrontation", confirmed that "high ranking army
specialists cast doubt about Iraq's capabilities in terms of equipment and quality of its
military personnel. The Iraqi suffers severely from a lack of distinguished leadership
because Saddam has executed a large number of high ranking officers including those who
planned Kuwait invasion" (issue No. 6350, 3 November 1990). Iraqi had, by 28 February
1991, lost "3708 tanks and 42 military divisions while the number of war prisoners has
reached 175,000" (al-Yaum, issue No. 8285, 1 March 1991). Despite all these losses
Saddam remained in power.
After Kuwait's liberation, the Saudi press reported Iraq failure, military negotiations
between Allied forces, and Iraqis in Basra. In addition, the prospect of the Western
military returning to their own countries was reported prominently, as the presence of
foreign military forces in the region was a sensitive issue religiously as well as politically,
being viewed as 'occupation by indirect means'. This matter, coupled with the sensitivity
with which the presence of foreign troops on Saudi soil is seen, led al-Riyadh newspaper
in its issue No. 8290, 8 March 1991 to report that "the British Prime Minister, Mr. John
Major, had announced in the House of Commons on 7 March 1990 that the British forces
will start to withdraw from the Gulf region in two days and this will be followed with the
withdrawal of the Tornado fighter planes a few days afterwards".
In this period the Saudi press also reflected generally on the nature of Arab politics which
appeared to have no means for bringing about change, other than violent conflict One
article highlighted this point by contrasting Arab history with that certain Western states.
For instance, it said "Thatcher was elected three times for the office of Prime Minister in
Britain but when the British people felt that she had been in office for too long and change
is needed, they voted her out of office [This is in fact inaccurate. Margart Thatcher was
by a Conservative Party internal 'coup'. She was not defeated at a general election]. This
does not happen in the Arab world and the only means to effect change is through bloody
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confrontations, imprisonment or physical liquidations" (al-Riyadh, issue No. 8217, 2
January, 1991).
7.1.2.4.3 Crime, Law and Justice News of the Gulf Conflict
Crime, law and justice are also factors which may contribute to legitimising or
delegitmising the Gulf conflict coverage. In line with usual news practice, the more
negative the consequences of an event, the more probable it is that it will become a news
item, on the historic assumption that negative information tends to have a stronger
newsworthiness than positive information. During Iraq's invasion and occupation of
Kuwait, there was emphasis on the negative attributes of Iraqi authorities and the injustice
of their policies. The Saudi government was not featured, whether as mediator or
commentator. News of Iraq's crimes and injustice, both inside and outside Iraq, were
ranked as the second theme of news items in the Saudi Arabian press.
During the liberation, crime, law and justice news ranked third, as it did during the
invasion and occupation. The Saudi press focused on the Iraqi government's crimes, such
as foreigners being held hostage, terrorism, and the use of Iraqi people as human shields
to protect Saddam during the allied bombing of Iraq. Examples of Iraqi crimes come
easily from various sources such as the announcement by the American State Department
which reported that "another four American citizens had joined some 110 other American
civilians believed to have been kept hostages in Iraqi military cites and being used as
human shields" (al-Riyadh, issue No. 8166, 2 November, 1990). Quoting President Bush,
al-Riyadh also added, "this is something which even Adolph Hitler did not do". According
to another report, "A 24-year old Kuwaiti resistance fighter has said that an Iraqi soldier
has killed four children in front of him and in front of their mother. He then threatened the
mother by warning her that she would be the fifth to die if she made any resistance.
Another young man's mother was killed because he was accused of being a member of the
Kuwaiti resistance. Another died after an electric current was passed through his genital
organs" (al-Riyadh, issue No. 8167, 3 November, 1990).
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Al-Yaum newspaper, quoting Reuters News Agency, which itself was quoting the Egyptian
newspaper Al-Akhbar [The News], reported the arrival of 560 bodies the Egyptian soldiers
killed in Iraq during 62 days. The bodies were transported by bus or aeroplane to Amman
first and then flown to Cairo (issue No. 6292, 6 September, 1990).
As far as Saddam's terrorist activities abroad were concerned, it was reported that twenty-
five Iraqis had been expelled from Turkey after being found engaged in hostile activities
against Turkey" (0k.-.:a, issue No. 8872, 2 November, 1990).
After the liberation, the Saudi press voiced its concern about the Kuwait people who were
missing. It stated that 33,000 Kuwaitis were missing; 22, 000 had been taken as hostages.
News was reported about bodies found in the Sabah Hospital. The press also tackled what
Saddam had done to his army, simply by the invasion of Kuwait. Some of the hostility
towards Saddam was extended to those Arab countries which had supported Saddam in
the name of Arab solidarity, and it was claimed that "the regimes, both left and right, are
no longer fit to lead their people into the next phase" (al-Riyadh, issue No. 8137, 4
October, 1990).
These examples show that the press was primarily concerned to demonize Saddam and
assign blame for the events of the conflict. However, they failed to question what would
happen if Iraq had actually invaded Saudi Arabia or used chemical weapons or, as one
journalist (J/3), said: 'What economic losses would Saudi Arabia have incurred if Iraq had
overrun Saudi Arabia?
7.1.2.4.4 Economic News of the Gulf Conflict
Coverage of news relating to economic matters was on the Saudi press agenda but it
ranked fourth during the Iraqi invasion and occupation as well as after the liberation of
Kuwait, and fifth during the liberation period. The historical weakness of the Saudi press
as specialists in economics, as well as the fact that economic analysis is not on the
curriculum of Saudi departmental communications, would clearly contribute to the low
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attention given to economic news. The journalists seemed unwilling and unable to tackle
the economic implications of the conflict, such as when the Iraqis burned the oil fields and
polluted the water of the Gu11 though a few articles appeared about rising oil prises and
the effect of economic sanctions. There was also a particularly marked contrast in
frequency of occurrence between the three previous news topics namely, political, military
and crime/law/justice news and this topic, and most of the economic news was foreign (see
Chapter 5, Tables 5.3, 5.16 and 5.29).
During the liberation of Kuwait, economic news ranked fifth. The main feature of the
news in this period, compared with the invasion period, was the focus on the economic
consequences of Iraq's firing of Kuwaiti oil wells. The total number of oil wells set on fire
in Kuwait was estimated at 600. This is in addition to other oil installations (al-Riyadh,
issue No. 8291, 7 March, 1990). Although these events themselves were negative, the
news items are classed as positive, since their impact was to support the allied military
operation, which was the definition of positive news adopted in this thesis. In an article in
Okaz newspaper, for example, it was reported that a number of specialists in petroleum
studies had told the paper that "the destruction of oil installations by the invading Iraqi
forces and setting them on fire would in the end lead to the defeat of Saddam and his
forces and would accelerate his downfall. This is particularly so because Kuwait is one of
the major sources of energy that benefit the industrial countries and the developing ones on
an equal basis" (issue No. 8956, 25 January 1991).
After the liberation of Kuwait, the Saudi press was more concerned with foreign than with
local economic news. In this respect, the Saudi press can be accused of failing to inform
Saudi society of the local impact of the Gulf conflict. There was a failure to consider such
topics as how much Saudi actually lost because of Iraqi aggression, how much money was
paid to Russia to persuade her not to interfere, and how the invasion might affect the Saudi
national income in future because of the instability in the oil markets after the liberation of
Kuwait. It did not, in this researcher's opinion, provide an objective account of the effect
of Saudi politics in the region on the public. Saudi journalists seemed to lack a proper
Saudi economic perspective of the conflict and gave preference in economic news to
western, US and Egyptian stories. This is because neither journalists nor the public are
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economics oriented, a situation which may perhaps be explained in terms of the county's
sudden increase in prosperity following the 1980s, and the rise in oil prices, which brought
a standard of living higher than in most of the developed countries. Lacking understanding
of the finite nature of this resource, or experience of the complexities of modern
economics, individual prosperity has not been accompanied by a similar increase in general
awareness and in media awareness and as a result individuals squandered money without
any appreciation of its value. Sudden wealth brought a trend away from traditional means
of production, on creating a nation of consumers without any realisation of economic
initiatives or opportunities available to them. In this situation, it is not surprising that the
media should show less interest in economic than political and social issues, and should be
deficient in economic analysis. Another reason for this lack of interest is that the centrally
planned economic of Saudi Arabia, economic analysis and decision-making is regarded as
solely a government concern. There is no tradition of economic analysis by the media, nor
is such analysis encouraged.
7.1.2.4.5 Religious News of the Gulf Conflict
Religious news is considered as highly sensitive. Domestic, international and foreign
religious news related to the Gulf conflict was, as can be expected, 'good news'. The
heavy emphasis on religious news was largely international where Saudi Arabian
authorities, including religious leaders, were involved. Even though religious news ranked
sixth during the Iraqi invasion and occupation, it could not be avoided nor dismissed as
'meaningless' news, since almost all Islamic and Arab countries participated in the conflict
and had the same faith as Saudi Arabia. Egypt was a good example of this. The Saudi
press tried to prepare public opinion, both inside and outside, for the presence of friendly
armed forces in the region, by mentioning that this was Islamicly and constitutionally
acceptable. In fact the government campaign helped to set the press agenda by
encouraging the coverage of religious debate which would help to give its policies
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Thus, Islam was forced into the political crisis in the
Gulf. As the Ambassador of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to the United
Kingdom, Al-Gosaibi, says:
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Islam was forced into the political crises in the Gulf even before anyone
had conducted a thorough study of all aspects of the crises to reach an
Islamic judgement on it. Each party to the crises has built its political
stand in the light of political considerations and came up with divine
explanations later. Those who opposed the invasion of Kuwait found
some Islamic divine texts to support their arguments and those who
supported the invasion also found texts in their favour, i.e. each group
had selected texts from Islamic jurisprudence in line with what it was
saying (1992: 127).
The government opened Islamic dialogue and the papers started to discuss the views of
regional and international Islamic religious leaders. The language used was effective. For
example the Saudi scholars' statements read that the duty of a ruler is to use all means to
deter aggression and the incursion of evil as well as ensure the safety of the people and
safeguard their wealth, honour and blood (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1991: 41-2). The
statements also contained highly emotive Islamic concepts. For example, a statement of
the Board of the Senior Ulema in Saudi Arabia referred to vicious crimes, violation of
sacredness, the enemy, and aggressive incursion against the Islamic world. Sheikh Abdul
Aziz ibn Abdullah ibn Baz, the General President of the Islamic Science Research Ma
(tyranny) Call and Guidance Department, used words such as 'sinful aggression', 'gross
injustice', 'spilled blood', 'robbed wealth', 'violated honour', and 'displaced innocent
people'. The messages were supported by evidence from the Holy Quran. The Sheikh
quoted from it : "And the wrong- doers will have no protector, nor helper" (Al- Shura,
verse 8), "And whoever among you does wrong, him shall we cause to taste of a grievous
penalty" (Al- Furgan, 25, verse 19). The Supreme Judicial Council also used the words
'aggression' and 'evil'. A message from the Acting General President of Affairs of the
two Holy Mosques said" Saddam is mere lies and allegation" (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
1993: 42-44, 47).
Al-Yaum newspaper reiterated the call made in the Makkah declaration, which called for
the resignation of Saddam, and it went on to say that "the regime in Iraq is against Islam
and Muslims since it is based on a materialistic ideology which is opposed to the teaching
of Islam" (issue No. 6420, 12 January 1991). In the same issue the leading article of the
paper said: "the oppression of the Iraqi regime has reached the point whereby it has started
246
to ridicule the Islamic ulama and the conference currently being held in Baghdad under an
Islamic banner to justify the invasion is a good example of this. Islam has nothing to do
with Saddam's regime, his clique or of the actions of those who responded to the call of
the aggressor and went to Baghdad to support him"
The ulama in Al-Azhar in Egypt confirmed that the Kingdom had every right to defend
the holy places. It must be pointed out that the ulama in Al-Azhar have always maintained
a distinguished place in the Islamic world and they are respected by all the Islamic ulama
because of the excellence and high distinction of the Azhar university in Islamic
jurisprudence and as a result the views of its ulama are taken very seriously in the Islamic
world.
The office of the Conservative (Islamic) Sunni Society for the teaching of the Arabic
language and Islamic religion in Mauritania declared: "we think that the decisions you have
taken, [i.e. those of the Saudi government] on this subject are correct and objective"
(Oka:, issue No. 8872, 2 November, 1990).
The language and tone of religious news, from credible organisations inside and outside
Saudi Arabia, injected an atmosphere of accusation in the Saudi press. This suggests
conscious attempts to use the press to get the Saudi Arabian people to support the King's
decision. This could not have been achieved if the religious leadership had opposed it.
The effect of the religious news and messages was to get Saudi citizens to show readiness
to join the volunteer training centres and contribute to the defence of their country. In
short, the Saudi government gained full support for the measures it took. The same was
also the case during the war, with an emphasis on local religious scholars' directions to
Saudi citizens. But after the liberation of Kuwait, the religious news was local, not
international or foreign, due to the fact that the job had been done and there was no further
need for justifications. The religious lobby shaped and reinforced the Islamic peoples'
attitude to the allied coalition and thereby helped to transmit government policy and set the
Saudi press agenda.
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Considering the Saudi press agenda as a whole, the bulk of the stories dealt with familiar
subjects and familiar activities and caused little surprise. The frequency of the main news
topics, their tone, types and themes matched neither the rising or ebbing significance of the
Gulf conflict, not the expressed major interest of either journalists or media academics.
For example, political negotiations continued to be matters that received strong press
attention, although there were no unusual developments in the reasons why Iraqi invaded
Kuwait. The Saudi press emphasised foreign affairs (political, military, economic) far
more than subjects that might affect citizens, obviously because the foreign stories
contained more dramatic developments of the Gulf conflict for one simple reason: foreign
sources held keys to issues due to their power, economically and militarily. Similarly,
many Saudi academics and journalists complained about an overabundance of conflict
stories in which the Saudi press covered topics of little interest to the public, but omitted
important information before, during and after the liberation of Kuwait. Such disparity
between desired news and available news calls into question the performance of the Saudi
press. The reason, according to the Saudi media academics and journalists, was that Saudi
journalists are inexperienced and are unduly affected by the Saudi information policy. For
example, they are bound by the article No. 26 "Freedom of expression in the information
media is guaranteed with the national and Islamic aims and values which are observed by
the Saudi information policy" (see Appendix B). Therefore, both the Saudi government
and foreign sources such as Reuters, AFP, AP, UPI, shaped the Saudi press agenda simply
by giving coverage of their news. So, the question raised is what were Saudi journalists'
opinions regarding the conflict events (discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 in more
detail). Thus, the next section will consider the Saudi journalists' leading articles
presented during the course of the Gulf conflict, to see if there was any conflict between
journalists' perceptions and practice.
7.1.2.5 Leading Articles of the Gulf Conflict
One of the best ways to look at the Saudi press journalists' opinions on any issue, during
peace or war time, is in the leading articles. Since the Saudi press is considered a loyalty
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press, their content to a great extent reflects directly or indirectly the government's point
of view at least in a general sense.
With regard to hypothesis No. VI, which stated that the tone of the leading articles of the
Saudi press would be more positive than negative during the Gulf conflict the data in
Chapter 5, Tables 5.15 and 5.28 do not provide support for this with regard to the periods
during the invasion and occupation and the liberation of Kuwait. Table 5.41 (Chapter 5)
provides neither support nor opposition after the liberation of Kuwait. The data on leading
articles' tone in Figure 7. 7 illustrates the general conclusion on hypothesis VI during the
three periods.
Since the leading articles' themes heavily emphasised 'negative' aspects during the Gulf
conflict, the evaluation of the leading articles needs to examine to whom they were
directed, and why.
During the	 During the
	 After the
Iraqi Invasion	 Liberation
	 the Liberation
and Occupation	 of Kuwait
	 of Kuwait
Periods
Figure 7.7 Frequency of the Saudi Press Tone of Leading Articles during
the Gulf Conflict
During the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, most of the leading articles were
directed at the Iraqi government, mainly to Saddam Hussein, heavily emphasising the
negative qualities and lack of integrity of the Iraqi authorities. The qualities of Arab
leaders supporting the UN resolution were also emphasised. The Arab world was divided
into two parts: those who agreed with the international stance on Kuwait, and those who
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supported Iraqi aggression and opposed the US deployments and later participation of the
western military. A good example of the latter was the report that "Muammor Gadaffi led
a demonstration of an estimated half a million people in Tripoli in December 1990 [in
support of Iraqi" (Helical, 1993: 23).
In addition, the Saudi government, after attempting to persuade Saddam Hussein in ethical
terms to withdraw from Kuwait, argued that this habit of invasion would lead all Gulf
states to many problems that would take years to solve. It believed that Saddam's goal
was to take part of eastern Saudi Arabia, where vital oil resources are located.
In its leading article of al-Riyadh newspaper posed the question "Why did the International
Forces deploy in the Gulf?" (issue No. 8092, 20 August, 1990). It answered this question
by saying that "the international forces did not come to the Gulf secretly in the early hours
of one morning, but they came in accordance with the law and on request from sovereign
states with a standing in front of the Security Council and United Nations". The leading
article argued that accusations and sheltering behind excuses do not change facts or rights
and that the complications resulting from Iraq's invasion stem from such practices. Is
there any way to roll back time and to respect international law by reinstating sovereignty
to Kuwait? Or should events take their course, of which no one could predict the
consequences? The main point this leading article made was that Iraq was in crisis. The
paper went on to ask: what if events did not succeed to free Kuwait? The question posed
at the beginning of the leading article, however, highlights the serious consequences of the
Iraqi game and their collaboration with other agencies. Full details of this cannot be
revealed at the present stage. What we can reveal, however, is that under the heading of
"More than 19 Million Dollars of Iraqi Bribes to the Ba'th Party in Yemen: how was it
leaked?". Okaz newspaper reported that "the Iraqi ambassador in Sanaa, Mr. Abd Al-
Hussein Al-Rafiqi, was busy conducting an investigation as to how this news was leaked
to the press" ( issue No. 8876, 6 November, 1990).
In the researcher's view, it is the Arabs' inability to comprehend the experiences of others
(politically and in terms of media), a tendency to base their judgement on emotion more
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than reason, that is our major and persistent problem. Lack of objective understanding
could give rise to wrong and even deadly behaviours.
So disseminating information was necessary to prepare the public for further emergency
situations. One way was to publish aggressive messages about the Iraqi authorities. As a
result, the Saudi press engaged in personal condemnation of Iraq and described the Arab
Nations as enemies of co-operation between themselves. The leading articles described
Saddam, for example, as the 'Antichrist', and emphasised his 'preaching and lies', 'two
faces', meaning double standard, 'hypocritical comments' and 'dictatorship'.
The Saudi press also described the Arab nation by first asking "Can Arabs overcome their
own problem?"(a/-Riyadh, issue No. 8078, 5 August, 1990) and making it clear that in
their view the answer was definitely No. The leading articles started to blame the Arabs
as one unit. For example: "Are Arab nations 40 years behind the times because of lack of
co-operation?" (al-Riyadh, issue No. 8079, 6 August, 1990). This researcher believes this
situation was due to the lack of trust and selfishness of the majority of leaders, and to
political instability, overthrows, corruption etc. For example, in a commentary entitled
"The Stupid Allies", the al-Riyadh newspaper says that "the 'fruition of Arab unity' was
that of these countries (i.e. Jordan, Yemen and Sudan), agreed on the timing of the Iraqi
invasion and on a big plot in which Saddam is the main player, supported by All Saleh and
Hussein ibn Talal" (issue No. 8271, 15 February, 1991). The article analyses some of their
moves and how these conspirators formed an evil alliance that threatened other Arab
countries:
in terms of profit and loss, however, the three countries remained loyal
to Saddam but that cost them dearly because they lost the support they
used to receive from the Gulf States. Ironically they never fought a
single war beside Saddam which proves that their support to Saddam
was merely to serve their interests. In other words, it is a fragile
opportunistic affiance that can be easily broken specially since these
countries became pre-occupied with their own internal problems to the
neglect of those of Saddam. They soon started rethinking what would
happen inside them if the crises were to continue and if things
developed contrary to what the leaders had anticipated, given that they
were expecting a crisis of unparalleled proportion.
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These countries had no realisation of the political and economic strength of Saddam vis-à-
vis that of the Gulf States and the place of the Gulf especially Saudi Arabia, in the
international order.
The article then goes on to say that "what is even more strange than this was that Iraq and
South Yemen (before being united with North Yemen) had a joint defence agreement with
the former USSR (now the Russian Federation) and Jordan is living under the western
umbrella but these agreements become null and void, just like Saddam's disastrous
adventure. The USSR became part of the opposition camp and it refuses to be drawn into
any stupid confrontation" (al-Riyadh, issue No. 8271, 15 February, 1991). Thus, the Iraqi
media's reaction to the possibility of Russia sending a token force to the Gulf was hostile,
accusing Moscow of betraying an ally and sabotaging the Arab cause (Cigar, 1992:13).
The spate of criticisms in the newspapers, by al-Riyadh newspaper, confirms our argument
about the disunity and fragmentation of the particularly Arab nation. In its leading article
it questioned "whether the Arab would waste another forty years and wondered whether
the 1950s and 1960s climate have come back to dominate Arab politics again, an era which
saw the echoing of dissenting voices and which divided the Arab nation into left, right,
progressive, reactionary, imperialist agents and Israeli agents" (al-Riyadh, issue No 8078,
6 August, 1990). This disunity, it was said, was responsible for keeping the Arabs at the
bottom of the ladder of civil societies in terms of influence and independence, instead of
taking pride in a national home and occupying their rightful place in the peaceful and
sometimes conflicting international arena. The present day climate, it was suggested,
recalled that of thirty or forty years back when the minds of the leaders were clouded by
slogans and Israel, the weak state in the region, was planning and preparing itself for the
opportune moment to deliver a blow to the Arab heart and soul. That is exactly what
happened and the results were catastrophic, leaving massive destruction in Lebanon and
Arab countries torn apart more than ever. This is in addition to the feeling of defeat and
apathy that prevailed afterwards, i.e. a state of emptiness, illusion and disunity had
dominated the Arab family at that time and it was impossible to agree on any common
stand.
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A similar point was made in the leading article of Okaz newspaper in issue No. 8842, on 2
October 1990, under the title "The Sad Comparison". It wrote: "at the time when the
boundaries between East and West Berlin were brought down with the will of the people
and the determination and commitment to improve the well being of the German people in
both sectors of the city, Saddam Hussein still talks about the historic interests and right of
Iraq in Kuwait and its invasion and the humiliation of the Kuwaiti people. This leader and
those like him have been the ones who are responsible for the backwardness of the Arab
nation for tens if not hundreds of years".
The paper concludes by saying that "up to now we (the Arabs) have not caught up with
the civilised world where life is more peaceful and more habitable for our children and for
the future of our nation and its national security." The conclusion of the leading article is
perhaps too optimistic. It is probably the outcome of the state of despair given the
prevailing climate in that period when people with poor educational backgrounds became
leaders and people from humble origins became decision makers and demanded the
execution of those decisions (without abiding by them themselves) and the honest are
accused of being dishonest in the eyes of the hypocrites of the Arab world.
The leading article of the al-Riyadh newspaper carried the title "The Arabs Are Like a
Train Carrying a Load of Explosives" (issue No. 8079, 7 August, 1990) which paints an
even clearer picture. It says: "it is as if the Arab people have no aspirations, opinion or
social philosophy capable of replacing the use of "swords" with the use of the "pen", noise
with serenity and a useful dialogue and a language that transcends the use of words to the
wider knowledge".
Al-Riyadh continues its analysis of the Arab world situation in its leading article by
pointing out that: "the tragedy of the Arab nation is that it has no political base because
one of the results of the political manoeuvres and plots that dominated the region during
the past forty years was the destruction of all political and economic bases and the
consequences of this was the emergence of single party systems, single leaders and the
alliance of opposition against international imperialism" (issue No. 8111, 8 September,
1990).
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This evaluation is supported by the view of one political academic this researcher
interviewed who claimed that "first the Gulf conflict between Arab and Arab is a political
disagreement, not a cultural conflict. Second, the conflict is centred around the leaders.
This kind of political disagreement can be solved if there is another political evaluation of
the elements/facts of political interests" (PA)1.
These extracts, highlighting the Arab tendency to engage in emotional rhetoric rather than
political analysis, indicate that some academics and journalists, at least, are aware of a
shortcoming of the Saudi press in this respect. It is possible to say that we need to use our
minds instead of our emotions on sensitive issues. We need to analyse the content and
give the truth its actual share in an environment characterised by friendship and respect
based on mutual interests with the west so that individuals can live in a permanent and
comprehensive peace in this world (One always hears this last expression before or after
every political meeting in the Arab world). If these views are optimistic, we should have at
least a minimum degree of peace so as to reduce the prevailing tension and to give peace
another chance.
In short the themes related to the Arabian nations took the 'question formula' and were
indignant/depressed in tone. One leading article commented on the Arab people's
"suspicious attitude" towards their leaders (Okza, issue No. 8813, 4 September, 1990).
The reason for criticising the Arab nations as one unit was that Jordan, Sudan, Yemen,
PLO and Tunisia did not oppose the Iraqi aggression.
During the liberation of Kuwait, it might have been expected that there would be more
information about the outcome of the war, rather were reiteration of condemnations of
Saddam from those who supported his invasion and occupation of Kuwait, but this was
not the case. Such questions, this researcher argues, should have been tackled by the
leading articles. For example: why did the political initiatives fail? What were the likely
outcomes, and why? In other words, the language employed by the press was not
significantly different from during the Iraq invasion and occupation. The leading articles
(PA) Saudi Political Academic, King Saud University, Riyadh.
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kept discussing Saddam's lack of credibility, arguing that he was a burden on his nation's
wealth, and that he was in the eyes of international public opinion, including that of the
Saudis, seen as the world's new Hitler. The main themes were to punish Saddam and his
Ba'th regime. One major change during the liberation of Kuwait, was that the focus of the
leading articles toward the anti-war countries, specifically Jordan, Yemen and Sudan, was
on their leaders, as well as the chairman of the PLO, rather than on the Arab world as one
unit, as it had been before the liberation. The aggressive language was expected since
these figures were Saddam's allies. These four leaders were described as an 'allied
conspiracy' (Okaz, issue No. 8266, 10 February, 1991); 'a hypocritical group' (Okaz, issue
No. 8882, 2 November, 1991); 'Stupid allies'(al-Riyadh, issue No. 8271, 15 February,
1991) and 'Spineless screamers' accused of 'double standards' (Okza, issue No. 8286, 30
February, 1991); King Hussein of Jordan was described as 'one face of employment of
mercenaries', and 'only one fraction in the accurate numbers equation and stupid since he
got lost in Saddam's shelter' (al-Riyadh, issues Nos. 8263 and 8264, 7-8 February, 1991).
The aggression toward this group was a response to the fact their press had started
insulting the allied coalition, and particularly the Saudi government policy, as revealed in
several leading articles, which tackled the misinformation of the Arab press.
Quoting its own sources, the Oka: newspaper comments on the idea of "a conspiracy on
some parts of the Kingdom and other Gulf states" (issue No. 8846, 7 October, 1990)
saying that the idea of a conspiracy was the brain child of King Hussein who had in recent
years felt that his throne in Jordan was engulfed by threats and internal problems in
addition to the Israeli threats. This is in addition to the increase in the might of the Iraqi
army and the expansionist tendencies of the Iraqi leadership. As a result he sought to find
an alternative throne for himself either in Al-Hijaz or in Iraq, but the plot had failed and
Saddam was defeated and demoralised. The situation was such that there was a
congruence between the idea of King Hussein and Saddam's hatred of the Gulf states and
his interests in the region. To carry out their plan, the two leaders had co-opted the other
three partners in the plot, namely Sudan, Yemen, and the Palestinian Liberation
Organisation. King Hussein visited Israel in 1989 and offered to sign a joint treaty with
Israel in return for Israeli silence about his plot to redraw the political map of the region.
He also supplied Iraq with chemical weapons. The Jordanian authorities killed one of their
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secret agents in Paris after his role in the plot was leaked out. Likewise, Arafat severed
dialogue with the United States for the same purpose. Knowledgeable sources in Amman,
in Jordan, were reported to have confirmed that the Palestinian organisations, including the
PLO, had agreed to make Jordan the Palestinians' substitute home. They had also agreed
to unite their positions to ensure Jordan's stability as their substitute home, especially
following "the failed plot, in which King Hussein took part, of making Kuwait the
Palestinians' substitute home" (al-Riyadh, issue No. 8140, 7 October, 1991).
Saddam saw this as deviation from a previously agreed plan which called for the
partitioning of the Kingdom and which would give King Hussein al-Hijaz (the west of
Saudi Arabia) and which would subsequently make him officially known to his people as
"Al-Sharief Hussein". Saddam also believed that this announcement at that particular time,
i.e. 11 th of August, as tantamount to the rescinding of the agreement for partitioning the
Kingdom" (Okaz, issue No. 8841, 2 October, 1991).
After the relief of the liberation of Kuwait, there was no difference in the number of
positively and negatively treated themes. The leading articles highlighted the defeat of Iraq
and they accused Saddam of causing the war, of destroying his country, and enumerated
his crimes. In addition, a few called on the Arabs in general to learn from the conflict and
for a new way to build themselves again.
Another point is the absence of the collective pronoun, 'we'. The leading articles discussed
the UN's resolutions, outcomes of GCC meetings and how these meetings affected the
outcome of war, and how these organisations contributed to the cause or effects of the
conflict Such questions or debate in the leading articles would have informed particularly
elite people who relied on the leading articles for assessment of the situation in Saudi
Arabia. Questions like 'was there another country involved in the cause of conflict and
particularly the war?', 'Was the problem started first between OPEC and Iraq and why?',
Was Iraq driven to invade Kuwait and why?' should, one can argue, have been tackled
and should have been on the Saudi press agenda before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait or
after the liberation of Kuwait.
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In fact, however, the Gulf conflict was presented not as a general conflict, but as
aggression by an individual. Attempts were made to characterise the war as the only
possible solution, which had been forced on the U1sT by Saddam's invasion of Kuwait and
his refusal to action accordance with the UN resolutions.
Moreover, the leading articles responded to Saddam Hussein's characterisation of the war
as a 'holy war', by explaining in more details the reasons for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In
this respect, J/4 believed that the Saudi press had refuted Saddam's claims but another
journalist, J/5 disagreed since he thought the Saudi press had used Iraq's method
(propaganda) to reject the Iraqi claims on the simple ground that they were 'not based on
information'. The majority who were interviewed agreed with J/5 as inferred from their
comments on Saudi journalists' lack of skills, management experience and organisation
structure as well as the lack of information from the government.
Therefore, the leading articles set the terms by which political judgements were reached
and political choices made, particularly with regard to Arab countries, almost all of which
agreed with the Saudi government and international law. It was not, in this researcher's
opinion, part of the government agenda nor the public agenda to adopt an aggressive
stance toward the Arab nations, but after Arab media, in Jordan and Sudan critiqued Saudi
Arabia, the government allowed the press to respond in like manner The political
judgements did not only reflect Saudi government speeches and statements. Aggressive
words or questions were used, such as 'Can Arabs overcome their own problems? "Are
Arab nations 40 years behind the times because of lack of co-operation?" And in the
same vein, the press contradicted itself by attacking Saddam Hussein's behaviour using
aggressive words such as 'two faced Saddam', and 'the promoter of lost causes' (al-
Riyah, issue No. 8105, 2 August, 1990); 'Iraq and the death of restraint'(a/-Riyadh, issue
No. 8108, 5 August, 1990); 'Saddam is pretending to be the sole representative of
Islam'(al-Riyadh, issue 8109, 6 August, 1990); and 'Antichrist', `Saddam's preaching
and lies to his own people' (al-Riyadh, issue No. 8111, 8 August ,1990). Its seems to me
that this approach assumed that the readers were ignorant and had no other sources of
information. The point is that the Saudi press was saying one thing and other foreign media
were saying something else, e.g. highlighting Saddam's ability to produce nuclear and
257
chemical weapons, and the Saudi press did not understand that Saudis, at least the elite,
knew the real situation from other sources such as CNN and BBC, and could judge the
situation more objectively.
One point that could be made is that during the military build-up in the region there was no
doubt that war would take place and the Saudi press news and leading articles should
have prepared the Saudis for the war, but instead, they confined themselves to reiterating
opinions that had been already agreed, not only locally but also in the international
community. So, to serve the public interest or to be objective, the balance of leading
articles contained in this respect was not directed to the general public. It gave the Saudi
government in view of the situation, which in fact needed no publicity, as the same view
was already held by numerous countries, organisations and influential public figures, inside
and outside the country.
It seems clear, then, since the Saudi press in regard to the leading articles was affected by
the news contents gathered from foreign sources, the news about the Iraqi aggression and
the military task became a major force in the Saudi journalists' leading articles day by day.
This raises the question of how faithfully and wisely did Saudi journalists interpret the
conflict's events. The content of the leading articles did not convey the reality and the
public desired to be told the reality; not, merely that Saddam's behaviour was evil, which
was already agreed, but what was actually happening. Instead, the content analysis
revealed the coverage was fragmentary. It focused on what was 'newsworthy' in the eyes
ofjournalists, contrary to the principle that the press should be objective and timely. The
issues the press was raising should have been in the news papers before Saddam invaded
Kuwait.
So, the coverage of political, economic, and crime issues could be criticised because many
pertinent issues were not presented; for example, whether Western armies in the region
were bad or good; how vulnerable were tourists to attack; whether there was any
alleviation of the environmental damage caused by the burning oil wells. Such problems
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were important but no objective coverage of them appeared in either the news content or
in the leading articles.
Measuring the performance of the Saudi press is one way to draw preliminary conclusions
about how it portrayed the reality of the Gulf conflict The Saudi press did not portray the
Gulf conflict accurately judging by comparison with other news sources such as European
and US sources. This suggests a need to study media other than the Saudi press, but it has
been agreed that the western press exists in a climate of freedom of expression, so direct
comparison would be unjust. The views expressed by Saudi media academics and
journalists were enough to justify our argument so far. Two major themes were derived
from those who were interviewed. First, since Iraqi intentions were tackled by the
Western media, not by the Saudi press in the first instance, this gives us an indication that
the Saudi press was not accurate and informative enough. Second, during the Iraqi
invasion and occupation until the war started, the Saudi press, as well as society as a
whole, had no idea how to stand up against the Iraqi radio propaganda (see Chapter 4).
So, the Saudi press was not prepared, like that of the West. Consequently, the information
given to readers was not relevant to their previous knowledge. For example, information
about Saddam Hussein, for the majority of the public, was not known or tackled in the
Saudi press. In short the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict simply reported what it saw;
it did not interpret the situation, it presented the ideology of the ruling class including that
of the allied leaders, but it did not present a balanced view or debate the issues openly. In
an area where illiteracy is high, and as the Spiral of Silence Communication Theory
suggests, the public accepted at face value what they took to be the reality presented by
the Saudi press or as seen on the T.V, where there were no alternative sources of
information with special reference to the Gulf events, even from the allied media. To read
between the lines of the news stories would require a degree of education and political
sensitivity which, on the whole, are lacking among the Saudi readership.
One reason for this is the youth of the Saudi population. Analytical studies carried out by
the Department of General Statistics of the Ministry of Planning have shown that Saudi
men and women below 15 years of age constitute up to 49.2 percent of the total
population whereas those whose ages are 64 years and over constitute only 3.3 per cent of
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the population. The average age of the individual in Saudi Arabia therefore is 15.4 which
indicates the young nature of the Saudi population and consequently the likely
inexperience of those who would be in charge of dealing with the thorny issues of local,
regional and international media and above all with the deciphering of the political
messages and their allegory (al-Riyadh, issue, No. 10529, 22 April, 1997).
The role of news and information is not simply to attack one country and ignore another's
faults and intentions, since modern conflict contains more than one face. The Saudi press,
with the power gained from its relationship with the Saudi government and privileged
access, should have tackled not only the causes of the conflict but also why it existed in the
Gulf region. In addition, we can not be certain about the effect of factors or information
presented in either the news or leading articles on the public at large for two reasons.
Firstly, it was not to be expected that the Saudi press could change overnight the image of
Saddam that had been created in the public mind over the previous eight years, as a result
of the Iran-Iraq war. Secondly, the Saudi press had to counter the manipulation of the
Arab media by Saddam Hussein himself
The point that should be noted, supported by many Saudi media academics (for example
MA/5) is that the Saudi press behaved in a similar way to the Iraqi media, in presenting
and trivialising matters directed to the Gulf States' governments.
This study of the coverage of the Gulf conflict by the Saudi press has revealed that
reference to frequency, threshold, meaningfulness, consonance, elite, etc. played a key role
in the way the Saudi press selected its news. More came from foreign news services, and
locations, personnel etc. than from Saudi sources, as was shown in Chapter 5, summarised
and presented in Appendix F.
But, this limited the role of the local gatekeeper. The obvious newsworthiness to Saudi
Arabia of the rich and powerful countries such as the US and UK played a role in
convincing the Saudi journalists to select their news items. We reject to some extent the
research hypothesis that the function of the Saudi press system was in line with the
authoritarian press model. The findings show that the Saudi press printed more foreign
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than local political, economic, and personal news. At the same time, economic, social
service and other issues related to the Gulf conflict received less attention. Journalists
believed that coverage of political and military issues in regard to the events would be of
more interest to the public and have more impact.
Another consideration, however, given that the Saudi press is a loyalty press, was to avoid
criticism of the government and its allies. So, although in general, political and military
news, particularly from foreign sources, was extensively covered, mistakes such as the
bombing of al-Amariya which had unfavourable implications, were not tackled.
Conclusions
The views of academics and journalists are important for understanding first, how each
member thinks, especially since most of them have studied in the west and are familiar with
western media theories and because they teach in Saudi universities, whereas the
journalists represent the link between society and the state and between the international
arena and society. Secondly, it must be emphasised that the mere agreement of this group
to meet the researcher is a strength of this study, since no other Saudi or non-Saudi
researcher before has had the chance to meet all these scholars to discuss media questions.
This gives an indication of the value of the views expressed by all these individuals which
served the aims of this research and may help to develop the press in Saudi Arabia in
future.
The main difficulty faced during the course of the study was the fact that the meeting of all
these scholars took place six years after the liberation of Kuwait, despite the fact that I
believe the real struggle in the Gulf started after the liberation of Kuwait, as indicated by
the launch of the "Operation Desert Fox" 16-20 December 1998, whose aim was to take
out Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (thought, this was one reason, as presented in
Chapter 1, for the conflict in the Gulf area). As a result of the elapse of so much time
since the events with which this study was concerned, the researcher had to press hard to
know what was in the mind of the interviewees, besides putting across various
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psychological, political and media hints, to obtain real answers. From this we were able to
hie-flight the unvoiced views about the actual press treatment of the Gulf conflict, even
though this took place six years after the end of the war. However, it is possible to say
that the agenda of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict dictated the participants' views
about the performance of the Saudi press during the conflict and in this thesis we were able
to present the agreement and disagreement in opinion about satisfaction and dissatisfaction
of the press treatment of the conflict. The findings of this investigation could be stated as
follows:
First, in relation to the actual state of the Saudi press, the Saudi press before the Gulf
conflict was very narrow in its perspective. As a result of the involvement of journalists
and media personnel with political and military policies, foreign journalists and advanced
broadcasting technology, they gained a wider view of events and of the journalists' role.
Despite the close resemblance of many of the regimes with the socialist model, which was
in the last stage of its collapse, the one-sided presence of the American media in particular
gave the chance to the Saudi press and broadcasting to watch and learn how journalists
interact with events and how to deal with the official spokespersons and press conferences.
This, in turn, helped to reduce the gap and suspicion between the journalists and the
military during the coverage of events and the search for information, as did the dominance
of CNN and its prominent presence on Saudi television's Channel Two (the English
service channel).
This dominance played a major influence, since the western media philosophy is based on
western culture, belief in freedom of expression and giving those with different opinions
the right to express them, whether those opinions concern the treatment of the Iraqi
invasion, the role of the allied forces in the liberation of Kuwait or things that the Saudi
media, including radio, television and press, cannot do because they require high human
and financial resources. One of the events, as mentioned previously, shown by CNN, was
that of some of the Saudi women demonstrators who took to the streets in their cars in
Riyadh to protest at the banning of woman from driving cars. This was unacceptable to
the religious leadership and never commented upon by the government. Another example,
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is the showing of some religious rituals and singing, which was seen by owners of satellite
dishes.
Most of the media academics and a few journalists have pointed out that the Saudi press
was completely unprepared for the Gulf conflict, but the important thing is the final results.
The successful propaganda of the Iraqi press before the war had shaken the feelings of the
Arab nation, but Saudis needed the media to deal with urgent military, political and
economic issues instead of merely engaging in nationalistic rhetoric. Instead of dealing
with people's current concern, the media channels became absorbed in showing the huge
human and financial support previously given by Saudi Arabia to the states which were
now "enemies", which made people question the relevance of their information to their
personal needs. Naturally, given this situation, the political decision makers and the state
security apparatus were far from comprehending any possibility of Iraq becoming the
dominant force in the Gulf region. This indicates the absence of the press and this may be
due to the weakness of the press institutions, as will be shown later. As a result, the
enlightened and more educated Saudis moved to other media sources such as CNN and
the BBC in the belief that these sources were more advanced and capable of providing
them with a better service, better analysis and better contextual reporting.
Second, in relation to the political dimension and its relationship with the Saudi press, we
became aware from the answers that were given to us that it is impossible to separate the
function of the press from the state's general policy. It is a written press policy. The
Saudi Press Agency played an intermediary role between the Saudi government agenda
and the work of the chief editor, a key player in the government campaign, as the gate
keeper in the Saudi press. The Editor-in-Chief is the one who decides what to publish and
what not to publish and at the same time he is wholly accountable before the state legal
prosecutor. This prestigious position of the Editor-in-Chief is accorded to him because he
is appointed by the Saudi Ministry of Information, and after the approval of the highest
authorities. The thinking behind this is a perceived need to make sure the newspapers
follow the path planned for them to preserve the nature of Saudi society as a conservative
Islamic country.
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The best example of the strong relationship or the tie between the press policy and the
state policy is the fact that the Saudi press did not mention the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
until after some time had passed and after the official line of the state started to emerge.
In addition, no critique was made of Saddam's behaviour before his invasion of Kuwait.
In other words, the political decision preceded the press decision and, as a result, the Saudi
citizens heard the news in more detail about the invasion either from the television stations
of the neighbouring countries in the Gulf region or Egypt or from radio services like the
BBC Arabic service. Although some participants praised the soundness of the Saudi
government's judgement, and its wise policy in not rushing into a decision on this matter,
others pointed out the dangers of such a policy and the lack of credibility of the local
channels which one participant has compared with the Tylenol2 capsules incident in the
United States.
Third, in relation to the press treatment of the conflict, encompassing the press practices,
propaganda, and psychological treatment, the Saudi press reported the news, followed the
events, and sent press correspondents to press gatherings, even though most of these
efforts were personal initiatives from the press. A few participants mentioned the
propaganda side and there was an exchange of insults between the Saudi press and the
Iraqi press but less harsh words were used by the Saudis. The Iraqi propaganda, however,
had much influence on the public in the Gull; Arab and Islamic countries because the
indigenous press lacked information. The participants, however, deny that Iraqi
propaganda had any success in Saudi society. One reason, the researcher would argue, is
the deep-rooted respect for the Saudi government, specifically the King, based on Islamic
principles.
The psychological activities were a strong element associated mainly with propaganda
work. Through the use of the radio the Iraqis were able to raise slogans such as
'freedom', 'comp atriotism', 'Arab nationalism', 'Islam and the West', 'Jihad', 'European
society and imperialism'. The Saudi people were not used to hearing such slogans and
2 . Tablets contaminated with poison had been distributed to chemists throughout the US. An
investigation of the speed with which information reached the public revealed that some citizens
were still unaware of what had happened, five days after the event. See Chapter 4, p. 92 for
more details)
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this influenced them psychologically, but this influence soon disappeared when the air war
started. It would have become a major influencing factor if the Iraqi propaganda had been
allowed to continue, but the bombing of Baghdad stopped that. A good example was
given by Dr Al-Badr in a talk on psychological warfare, when he revealed that edited films
from the war had been found, which had been doctored by superimposing the images of
American men and women soldiers, to give the impression that they were inside the Kaba
in Makkah city and these films were being circulated in south-east Asia and other Islamic
societies. They were ready for distribution before the conflict began and, when the war
started, the Iraqis started circulating them.
Fourth, in relation to the religious dimension, as it has been made clear above, the press
experienced both planned and unplanned propaganda and psychological practices from the
Iraqi side and the Saudi side (including the media of the allied forces, even though we did
not deal with this subject at a great length) because of the strength of the Iraqi media, yet
religious messages were also present. This is quite natural because the conflict happened
on Islamic soil but took on political and ideological dimensions. Nevertheless, irrespective
of the aims and correctness or incorrectness of these messages, it has long been accepted
in both Muslim and Christian societies that religious arguments are invoked in support of
war. Thus, religion was used as a means to achieve political goals.
In brief; the difficulty of the situation, and the dangers faced by the press and by the
surprise invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, created doubt in the minds of the Arab and Islamic
general public. It even deepened the inter-Arab conflict In this regard, criticism may be
raised of the press policy. Although the policy statement contains impressive rhetoric, in
practice, the administrative leaderships of the press institutions were incapable of
activating this policy in a manner proportional to the economic and diplomatic weight of
the Saudi state. It was clear from the views of the majority of the participants that the
Saudi media, the press included, did not change much after the liberation of Kuwait. They
gave a number of reasons for this. It was said that the press institutions were weak in pre-
planning, training, preparation and specialised cadre. At the same time, they were unable
to attract specialists, before and after the invasion of Kuwait, to edit the media messages
and to read between the lines, or to get near to the decision makers.
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Very briefly, if all of the answers, arguments and findings given during the course of this
study are taken together, we would arrive at one common factor, which is the need of the
Saudi media (press, radio, and television) to rewrite its press policy, which has governed
the press since the time it was been transformed from a privately owned press
concentrating on literary and political subjects in 1963 to the present press institutions with
more or less modern subjects. The activation of the press policy and its development to
suit the changes of the present age and to enter the year 2000 will have an important role
to play in political, economic and social policies locally, regionally and internationally.
To treat the press channels as a mediator between the decision makers and factions of
society and adopting a two-way communication system from top (leadership) down (to
public) and vice versa is the best choice, compared to a top down media only. This is the
first important item open to discussion in the context of freedom of expression, based on
reasonable debate to serve the nation's interest.
Secondly, the performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict reflected a
combination of the authoritarian press and loyalty press models. Although, its attention
was given more to international news topics, sources, location, and personnel than those
from Saudi Arabia, the tone of all news toward all those countries, including Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait was positive and no criticism or question appeared toward the allied
governments, including the Saudi government policy. This reflects what we explained in
Chapter 2, the loyalty of journalists and what the Saudi press information policy meant
(see Appendix B). But the danger is that, while Saudi Arabia is a respected country, the
leader of the Islamic World, stable politically and to some degree economically, these
conditions were under threat since a small group of journalists, with no experience of
reporting or gathering news, themselves were in crisis. Their task was certainly
formidable. The content of the press during the course of the Gulf conflict, and from
opinions taken from both media academics and journalists, revealed a variation that can
not be taken for granted during the Gulf conflict Many questions would need to be
answered concurring the Gulf periods, such as why did Iraq invade Kuwait? Were
questions directed to Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which Iraq claimed had stolen
its oil? Was Saddam capable of producing chemical weapons? Why did some Arab
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leaders and their people blame only Saudi Arabia while Saudis were often involved
financially and emotionally with any Muslim conflict or humanity9 And so on.
This researcher then strongly predicts, based on the information presented previously, that
if the Saudi government does not take the initiative toward reforming the Saudi press
soon, the stability of Saudi Arabia will be in danger. The press, indeed, is one of the
major pillars of the national institutional framework of Saudi stability. Accordingly, the
following recommendations are suggested for the Saudi government and Saudi press:
Recommendations
The further development of the Saudi press is essential. The recommendations featured
here provide many opportunities for a new maturity, which will enable the Saudi
government, since it controls the Saudi press as well as broadcasting, to fulfil its
responsibilities to the nation with increasing confidence, accuracy and effectiveness. With
the Saudi government initiative, the press as we know is the fourth estate and this power
needs an authority to keep it within the limits granted to it by society, because the press
sometimes exaggerates to attract attention and by doing so may endanger national interests
or exceed its social obligations.
Encouraging 'fair performance' among professional journalists is the aim of these
recommendations, to help the Saudi press administrations to prepare their staff to achieve
knowledge and skills to do their job based on a high standard of performance Thus
suggestions are made for three major institutions: the Saudi government's Ministry of
Higher Education (Saudi Universities) and the Saudi Ministry of Information and the Saudi
press organisations.
Recommendations for the Saudi Government
1. Since Saudis' minds are not trained on a mass basis through the process of education,
it is dangerous to give the press unlimited freedom. It is difficult to have some form of
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professionalism which if achieved would satisfy the needs of society and achieve unity and
sovereignty. To this end, the Saudi universities which offer communication degrees
should review their curriculum and develop it in line with world changes. In addition, a
training centre in the Saudi press or in the Ministry of Information or through the Chamber
of Commerce should be set up to train new staff to shoulder their responsibility to the
Saudi society.
2. A Supreme Council for Information and establishment of a planning committee within
the Saudi Ministry of Information are needed.
Firstly, the Supreme Council for Information established in 1980 should be brought within
the control of the Ministry of Information. The reason for this first step is that, unlike the
current council which is not full-time, the Ministry of Information is an active and effective
organisation which interacts with events and an instrument of the government. Its major
job would be to approve proposals prepared from a planning Committee in the Saudi
Ministry of Information (more details will follow about this committee) and report it
directly to the Cabinet for final approval. The Minister of the Interior, as president of the
Supreme Council for Information, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Defence, the
President of the National Guard and Minister of Foreign Affairs should serve on this.
Also, the Editors-in- Chief of the Saudi press (seven people) should serve on this Council.
The Council would discuss Planning Committee proposals, make any requests and
comments before submitting them to the Council of Ministers for approval. As a result,
the effectiveness of Ministry of Information as well as the Saudi press would be evaluated
by this higher committee.
Second, a planning committee should be established in the Saudi Ministry of Information.
The aim is to secure more effective co-ordination of studies and research, planning,
promotion, communication and evaluation. The planning committee chairman should be
the Minister of Information or his assistant. Specialists in politics, economics, military
matters and psychology should serve on this committee. The planning committee would
determine the press/broadcasters' necessary research, time schedule, objectives, and
budget. The committee should set comprehensive national information policies linked to
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overall social, cultural and economic development objectives. The committee might need
to co-ordinate with bodies outside the government sector, such as the Departments of
Mass Communication in all Saudi universities, and firms hired in an advisory role. Hiring
employees who have taken survey courses in economics, management, and journalism and
broadcasting to conduct survey studies is vitally important. In addition, an information
centre should be developed that is equipped with the highest technology (including the
latest digital technology) in the Saudi Ministry of Information. The planning committee's
agenda/proposals will be presented to the Supreme Council for Saudi Information
Committee members for discussion and approval
However, before changes and the establishment of the two above committees, a
conference should be held in which the Ministry of Information, all Saudi press
organisations, the Ministry of Defence, and all these who are important in the press from
varied disciplines should be invited to participation. Participation should also be invited
from media experts from abroad. The aim is to discuses the Saudi press's
function/performance and theory and practice in the age of global information. In addition,
the role of media at war is an important area to be discussed. In short the first step in the
process of the planning committee would be to answer 'What should we do and why?'.
Recommendations for the Saudi Press
The Saudi press administration can begin without waiting for the recommendations
addressed to the Saudi government to be achieved. The press strategy is crucial to the
success of the performance of the press. However, many of the following
recommendations to the Saudi press were inferred from the Saudi media academics and
journalists interviewed. Thus, the press should do the following:
1. Establish departments in the press whose function would be to concentrate on political
and other studies, especially international relations and economics;
2. Create new jobs in the organisational structure, such as a political advisor and
a specialist in political studies;
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3. Co-operate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning information of a political,
economic, military and other nature;
4. Train journalists in the field of writing material of a political, economic and diplomatic
nature;
5. Seek help from consultative cadres from the political, economic, media and military
leadership s;
6. Make use of ambassadors and diplomats by offering them jobs after their retirement
from diplomatic work.
These proposals could help to create an atmosphere conducive to effective reporting.
They will also help the Saudi government or press before or when any new conflict occurs,
such as the Gulf conflict, and enhance the credibility of the Saudi government and press in
the eyes of public opinion, at home and abroad.
One last word to be addressed here is that the loyalty of the press based on emotion would
be likely to affect the nation's stability. Stability needs a more reasonable, open mind, and
wide vision to examine and discuss the realities facing Saudi Arabia.
Further Study
An attempt was made in this study to go beyond an investigation of the performance of the
Saudi press during the Gulf conflict, Saudi media academics' and journalists' opinions of
the Saudi press performance or the Saudi journalists' perception of their performance and
the press function in society during the war time. Thus, further study is needed.
1. If these changes and recommendation presented in the present study are not made, an
exploratory study based on 'focus groups' should be conducted to find out the exact
reasons and problems affecting the Saudi Ministry of Information which are preventing
them from implementing these suggestions and recommendations.
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2. A study should be conducted to serve the military personal in the Saudi Ministry of
Defence to find out their perception of the press during war time. The methodology used
in the present study should be used again. Such a study should be done by the Saudi
Ministry of Defence in order to gain a view from the military perspective.
3. A study should be conducted among the public, using the first part of this research'
survey (see Appendix F) to identify their opinion toward the press function in Saudi
society in peace and war time.
4. The present study was concerned only with press coverage during the conflict itself and
did not examine the impact of such coverage on the Saudi people. It would be of interest,
therefore, to study the long term effects of that coverage on Saudis' perceptions of the
conflict and the people involved in it.
However, once this further study has been done, along with the recommendations
presented earlier, obviously, much will have to change. The Saudi Ministry of Information
and Saudi press will clearly benefit. The Saudi press, then, will function in a more accurate
and objective way to serve the Saudi government and Saudi society as whole. As we enter
the next millennium, the millennium of a 'global information society' characterised by new
communications technologies (such as the intemet) which will themselves present fresh
challenges for the flow of information between government and people, nationally as well
as internationally, the problems identified in this thesis about a conflict fought 9 years from
the end of the century are, quite franldy, archaic in this new context. Patterns of change
are likely to accelerate still faster and if we cannot resolve even the most fundamental of
issues - such as the non-reporting of an invasion of a neighbouring state - the credibility of
the Saudi media system itself is at stake. Because of its relationship to the Saudi
government, the logical conclusion is that the very credibility of the Saudi government may
be at risk unless we address these issues now.
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Appendix A
UN Resolutions, Dates and Themes in Relating to the Gulf Conflict
(2 August - 29 November 1990)
Resolution # Date Theme
660 2 August 1990 Iraq must withdraw immediately and unconditionally.
661 6 August 199 Reaffirmed resolution 660 and imposed economic sanctions.
662 9 August 1990 Iraq to withdraw immediately and unconditionally.
664 18 August 1990 Iraq to permit and facilitate the immediate departure from
Kuwait of Kuwaiti nationals.
665 25 August 1990 To bring to an end the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq.
666 13 September 1990 Foodstuffs to be supplied.
667 16 September 1990 Iraq is responsible for the use of any violence against foreign
nationals.
669 24 September 1990 Recalled resolution 661 and made recommendations to the
Security Council for appropriate action.
670 25 October 1990 Iraq continued to occupy Kuwait and violated all previous
resolutions as well as international humanitarian law.
677 28 November 1990 Referred to the suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait as
a result of the invasion and occupation by Iraq.
678 29 November 1990 Recalled and reaffirmed all the above resolutions and vowed
to restore international peace and security in the area.
Note: Adapted from The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents and Opinions. (1991: 137-156) by
Charles Krauthammer. Edited by Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, Time Book,
USA: New York, Inc.
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Appendix B:
Saudi Arabia's Information Polk?
The information policy consists of the principles and the aims upon which information is based in the
kingdom and which are required by it. This policy is considered a part of the State's general policy
and it is defined in the following articles:
Article 1:
The Saudi Information abides by Islam in everything issued by it, keeps the doctrine of the ancestors
of this nation, and it excludes from all its media everything that contradicts God's Shari'a which
Allah enacted.
Article 2:
The Saudi Information seeks to oppose the destructive currents, the apostate directions, the hostile
philosophies, the attempts of diverting Muslims from their faith and it unveils their falseness and
brings to light their danger to individuals and societies in addition to resisting the hostile challenges
of information according to the State's general policy.
Article 3:
The information media persevere to serve the society through engraining its precious Islamic values
and establishing the magnanimous Arab customs and keeping its good inherited habits in addition to
resisting everything that spoils its purity and serenity. Moreover, those information media make
every conceivable effort to push forward the wheel of development in cooperation with the concerned
establishments in this field.
Article 4:
The information media persevere to stand up for the Kingdom's Policy which is based upon keeping
the sublime interest for the citizens particularly and those of the Arabs and Muslims generally
through the adoption of this Policy and presenting it in an objective manner supported by documents
and backed by attitudes and truths.
Article 5:
Internally and externally, the information media concentrate upon setting forth the distinguished
and unique character of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and uncover the things which have been given
to it by God, such as the blessing of stability and security in addition to the Kingdom's progress
facilitated by God in different fields because of its decision to consider Islam a constitution for its
regime and a code in life. Moreover, the information media show the blessing bestowed upon the
Kingdom by the Grace of God regarding the service of Muslims' sacrosanctities and the great
burden which it takes in this concern.
1 From The Saudi Media: Evolution and Progress (June, 1993: 160-168) by Al-Qimam House for
Mass Communication: Consultation - Research- Public Relations. However, the policy authorized
by the Council of Ministers, concerns decisions number 78 (dated 14- 5- 1400, AH) and 82, (dated
4- 6- 1402 All).
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Article 6:
The information media strengthen the bonds of love and cooperation among the individuals of Saudi
people through acquainting the citizens with the dear parts of their homeland and by means of
showing the resplendent sides in each of them together with the elucidation of their integrity and
mutual assistance in building this home country.
Article 7:
The information media deepen the sentiment of allegiance for the Saudi home country regarding
both its land and entity in the souls of the citizens and enlighten them on the abilities and potencies
bestowed to it by God in addition to acquainting them with its past and present feats and urging
them to give it generously and to contribute earnestly in its progress and its civilisation in addition
to protect it. Those media spare no effort to make the citizen know his fundamental duty in this
concern.
Article 8:
The Saudi Information gives the family the importance it deserves and looks at it as the main cell in
the society's structure and as the first school at which children receive their knowledge and
guidance. In fact, it considers the family as a place where the personalities of the young are formed
and their conduct is controlled. The Saudi information grants the family incessantly everything that
helps it realize its message and solidity.
Article 9:
The Saudi information affirms that the child is clear and pure by nature and it is a fertile soil, and
the image of the future society is seen through today's child. So, it has to give the recreational,
educational, and directive programs the effort and importance they deserve. To serve this purpose, it
must evaluate these programs upon studied, scientific, and pedagogical bases; in addition, to entrust
them to those who are highly qualified in this field.
Article 10:
Although it is not doubted that women are equals to men, the information media take into
consideration the depth of the woman's nature and the function entrusted to her by God. Depending
upon this, they plan to favour her with specific programme which help her perform the functions
that conform to her role in society.
Article 11:
The Saudi information favours the youths with a particular care which proceeds from the conscious
comprehension for the dangerous stage which they undergo from adolescence until the legal age.
Moreover, the information media devote to youths well studied programme which address their
problems, meet their needs, protect them from any deviation and gave them a sound and strong
preparation in religion, manners and behaviour.
Article 12:
The Saudi information pays attention to the information documentation through various audiovisual
aids for everything connected with the Kingdom's history and culture. Furthermore, it takes care of
keeping the documentation and registration materials of information in addition to acquiring
everything available in the country or abroad concerning those information materials pertinent to
the Kingdom and its legacy.
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Article 13:
The Saudi cadres undertake researches and information studies in cooperation with the social and
pedagogical institutions and the pertinent research centres.
Article 14:
The information media designate high standard educational programmes in diverse fields for the
highly cultured categories; the matter which answers the cultural and intellectual needs of these
groups, keeps them in touch with the advanced scientific life and acquaints them with the current
intellectual cultures.
Article 15:
The Saudi information aspires to promote the standard of the information material in all its fields
and encourages specialists to contribute to the field of their specialization. To serve the purpose, it
excludes any production which does not reach on excellent standard. Such a matter is executed
through qualified persons with a high standard of religion, knowledge, consciousness and fidelity,
provided that they are offered proper circumstances which enable them to fulfil their assignment.
Article 16:
The Saudi information seeks to accomplish the eradication of illiteracy and getting rid of it, feels its
important share of responsibility in treating it and employs a suitable portion of its efforts regarding
this treatment. To fulfil this aim, it depends on pedagogical and scientific bases, and designates
cultural programmes proper for all tastes and ages which elevate man's thought and conscience.
Article 17:
The Saudi information is convinced that standard Arabic is Islam's receptacle and it is the
depository of its culture and the source of its legacy. Such being the case, the Saudi information
strives for the following:
1. Directing the authors and script-writers to the necessity of abiding by the rules of standard Arabic
syntactically and morphologically and the integrity in expression and soundness in word usage.
2. Directing the announcers, newscasters, symposiums directors and others to the necessity of using
standard Arabic and to the avoidance of any pronunciation error whether it is
syntactical or morphological, in addition to observing the rules of correct rendition, is consistent
with Arabic's origins.
3. Paying attention to purify the information material presented through all information media of
everything that abuses standard Arabic language, makes it loathsome, or lessens its importance.
4. Encouraging the specialized magazines which are issued in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
particularly and in the Islamic and Arabic world generally according to the information policy.
5. Upgrading the language of the folklore programmes which are presented in the colloquial dialect
gradually and replacing it with the simplified standard language.
6. Encouraging programmes which serve the standard language, strengthen it with the educated
people, and clear it in the souls of the common people in addition to backing up the plays and the
series which are presented in it.
7. Contributing to teaching the standard language to those who are non-Arabic speakers from the
citizens of the Islamic countries according to the most advanced, scientific, and pedagogical
methods.
Article 18:
The Saudi information performs its share in backing up the cultural and scientific renaissance
through the following media:
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1. Encouraging researchers, scientists and intellectuals by every possible means including
participation in publishing their production and opening up opportunity for them to set forth
their activities publicly.
2. Taking care of the youthful talents and encouraging them both financially and morally and
looking after them until they reach the expected standard.
3. Undertaking to hold intellectual symposiums, literary and scientific conferences, and meetings
among the Kingdom's citizens and between them and their counterparts abroad with the aim of
contributing to the scientific life, opening the doors of the constructive dialogue and presenting the
Kingdom's scientific and cultural activity inside the country and abroad.
4. Encouraging the national publication houses and backing them up financially and morally in
order to do their duty in publishing the serious Saudi books and putting the incentives which
enable them to distribute Saudi books widely inside the Kingdom and abroad, in addition to the
encouragement of setting up book exhibitions, the matter which elucidates the Kingdom's
scientific rank and the high standard reached in science and intellectualism.
Article 19:
The Saudi information is convinced of the importance of the legacy and of the pressing necessity to
vitalize it. So, the Saudi information undertakes doing its share in this regard by different means and
especially the following measures:
1. Encouraging the publication of useful legacy, materially and spiritually, through various means of
which the following are the most important:
a. Preparing programmes which acquaint citizens with the most important books and indicate they
are available.
b. Supporting their verifiers (sic) either by printing the books at the expense of the State or by
purchasing enough copies out of what is printed from those books.
c. Facilitating the measures of access to the legacy books for those who are concerned in them.
2. Counteracting all the attempts aiming at destroying the legacy or lessening its importance.
3. Encouraging programmes which take their material from the legacy books, especially in the field
of stories, plays, series and literary biographies.
4. Displaying masterpieces from the legacy books, acquainting people with the efforts of our
ancestors in the various fields of knowledge, and informing them about the glorious achievements
realized by their forefathers and asking them to connect the present time of this nation with its
respectable past.
Article 20:
The Saudi information media make every conceivable effort to confirm the ties of fraternity, mutual
assistance, and joint liability among the Muslims. They seek to combine their hearts with each other
by means of acquainting them with the Islamic peoples and their countries in addition to making the
spiritual and material abilities known together with enlightening them on the good that may prevail
them all as a result of their cooperation and mutual assistance.
Article 21:
The Saudi information calls the Arabs to:
a. Joint liablility, cooperation, unanimity on rightness, and remoteness from everything that serves
their bonds.
b. Defending their causes and their critical problems on various occasions and urging them to do
their duty ... Fin standing] up for the religion of Islam besides defending it since God has
bestowed the honour of Islam upon them.
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Article 22:
The Saudi information makes sure that the call for God among Muslims and other peoples is existing
and eternal until God inherits the earth and everything on it. Embracing this belief, it accomplishes
its share in carrying out this great duty, following the manner of judiciousness and religious
exhortation in its calling for God, depending upon addressing the mind and avoiding everything that
might arouse, rancour of others.
Article 23:
The Saudi institutes of information work with their counterparts in the Islamic world generally and
the Arab world particularly to adopt a unified information .. . [ ideological] which serves Muslims'
earthly and heavenly interests, respects their civilized and ideational unity and makes their hearts
on intimate terms.
Article 24:
The Saudi information affirms the respect of individuals' rights concerning their properties and the
rights of groups regarding their common things. At the same time, it acts to ingrain the spirit of
social reciprocal responsibility among the individuals of the nation, together with developing the
natural disposition of cooperation and sacrifice in the souls and notifying the citizens of their direct
responsibility toward their society.
Article 25:
The Saudi information relies on objectivity in displaying the truths and on remoteness from
exaggeration and alterations. Furthermore, it deeply appreciates the honour of the word and the
necessity of protecting it from futility and it avoids everything that might stir grudges or awaken
dissensions and hatred.
Article 26:
Freedom of expression in the information media is guaranteed within the national and Islamic aims
and values which are observed by the Saudi Information.
Article 27:
The Saudi information turns in its exterior relations towards a humanitarian direction built on
respect for man's ability to lead a life of liberty in his native land and disapproves of all kinds of
aggression which affect the rights of the people and the individuals. In addition to that, it struggles
against the expansion ambitions, backs up the truth, justice, and peace and opposes injustice and
racial discrimination.
Article 28:
The Policy of Information affirms the importance of preparing cultured and experienced manpowers
which are capable of realizing the aims of the Saudi information, in addition to taking care of these
capabilities by constant guidance and training.
Article 29:
The Saudi information encourages the production of good local information materials corresponding
with the Policy of Information.
Article 30:
All the information Institutions in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia shall abide by this Policy and by the
regulations and the rules issued for its implementation.
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Appendix C
Questions in the Research Study: To Saudi Media Academics and Journalists
The main questions planned for the interviews are listed below. However, it should be noted that
these were semi-structured interviews; prompts and supplementary questions were added as needed.
Moreover, interviewees' comments sometimes raised issues beyond the scope of the original schedule,
which it was interesting to follow up. These are reflected in the interview report in Chapter 4.
Ql. Like any other area in the Arab World, the Gulf region is rather more reactive than proactive
(militarily, economically and socially) towards threats. The press is faced with the task of
interpreting the environment and what is really being planned or prepared. So, do you believe that
before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Iraq's subsequent threat to the rest of the Gulf States, the
Saudi press had identified the threat, particularly in view of conflict preceding the military
occupation? If the Saudi press did not identify the threat, what was its role during the political
conflict and why? And, do you think the press covered the conflict thoroughly by publicising the
common view point, and/ or, predicting the future trends of the conflict and why?
Q2. After the Iraq invasion and occupation of Kuwait until the liberation of Kuwait, do you believe
that the Saudi press performance was changed? To what extent was the Saudi press able to present
relevant news and information and why?
Q3. It is inevitable that a clash would develop between the optimism of the Saudi press and the
stubbornness of the Iraqis on how to get out of the conflict. How did the Saudi press interact with, or
to what extent was it opposed to, the Iraqi press, since each press followed its respective government
policy? Why did it react in this way?
Q4. CNN breaks the news first, wherever, whatever and under any circumstances that it can. It is
argued that is a primary source of news and information and affects not only international public
opinion but also the decision - makers of governments over the world. So, the Saudi press during the
Gulf conflict, particularly in the actual war, faced a challenge from CNN in making and presenting
the news. To what extent did this challenge affect the Saudi press in its coverage and why?
Q5. It is commonly believed that the military and the press view each other with suspicion. The
military desire to act away from the press, while the press always desire to cover events fully and get
the facts. To what extent do you think this statement is true? If otherwise, how do you conceive the
relationship between the military and the press and why?
Q6. Do you think the Saudi press performance was changed as a result of the social, political,
economic and psychological impacts of the Gulf conflict, particularly after the liberation of Kuwait
and why?
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Appendix D
Definitions of Main News Topics
News items were classified according to their predominant subject-matter, into 12 categories. For
coding purposes, the following definitions were used:
1. Political news is defined as news referring to the movements, meetings, actions and speeches of
governments members or bodies, or of other groups, organisations, institutions and communities in
relation to a political matter, e.g. the government stance on conflict-related issues.
2. Military/defence news is defined as news concerning the activities of the Ministry of Defence,
officials and military officers, visits to military units and facilities, the Armed forces' preparation for
mobilisation and deployment, allied operations, the military situation, casualties and prisoners of
war.
3. Economic news is defined as news predominantly concerned with prices, financial/trading reports
of companies, government revenues and expenditures, loans and subsidies, foreign debts and the
imposition and effect of economic sanctions.
4. Social service news is defined as news concerning the efforts of statutory and voluntary agencies
in the fields of health care; medical, food or other aid given in cases of accident and emergency;
advice and counselling.
5. Crime/law/justice news is defined as news concerning crime committed by individuals or groups
against persons or property; vice; the failure of individual or groups to function co-operatively
within society, the depiction of certain groups as anti-social, dishonest or corrupt.
6. Sport news is defined as news announcing or reporting any professional or amateur sporting
matter, contest or festival, describing the preparations for such an event; discussion of sporting rules
and trends and announcement of the transfers (e.g. signing, retirement of sporting personalities).
7. Education news is defined as news concerning education policy, educational achievements, or the
activities of any public or private educational institutions, including the opening or closure of such
institutions or disruption of their programme as a result of the conflict.
8. Ecology/environment news is defined as news concerning plant and animal life, habitats, and
natural or human- induced conditions affecting then, e.g. temperature changes, pollution of air, land
or water.
9. Nature disasters/accidents are defined as incidents beyond human control, or unforeseen events,
leading to destruction of property, personal injury or loss of life, e.g. fire, drought, flood,
earthquake, famine etc.
10. Religious news is defined as news concerning religious observations and festivals, discussion of
religious obligations, and reports of the pronouncements and judgements of religious scholars.
11. Multi-issues are defined as items which contain elements of two or more of the above categories,
such that no single category clearly predominates.
12. "Other" items are defined as articles or items which do not fall within the scope of any of the
aforementioned categories, such as poetry, reports of cultural activities, news about popular
personalities such as singers, "human interest", etc.
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Appendix E
Code Sheet2
	1. Tick the newspaper selected : Riy 	
 ( )
	
Oka 	
 ( )
	
Yau 	 ( )
2. Write the Date, Month, Year of newspaper issued (for one week from / / 	 to / / ).
3. Tick the period of study: Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
	 ( )
2 July 1990 - 1 August 1990
During the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait 	
 ( )
2 August 1990 - 16 Jan, 1991
The liberation of Kuwait 	 ( )
17 Jan 1991- 28 Feb., 1991
After the liberation of Kuwait
	 ( )
1 March, 1991- 30 March, 1991
1. Encode Main News Theme, Type (domestic, International or Foreign) and tone. Is it Positive (P)
r Negative 9
Domestic type of news International type of news Foreign type of news
Main news topic P N P N P N
Political
Military/Defence
Economic
Social Service
Crime/Law/Justice
Sport
Education
Ecology/ Environment
Natural disasters/accident
Religious
Multi-issues
Other
2
. Reduced for the original size.
(for one newspaper, each issue )
Theme
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2. Write the main themes of news items related to the Gulf conflict and their frequency
3. Write the main themes of news items related to the Gulf conflict and their frequencies
for all news a ers each issue
.	 .
Theme Riy
F
Oka
F
Yau
F
Riy, Oka & Yau
F
4. Encode the Origin of Personnel covered in news story presented. Is it related [RI to the Gulf
Conflict or not ?
.	 .
The Personnel RNRNRNRN R NRN R N
SA Government
Yemen
Sudan
Iraq
Libya
Jordan
PLO
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
North American
Latin American
Australia
Africa
Asia/Pacific
Middle East
Multi Region
UN
Allied Coalition
Individual
- Domestic
- International
- Foreign
Institution
- Domestic
- International
- Foreign
Multi- Region
Unidentifiable
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5. Encode the Geographic Locations of News Story. Is it related	 to the Gulf conflict or not	 ?
Geographic origin R N R N R NR NRN R N R N
Saudi Arabia
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
North American
Latin American
Africa
Asia/Pacific
Middle East
Multi- region
UN
Unidentifiable
6. Encode the Source of News Story. Is it related	 to the Gulf conflict or not 	 ?
Source R N R N R N R NR NRNRN
Own Staff
,
SPA 
Reuters
AFP
TASS
AP
UPI
Other media- home
Other media foreign
Private Citizens
Public Officials
Multi Sources
Other Agencies
Unidentifiable
7. Write the theme of leading article or headline if it reflects a theme of the leading article related
to the Gulf Conflict
Theme	 Name of newspaper (
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Appendix F
The Results of Research Hypotheses
and the Subhypotheses (I, HI, I V, V & VI)
The Results of Research Hypotheses and Subhypotheses Studied during the Iraqi Invasion and
Occu ation of Kuwait
Newspapers Hypotheses # Low
Limits
Upper
Limits
Observe
Percentage
against
the Null
hypotheses
Results Conclusions
Riy Ia. 1 79.91 83.73 20.68 SD S
Oka Ia. 2 78.4 87.72 16.94 SD S
Yau Ia. 3 75.69 84.87 19.72 SD S
Riy, Oka & Yau la 78.09 83.35 19.28 SD S
Riy lb. 1 7.09 14.69 89.11 SD R
Oka lb. 2 18.41 30.13 75.73 SD R
Yau lb. 3 7.88 16.26 87.93 SD R
Riy, Oka & Yau lb __ 12.68 18.06 84.63 SD R
Riy Ic. 1 89.88 96.12 7 SD S
Oka lc. 2 90.98 97.36 5.83 SD S
Yau Ic. 3 87.78 94.98 8.62 SD S
Riy, Oka & Yau Ic 91.83 93.79 7.18 SD S
Riy DI. 1 14.15 22.61 81.62 SD R
Oka DI 2 12.28 21.6 83.06 SD R
Yau DI. 3 8.7 16.3 87.50 SD
Riy, Oka & Yau HI 12.85 18.97 84.09 SD R
Riy IV. 1 29.73 40.03 65.12 SD R
Oka IV. 2 31.58 43.83 62.29 SD R
Yau IV. 3 13.12 22.3 82.29 SD R
Rip, Oka & Yau IV 26.77 32.89 70.17 SD R
Riy V. 1 50.47 61.33 44.10 SD S
Oka V. 2 53.22 65.48 40.65 SD S
Yau V. 3 24.43 35.01 70.28 SD R
Riy, Oka & Yau V 44.78 51.48 51.87 SD R
, Riy, Oka & Yau VI 32.27 I 50.61 I 58.56 I SD I R
S=
 Support (Hypothesis is supported)
R= Reject (Hypothesis is rejected)
Sl".3 Statistically significant
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The Results of Research Hypotheses and Subhypotheses Studied during the Liberation of Kuwait
Newspapers Hypotheses # Low
Limits
Upper
Limits
Observe
Percentage
against
the Null
hypotheses
Results Conclusions
Riy la. 1 79.83 87.19 16.49 SD S
Oka Ia. 2 68.53 77.79 26.84 SD S
Yau Ia. 3 82.86 89.56 13.79 SD S
Riy, Oka & You la 79.02 83.52 18.73 SD S
Riy lb. 1 4.3 9.9 92.90 SD R
Oka lb. 2 11.03 15.23 86.87 SD R
Y au lb. 3 4.69 10.17 92.57 SD R
Riy, Oka & You lb 7.08 10.72 91.10 SD R
Riy Ic. 1 89.73 95.45 7.41 SD S
Oka Ic. 2 92.8 97.94 4.63 SD S
Yau Ic. 3 89.49 95.09 7.71 SD S
Riy, Oka & Yau Ic 91.64 94.86 6.75 SD S
Pay LEL 1 14.72 22.36 81.36 SD
Oka HI. 2 13.08 20.92 83.00 SD R
Y au DI. 3 9.01 15.43 87.78 SD R
Riy, Oka & You Di 13.74 17.98 84.14 SD R
Riy IV. 1 29.66 34.42 67.96 SD R
Oka N. 2 27.75 32.65 69.80 SD R
Y au IV. 3 13.87 21.27 82.43 SD R
Riy, Oka & You IV 21.06 26 76.47 SD R
Riy V. 1 37.4 47.28 57.66 SD R
Oka V. 2 43.55 54.13 51.16 SD S
Y au V.3 32.1 41.54 63.10 SD R
Rh', Oka & You V 39.47 45.23 57.65 SD R
Riy, Oka & You VI	 I 29.63 I 46.79 1 61.79	 1 SD 1 R
S= Support (Hypothesis is supported)
R= Reject (Hypothesis is rejected)
ST:. Statistically significant
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The Results of Research Hypotheses and Subh ypotheses Studied after the Liberation of Kuwait
Newspapers Hypotheses # Low
Limits
Upper
Limits
Observe
Percentage
against
the Null
hypotheses
Results Conclusions
Riy Ia. 1 55.17 79.31 32.76 SD S
Oka Ia. 2 56.05 83.49 30.23 SD S
Y au Ia. 3 76.72 93.14 15.07 SD S
Riy, Oka & Yau Ia 68.88 81.70 24.71 SD S
Riy lb. 1 - 4.96 7.52 97.44 SD R
Oka lb. 2 3.34 30 83.33 SD R
Y au lb. 3 2.31 17.05 90.32 SD R
Riy, Oka & Yau lb 4.22 14.10 90.83 SD R
Riy Ic. 1 100 100 00 SD S
Oka Ic. 2 100 100 00 SD S
Y au Ic. 3 87.43 99.67 6.45 SD S
Riy, Oka & Yau Ic 94.01 99.89 3.05 SD S
Riy LEL 1 6.34 14.34 89.66 SD R
Oka M. 2 5.74 29.26 82.50 SD R
Y au HI. 3 2.96 17.04 90 SD R
Rip, Oka & Yau DI 7.00 16.80 88.10 SD R
Riy N. 1 19.13 42.93 68.97 SD R
Oka IV. 2 13.66 41.34 72.50 SD R
Y au N. 3 6.23 13.21 90.28 SD R
Riy, Oka & Yau IV 15.05 27.31 78.82 SD R
Riy V. 1 28.24 54.78 58.49 SD R
Oka V.2 15.79 44.21 70 SD R
Y au V. 3 53.99 77.27 34.37 SD S
Riy, Oka & Yau V 40.49 56.23 51.59 SD R
Riy, Oka & Yau VI	 I 32.61 78.51 44.44	 I SD I R
S= Support (Hypothesis is supported)
R= Reject (Hypothesis is rejected)
Statistically significant
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Appendix G
Questionnaire for Saudi Journalists
Dear journalist
I am surveying journalists' perceptions of the Saudi Arabian Press function in time of war and their
satisfaction with its actual performance during the Gulf conflict (1990-1991). This research is a part
of my academic research for a Ph. D thesis and will also influence the development of new
journalistic functions as well as the role of the Saudi press performance in conflict or/ and peace
time.
Your answers will help further the knowledge and development of the functions of newspapers.
The survey should take less than 15 minutes to complete. All replies will be confidential, and will
only be used for the purpose of this research.
Thank you in advance for your contribution to my research.
Sincerely
Abdrahman M. Al- Kahtani
Institute of Communications Studies
University of Leeds
Leeds LS2 9JT
UK
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This survey is divided into three parts. The first part asks about your perceptions of the function of
Saudi press in war time. The second part deals with your views and satisfaction on of the
performance of the Saudi press during the Gulf conflict, with reference to the Gulf war. Finally, the
third part deals with general characteristics about you so your answer can be compared with others
who are taking the survey.
Part 1 - Your perception of the function of Saudi press in war time.
1- Listed below are some statements about the essence of the function (performance of press. For
each of the following statements, please indicate if you are strongly agree (SA), agree(A),
undecided (U), disagree (D), strongly disagree (SD). (please make circle around your indication)
1. The press should be accurate and objective.
SA A U D	 SD
2. The press should seek to fully report as many sides of the issue as possible.
SA A U D	 SD
3. The press should convey information to the public.
SA A U D	 SD
4. The press should be a credible reference source.
SA A U D	 SD
5. The press should expose crime and the depth of war.
SA A U D	 SD
6. The press should inform readers of forthcoming events.
SA A U D	 SD
7. The press should provide background information to help readers understand events.
SA A U D	 SD
8. The press should publish pictures that help explain or clarify the written story.
SA A U D	 SD
9. The press is a community's most important instrument for bringing together all elements of the
war events.
SA A U D	 SD
10. The press should emphasise local and military news.
SA A U D	 SD
11. The press should print stories that are interesting and informative although not necessarily
timely.
SA A U D	 SD
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12. The press should depend on information releases distributed by publicity officials.
SA A U D	 SD
13. Information should be a factor in the selection of what news and information ought to go into the
press.
SA A U D
	
SD
14. The press should be able to sacrifice some accuracy in reporting if it means getting the news out
before any of the other news media.
SA A U D
	
SD
15. The press should present a variety of political, social and military issues directly or indirectly
related to the war.
SA A U D
	 SD
16. The press should assist in the promotion of worthy causes.
SA A U D
	
SD
17. The press should try to print some "good" news.
. SA A U D	 SD
18. The press should provide citizens with more information about the danger to the country in
case of attack by the enemy such as bombing of cities, chemical warfare, tricks,. . etc.
SA A U D	 SD
19. The press should offer its opinions on war events through its leading page.
SA A U D	 SD
20. The press should protect its readers against propaganda and false statements.
SA A U D	 SD
21. The press should help authorities avoid publishing content that might violate the public trust.
SA A U D
	
SD
22. The press should interpret stories that appear in local and foreign mass media.
SA A U D
	
SD
23. The press should attempt to guide public opinion after impartially presenting the different sides
of an issue.
SA A U D
	
SD
24. The press should print only those photographs which have news value.
SA A U D	 SD
25. The press has no obligation to separate fact from opinion.
SA A U D	 SD
26. The press should promote public service.
SA A U D
	 SD
27. The press should be required to correct all printed errors, deliberate or unintentional, as soon as
possible.
SA A U D
	
SD
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28. The press should be responsible to follow up officials' mistakes and inform the public
about them.
SA A U D	 SD
29. The press' function - as a mass medium - should be different from that of the electronic media
(that is, radio and television).
SA A U D	 SD
30. The press should support and advance the policies of the government.
SA A U D	 SD
31. The press should promote what the people want during the war time.
SA A U D	 SD
32 . The press should present material that is not morally and religiously objectionable during the
war time.
SA A U D
	
SD
32. The press should be the voice of its readers.
. SA A U D	 SD
34. The press should entertain readers.
SA A U D	 SD
35. The press should run photographs that don't offend the readers.
SA A U D
	
SD
36. The press should be neat and attractive in appearance.
SA A U D
	
SD
37. The press should inform its readers about political and military developments during the war
time.
SA A U D
	
SD
38. The press should refrain from use of information that might damage the national image of Saudi
Arabia or the allies.
SA A U D	 SD
39. The press should be a crusader.
SA A U D
	 SD
40. There ought to be an agency of some kind to see that the press acts in the right direction
SA A U D	 SD
41. The press is more a public utility than a private enterprise.
SA A U D	 SD
42. The press should follow the Saudi Arabian policy and not be dictated to by anybody during
the war time.
SA A U D	 SD
43. The press' regulation should come from the press' journalists.
SA A U D	 SD
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44. The press should have access to all meetings of government and others who have influence in
order to act as a mediator.
SA A U D	 SD
Part 2 - Your views and satisfaction with the performance of the Saudi press
in the time of the Gulf conflict.
45a. How would you rate the job the Saudi Press did in covering the Gulf conflict,
particularly during the time of actual fighting? ( please choose only one ):
(a): Excellent 	 11
(b): Good 	 II
(c):	 Fair	 11
(d): Not good 	 1	 1
45b. Please specify why you chose this answer
46. Which Saudi media most adequately covered the Gulf conflict, particularly during the time of
actual fighting? ( Please choose only one):
(a): The Saudi Arabian Radio 	
 I 1
(b): The Saudi Arabian Television 	  [ I
(c): The Saudi Arabian Press 	
 11
47. Human beings within the information age use a variety of knowledge sources. The local press
was one source of information about political, military and economic development and other
subjects during the Gulf conflict. Do you believe, from your own experience that the press
was the first source through which you followed developments?
Yes 	
 1 1
No 	
 II
48. Which of these was the main source of information and news about the Gulf conflict for you?
( Please choose only one):
The Saudi Arabian Radio(a): [1
The Saudi Arabian Television 1	 1(b):
The Saudi Arabian Press(c): [1
(d ): Other source (e.g., CNN, BBC, VOA) -[ I
Please state which source 	
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49. During a conflict any country follows a different information policy and deals with the press
and broadcasting organisations differently than during the peace time. As a result, the press
might not give the readers all information and news; which of the following factors limit the
press information and news? ( Please tick as many boxes as appropriate).
Insufficient information and facts available
to the press organisations 	
 [I
Conformity to the new information policy 	 I l
Co-operation with the government in
treatment of the crisis to compilation of its
military strategies and tactics 	 [I
- The benefits that the enemy could gain in
their military plans and psychological
operations 	 El
- Other 	 II
50. How necessary was the requirement by military authorities that the media "pool" their
reports to be submitted to the 'Joint Information Bureau' (JIB) to be examined and censored
by military information officers during the Gulf conflict and particularly during the fighting?
(please choose only one).
Very necessary 	
 [ I
Somewhat necessary 	
 [I
Somewhat unnecessary 	
 I I
Unnecessary 	
 [ I
51. From the point of view of military commanders there are many reasons why sources of military
information, communiqués and news should be controlled by the military and should not be
seen by citizens or given to journalists for publication. In your opinion, which of the following
justifications are valid? ( Please tick as many boxes as appropriate).
A journalist would normally tend to publish stories
which excite and attract the reader 	
 [1
A journalist often takes refuge in the concept
of 'objectivity' 	
 [1
A journalist may be considered as a 'spy' 	
 11
A journalist is not capable of dealing adequately
with war issues and the cannot fully treat even
a tiny part of these issues 	
 [1
A journalist thrives on conflict rather than
conflict resolution 	
 II
Other reason 	
 [I
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52. What were the reasons for dissatisfaction with press coverage the Gulf conflict by S. A.
Journalists? ( Please tick as many boxes as appropriate).
[1 . Not informative enough
[ J . Boring
[ 1. Repetitive
[ 1. Too little coverage
11 . Not always trustworthy
[ ]. Too much speculation
[ 1. Too much space devoted to the war
[I . Unethical news
[ 1. Did not always keep to the facts
[ ]. Not very balanced
1 1. Not up- to - date
[ 1. Other reasons; ( please specify below )
53. Please rank the main news topics that should to be devoted space by the press in terms of their
importance to the Saudi Arabian society during the Gulf war time. ( Write 1 next to the
topic/issue you think most important, 2 next to the second and so on, until number 12).
Main News Topic Rank
Military/Defence
Politics
Religion
Economics
Crime/Law/Justice
Natural Disasters/Accidents
Social	 Services
Ecology/Environment
Science/Technology
Sports
Education
, Culture/arts
54. There was a difference of opinion between the analysts and the critics regarding the
publication of Saddam Hussein's speeches and their effect on European, American and Arab
countries (e.g., CNN) during the Gulf conflict. Which of the following two views do you
accept?
Publication helped the world to understand
better that Saddam was the aggressor
as well as prompting the world take the necessary
steps to intervene 	
 [1
Publication helped Saddam gain support
from some Arab nations for his invasion of
Kuwait, and created suspicion about the
ability of Arab leaders and their governments
to solve the problem and convince their
respective people and the world of their policies 	 [I
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55. Report of negative events such as coalition planes being shot down, the bombing of a
bunker/shelter in Baghdad that resulted in heavy civilian casualties, coalition pilots captured by
Iraqi , coalition air attacks on Iraq forces along with the road to Basra when Iraq forces were
with drawing from Kuwait, Saudi Military dead in the al- IChafji; What would be the outcome
if these were concurrently reported? ( Please choose only one).
- Reporting all negative events could support the
Saudi government and its mass media, by reducing
the likelihood of the audiences looking at
other media, which might present the
outcomes of the event in a way that led to perturbation
in the military and the nation as a whole 	
 [1
- Reporting all negative events could lead to lack
of confidence in both sides of the government and
mass media and more confusion and attention
could occur in the military force and nation 
	
 [1
56. How closely are you now following the news and the results of the Gulf conflict? ( please
choose only one).
Very closely 	
 11
Fairly closely 	
 F'
Not too closely 	
 I'
Not at all closely 	
 F]
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Part 3 - About You
What is your title? 	
How many years have you been in the academic or journalist profession? Please tick
only one box
[ ] 15 or more years
[ 1 5 - 14 years
[ ] Less than 5 years
Have you ever worked in an academic institution or press organisation different
from the one you are currently employed by? Please tick only one box
[ ] No
[ ] Yes, on the "university" side
[ 1 Yes, on the agency/ consulting side
[ 1 Yes ( other, please specify) 	
What is your highest level of formal education? Please tick only one box
[ 1 Below High School
[J High School
[ I BA/BSc
[ ] Diploma
[ ] MA/MSc
[ 1 PhD
[ 1 Other, Please specify 	
What was your major field of study? 	
Here are basic demographic questions.
SEX.	 (a). Male 	
 1 1
(b). Female 	  [ 1
AGE	 20-24 [ 1	 25-29 [ ]	 30-34 [ 1
35-39 [ 1
	 40-44 [ 1	 45-49 1 1
50-54 11	 55-59 [ 1	 60 - or more 1 ]
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Are there any other comments or suggestions that you would like to make regarding the subject of
war and media or the development of Saudi press functions in society during war time?
Please return this questionnaire to your head of department or to the secretary
Bibliography
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